



antisemitismus  
meldestelle

# Antisemitic cases 2024 in Austria

ISRAELITISCHE KULTUSGEMEINDE WIEN



**Coverfoto:**

A flag of Israel, adorned with a black mourning ribbon in solidarity with the hostages taken on October 7, and displayed at the Vienna City Temple, is torn down in the early morning hours by two Swedish women (aged 18 and 28). They break the flagpole and attempt to set the flag on fire. The cover photo shows the flag with burn holes that was confiscated by the police. ([see page. 15](#))

**Imprint**

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1010 Vienna, Seitenstettengasse 4

Tel. +43/1/531 04-0

E-Mail: [office@ikg-wien.at](mailto:office@ikg-wien.at)

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
## 1. Summary

The Reporting Centre for Antisemitism (Antisemitismus-Meldestelle) of the Jewish Community of Vienna (IKG Wien) recorded a total of 1,520 antisemitic incidents in 2024. Compared to 1,147 incidents in 2023, this represents an increase of 32.5%, marking yet another negative record. The year 2024 continued to be shaped by the genocidal large-scale attack by Palestinian terrorist organisations on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the resulting war, which persisted beyond the end of the reporting period.

The number of antisemitic incidents reached its previous peak in December 2023 with 294 incidents, then dropped in January 2024 to 218 incidents, still the third-highest monthly figure since records began. On average, there were 4.15 incidents per day throughout the year, which is an increase compared to 2023 (3.14 incidents per day), but represents a halving compared to the period from October 7, 2023 to the end of that year (8.13 incidents per day).

This report does not provide a complete overview of antisemitism in Austria. A significant number of unreported cases is assumed, which, due to the special circumstances and challenges after October 7, 2023, is likely even higher than in previous years. Only antisemitic incidents that were reported and that, upon review by the experts at the Antisemitism Reporting Centre according to the [IHRA definition](#) (see Methodology, p. 22), were clearly verified as antisemitic are included in the statistics.


Antisemitic incidents (in total)



Of the 1,520 incidents, there were:


24 physical assaults (2023: 18)	616 mass mailings (2023: 536)
38 threats (2023: 18)	626 incidents of abusive behaviour (2023: 426)
216 incidents of damage and desecration (2023: 149)	

2024: Antisemitic incidents (in total)



After a peak in antisemitic incidents in December 2023, the number of incidents noticeably decreased. Certain events (such as the Rafah Offensive in May or the Austrian National Council elections and their consequences in the fall, [see Graph on page 21](#)) led to spikes in cases, the level of which remained high nonetheless ([see also page 20, ideological background](#)).

Changes in the number of reported incidents since 2009



Changes in the number of reports (\*no report for 2018)

## 2. Commentary

### 2.1. Another Year Marked by October 7, 2023

The genocidal violence of “October 7” continued to have an impact on 2024. The large-scale attack by Palestinian terrorist organisations on Israel, with 251 hostages taken to Gaza, along with a simultaneous multi-front war against Israel – through attacks from Gaza, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon – led to predictable military responses from Israel, especially in the Gaza Strip. This was clearly part of the [strategic calculation by Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organisations: using human shields as sacrifices](#) was meant not only to increase international pressure on Israel, but also to open an additional front – one against Jews worldwide. Both goals were achieved.

For example, ESRA, the psychosocial centre of the Jewish Community of Vienna (IKG), provided additional support or treatment to more than 500 individuals in connection with the consequences of October 7. Nevertheless, after the rapid and disruptive events of the first weeks and months following October 7, a kind of habituation effect set in. The wave of antisemitic incidents against Jewish students highlighted in last year’s report began to subside in early 2024 – but this is also because many affected children and adolescents had to change schools. Antisemitism in schools and other educational institutions hasn’t disappeared since, but is now simply targeted at Jews less directly.

Even long after October 7, the burdensome feeling and persistent fear in everyday life – whether at university, at work, at home, or generally in public spaces – remain present. This leads Jews to adopt conscious and unconscious precautionary behaviour in many areas of life:

“Am I wearing clothes or symbols that might make me appear Jewish?”

“What language do I use in public conversations?”

“What topics do I bring up in social settings?”

“Do I go to certain places?”

For Jews, grappling with these and similar questions was already a constant before October 7; since then, this internal weighing of pros and cons has become a pervasive and omnipresent part of everyday life, with significant psychological consequences. Across Europe, Jews report having restricted their everyday habits and activities. Some illustrative findings from a [survey conducted by the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee](#) in March and April 2024 include:

- 78% of respondents feel less safe as Jews in their cities compared to before the Hamas attack.
- 38% of all respondents—and nearly half (46%) of those under 40—say they have become alienated from their non-Jewish friends.

- 32% stated they were „less inclined to wear a necklace or a T-shirt with Jewish symbols.”
- 25% stated they were „less inclined to wear a kippah.”

An empirically observable development since at least 2022 is the growing number of attacks against Jewish children and adolescents, as well as the young age of the perpetrators. Alarming insights into increasing antisemitic attitudes among 16- to 25-year-olds are provided by the recently published [Antisemitism Study of the Parliament](#)<sup>1</sup>. Among youths in Austria, individuals who speak Arabic or Turkish were disproportionately more likely to agree with explicitly antisemitic statements.

## 2. 2. Normalisation and Shift

The habituation effect mentioned above is also reflected in public discourse: as the conflict continues, the boundaries of what can be said have increasingly shifted, while certain narratives and modes of discourse have gained broader social acceptance. This shift of boundaries, which is also promoted internationally, is especially prevalent when it comes to the State of Israel.

As was already emphasised in the 2023 report, it must once again be explicitly stated that criticism of the State of Israel – or even offensive or slanderous remarks about Israel – cannot in and of themselves be automatically classified as antisemitic. The working definition of antisemitism used by the Antisemitism Reporting Centre, which is widely recognised ([see Chapter 5.1: Working Definition of Antisemitism, p. 22](#)), also makes this abundantly clear:

“Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

Excerpt from the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism

Nevertheless, numerous national and international actors continue to deliberately misrepresent this definition and the critique of Israel-related antisemitism. There are claims, for instance, that any criticism of Israel or aspects of Israeli policy (such as its conduct of the war) is automatically “defamed” as antisemitic. This intentional shifting of boundaries often has the character of a coordinated campaign and is unfortunately also driven by representatives of international human rights organisations.

In addition to the explanation of the definition provided in every report, we would also like to refer to the [“Handbook for the Practical Use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism”](#)<sup>2</sup> from 2021. This was commissioned by the European Commission and jointly published

1 <https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Antisemitismus-2024>

2 [https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/RIAS\\_Pressemitteilung\\_Handbook\\_IHRA\\_Working\\_Definition.pdf](https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/RIAS_Pressemitteilung_Handbook_IHRA_Working_Definition.pdf)

with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), with the support of the German EU Council Presidency, the handbook was produced by our partners from the [German Bundesverband RIAS \(Chapter 3, p. 12\)](#).

### 2. 3. Glorification of Terrorism

Also fitting within the context of this shifting of boundaries is the already documented, partly open glorification of terrorism—both through coded language and openly. The red “ [Hamas triangles](#),”<sup>3</sup> for example, are highly popular symbols within certain scenes. They not only appear frequently on social media but also as graffiti or banners in public spaces. While this symbol has been punishable in Germany since November 2024 as a [sign of a terrorist organisation](#)<sup>4</sup> (in this case Hamas), in Austria it remains widespread both online and offline.

The deaths of antisemitic terrorist leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar (both Hamas), or Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah) during military actions were publicly mourned by large segments of the anti-Israel scene. Terrorism celebrated as “resistance” in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Iraq was similarly met with approval and even jubilant reactions.

The Reporting Centre frequently received submissions of content that, while not classified as antisemitic incidents, were clearly glorifying terrorism. Legal consequences were rare. Some activists, who had previously been vocal at demonstrations and on social media, suddenly vanished from public view — likely due to law enforcement and judicial action. Nevertheless, endorsement and glorification of terrorist organisations and their actions remain widespread, even though such conduct is punishable under Austrian law — just like the trivialisation of the Holocaust.

### 2. 4. The Shoah and Its Misuse

Amid the unprecedented rise in antisemitism, efforts to combat the latter have intensified under various guises. A key tool in these efforts is the misuse of the Holocaust, which can occur in numerous forms. On the topic of “Shoah distortion”, a [conference organised by the IKG](#)<sup>5</sup> in early 2025 was held within the framework of the ENMA network in collaboration with several European partners.

This phenomenon is captured statistically under the category [“Shoah relativisation/denial”](#) (see Chapter 6.3, p. 26). After incidents in this category dropped to almost negligible levels following the end of the pandemic, this perfidious form of antisemitism surged again after October 7. This time, however, the increase came less from the political right and more from the political left and the Muslim community. While the left tends to avoid crude Holocaust comparisons, we observed numerous malicious and deeply offensive instances of Shoah abuse from the latter group.

During the war between Israel and terrorist groups in the region, we observed the following forms of Shoah distortion in texts, speeches, and on social media:

3 [https://democ.de/zsg\\_blogindex/das-rote-dreieck-amas-pal%C3%A4stina-israel/](https://democ.de/zsg_blogindex/das-rote-dreieck-amas-pal%C3%A4stina-israel/)

4 <https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/amas-verbot-erweitert-um-rotes-dreieck-und-terroristen-bilder/>

5 <https://www.ikg-wien.at/nachrichten/veranstaltung-distorting-the-shoah-contemporary-challenges-and-european-responses>

- Equating Israel with the Nazi regime
- Referring to Israeli military operations as a “Holocaust”
- Equating the Gaza Strip with concentration camps or the Warsaw Ghetto
- Comparing Israeli (and Western) politicians to Nazi leaders
- Equating Palestinians with concentration camp inmates
- Replacing the Star of David with the swastika

As can be seen, Shoah relativisation in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict often involves a cruel mechanism: Shoah inversion not only distorts the Shoah but also reverses the roles of **victim and perpetrator**.

A particularly insidious aspect of this inversion is that Jews and the only Jewish state are portrayed as the “new Nazis” supposedly committing a new Holocaust – even though the enemy being fought (Palestinian terrorist organisations) explicitly base their existence on the destruction of Israel and Jewish life worldwide, and pursue that goal whenever possible, as demonstrated on October 7.

Such comparisons are legitimised by international organisations accusing Israel of genocide against the Palestinian population or implying such claims. Except in rare instances, these accusations generally don’t reference the Shoah. One such instance was when UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, [Francesca Albanese](#), made both implicit and explicit comparisons in that regard. Due to her antisemitic agitation, especially after October 7, several Western states distanced themselves from her. It was therefore all the more disturbing that Albanese was invited to speak at the [University of Vienna](#) in late 2024.

However, Shoah relativisation is not limited to the anti-Israel activism scene. According to the November 2024 [Right-Wing Extremism Barometer](#) by the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW), 42% of Austrians agreed with the statement: “Israel’s policies in Palestine are like those of the Nazis in World War II.” Among respondents with strongly right-wing extremist views, that figure rose to 60%. The [study](#) noted that such a statement “could, under certain circumstances, be deemed a criminal offense under the Prohibition Act.”<sup>6</sup>

## 2. 5. National Parliamentary Elections and Their Consequences

In this context, it is also worth mentioning that a significant portion of incidents in October and especially November originated from the political right. In many other cases, based on the content, a right-wing ideological background was suspected, though not clearly identifiable, and thus – per standard procedure – categorised as “unknown.”

One particularly notable episode was the planned visit to the Shoah Memorial at Vienna’s Judenplatz by newly elected FPÖ National Council President Walter Rosenkranz, which [was prevented by Jewish students](#) on the anniversary of the November pogroms. This led to fierce backlash against the Jewish community, including clear antisemitic “othering” (see Chapter 6.1) combined with Shoah relativisations and often interwoven with Israel-related antisemitism.

6 [www.doew.at/cms/download/c1g6t/DOEW\\_rex-barometer-2024.pdf](http://www.doew.at/cms/download/c1g6t/DOEW_rex-barometer-2024.pdf)

The most recent statistics on right-extremist offenses for 2024 present a grim picture: the number rose from 1,208 in 2023 to a record 1,486 in 2024. Of those, 1,296 were explicitly right-wing motivated, 97 classified as racist, 59 as antisemitic, and 9 as hostile to Islam.


Year	Total	Far-right	Racist	Antisemitic	Anti-Muslim	Other
2021	1053	816	66	52	9	110
2022	928	791	51	33	3	50
2023	1208	1080	66	43	7	12
2024	1486	1296	97	59	9	25

Source: Parliamentary inquiry responses (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

The number of charges filed under the Prohibition Act also rose significantly in 2024—from 1,203 to 1,450. However, data on indictments and convictions have not been published for several years. Occasionally, sources like “Stoppt die Rechten” offer some insight into this issue.

According to the “Hate Crime Situation Report” published in July 2024 for the year 2023, anti-semitism was, for the second year in a row, the most common motive in police-recorded bias-motivated criminal offences in the “Religion” category.

Number of police-recorded bias motives in the category “Religion”



Source: Hate Crime Situation Report (2021-2023)

Legend: 2021 (light green), 2022 (dark blue), 2023 (medium blue)

## 2. 6. Anti-Israel Activism and Its Enduring Nature

Organised anti-Israel activism in Austria—through demonstrations, disruptions, social media campaigns, and occasionally activist vandalism—remains limited but vocally present. What is officially described as solidarity with Palestinians is, in substance, largely anti-Israel propaganda. This goes beyond mere criticism or even hostile denunciations of Israel, which—even if hateful or deceitful—are not inherently antisemitic. Rather, it includes Holocaust-relativising comparisons, equating Israel with the Nazi regime, absurd conspiracy theories, traditional anti-Judaism, other forms of demonising the Jewish state, and direct or indirect incitements to violence and terrorism.

This activism is still predominantly driven by anti-imperialist groups, mainly composed of individuals from the far-left milieu. A [“postcolonial” left](#) aligns itself with Palestinians (and the “Global South” in general against the “West”), viewing Israel as a colonial – and therefore illegitimate – “white” oppressor project. In such circles, terrorist organisations like Hamas and Hezbollah are reinterpreted as [“part of the global left.”](#) This ideological framework has led [parts of feminist, queer, and other so-called progressive groups](#) to adopt antisemitic narratives against Israel.

These groups form the backbone of the scene and operate under the umbrella organisation “Palestine Solidarity Austria,” which overlaps ideologically and personally with numerous other groups. These include the [antisemitic BDS](#) movement, smaller groups like “Dar al Janub” that openly glorify terrorism, and organisations claiming to support “neutrality” or “peace” but in reality promote pro-Russian and anti-Western positions.

Also present are individual activists from the anti-COVID measures movement and anti-Zionist groups who strategically use their actual or alleged Jewish identity as a supposed shield against accusations of antisemitism. There are also some communist splinter groups, student associations, and individuals from the Muslim community, although participation from the latter remains relatively low, both in relation to the size of Austria’s Muslim population and when compared to other countries. This has often drawn explicit criticism from Muslim demonstrators themselves.

At Austrian universities, aggressive anti-Israel activism is less pronounced than in Germany or Anglo-American countries. At a few academic institutions, occasional disruptions occur. In May, a multi-day [“Student Intifada Camp”](#) was set up on a Vienna University Campus (Altes AKH). Notably, many participants in these protests appeared not to be students.

Anti-Israel activism also took a new turn politically: in the context of the Austrian national elections, some of the aforementioned activists founded a party called “Gaza List – Voices Against Genocide.” Apart from its blatant propaganda focus (radical anti-Zionism, demonisation of Israel, and anti-imperialist positions like “neutrality” masking apologetic stances for aggressors like Russia or Hamas), it had no other discernible socio-political agenda.

The rest of the contents in anti-Israel activism has not changed significantly. Speeches and online propaganda are updated for current events, but the mechanisms remain the same. Examples can be found in the section “Categorisation of Antisemitic Incidents and Examples” (p. 12). However, it has been observed that the “messaging” has often been adjusted—likely in response to judicial and law enforcement actions, particularly concerning hate speech or the glorification of terrorism.

This does not mean such glorification has ceased. Praise for the “resistance”—a common code word for terrorist organisations like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the Houthis in Yemen—is still frequently heard and seen.

The same applies to Shoah trivialisations, which often exceed the criminal threshold under the Austrian Prohibition Act. Cruder forms of misuse have increasingly been replaced or supplemented with implicit, less obvious forms of Holocaust relativisation, which, due to their ambiguous nature, are not recorded as antisemitic incidents.

### 3. Categorisation of Antisemitic Incidents and Examples

A key component of collecting, analysing, and disseminating data related to antisemitism is the categorisation of antisemitic incidents. For two decades, various EU institutions have identified the lack of international comparability in this area as a significant problem in combating antisemitism and have therefore sought to promote the standardisation of approaches.

To this end, EU-level guidelines for the categorisation of antisemitic incidents have been published, which were themselves significantly influenced by the British Community Security Trust (CST), which is particularly experienced in that regard. Over recent years, this categorical framework has been largely adopted by several organisations across Europe that document antisemitism. The Antisemitism Reporting Centre of the IKG Vienna cooperates with RIAS (Research and Information Center on Antisemitism) in Germany and has been using this methodology in its work for six years now. The European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism (ENMA) continues these efforts towards internationally comparable data, representing another step forward in the global fight against antisemitism.

The following section will explain these categories and illustrate them with examples from the past year. Further details about the methodology of the Antisemitism Reporting Centre’s work and the international context will be discussed in the section [“Methodology and International Perspective”](#) (from page 22 onwards).

#### 3. 1. Assaults

This category includes any form of physical attack on people and buildings, with or without weapons. Even an unsuccessful attempt at an attack (whether the victim fought back or was able to flee) is included in this category. The same applies to throwing objects at people, even if they miss their target. (The EUMC guidelines, CST, and RIAS recognise „Extreme Violence” as an escalated form. We consider the distinction between the latter and „attacks” in Austria to be impractical, see also the section [„International Perspective, p. 28”](#)).

**September 24, 1020 Vienna:** Three school-aged teenagers, clearly identifiable as Jewish by their clothing, are crossing a street when two significantly older teenagers quickly approach them. One of the two suddenly violently pushes one of the Jewish teens to the ground. The attacker and his companion shout „Free Palestine” during the assault. When a group of men rush over to help the Jewish teenager, the attackers quickly flee the scene.

**November 11, 1010 Vienna:** Late in the evening, a woman is on her way home when she overhears a fellow passenger's phone conversation on a streetcar. The older man is speaking loudly and audibly for all passengers, making disparaging remarks about Jews and referring to them as „ticks” (“Zecken”), among other things. The woman begins filming him secretly. When he notices, he first insults her as a “shitty Jew,” “filthy pig,” and “child murderer” (note: she is not Jewish). Suddenly, he becomes physically aggressive, begins hitting her, and tries to snatch her phone. He also threatens further physical violence. Two women intervene and attempt to calm the situation, but the man continues with the insults. A police report is filed.

**November 30, 1020 Vienna:** A man, clearly identifiable as Jewish by his clothing, is walking on the Sabbath when five individuals approach and surround him. Suddenly, one of the men knocks the Shtreimel (traditional fur hat) off his head, picks it up from the ground, and runs off with his companions. The victim hurries to the nearest synagogue and asks a security guard and the police for help. Officers, who were nearby, are able to apprehend the attackers minutes later not far from the scene. The hat is returned to the victim. It is later revealed that the attackers were participants in a far-right, [pro-FPÖ demonstration](#) that had taken place earlier that day in the city center.


### 3. 2. Threats

A threat is defined as: a concretely formulated threat of physical violence against individuals or institutions that are Jewish or perceived to be Jewish; the threat is specific and can be either written or verbal. Bomb threats and fake bombs targeting Jewish institutions are also categorised as threats.

**January 29, 1200 Vienna:** A student from a Jewish educational institution is on her way to a nearby supermarket. An older man approaches her aggressively and asks if she is coming from the „Jew center.” He gets even closer and grabs her hand, but she manages to break free. The young woman crosses the street, but the man follows her. He repeatedly shouts after her: „Are you Jewish?” Frightened, she takes refuge in a building near the educational institution, while bystanders call the police. However, the man does not give up and continues to search the area for the student until the police finally arrive.

**April 27, 1020 Vienna:** After evening prayers, a father and his seven- and ten-year-old sons are on their way home. All three are clearly identifiable as Jewish by their clothing. A group of older teenagers approaches them. One suddenly shouts „F\*\*\*ing Nazi” at the family and makes a gesture as if to hit them. The teenagers then walk away.

**October 4, Lower Austria:** A threatening letter is sent to a Jewish institution. Enclosed with the letter is a container filled with an unknown liquid. The postage is marked to be paid by the recipient.



Da Netanun des  
Hitler der Gegenwart  
ist, wird die  
Synagoge am  
Do, 10. Okt. gesprengt.  
Bitte halten Sie an  
diesem Tag Menschen  
fern !!

### 3.3. Damage and Desecration

The category of damage and desecration covers non-life-threatening assaults on an object. It also includes graffiti and the application of stickers and posters.

**May 6, 1010 Vienna:** During the third [“European Conference on Antisemitism,”](#) the following incident occurs: As Federal Minister Karoline Edtstadler and IKG President Oskar Deutsch arrive at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, an attacker attempts to douse them with red paint. He displays a sign with an anti-Israel slogan and shouts matching slogans. He is detained by the police; however, later that same day, he is seen at the so-called “Student Intifada Camp” on the grounds of a Vienna university Campus (Altes AKH).

**June 7, 1090 Vienna:** During the night of June 7, the [House of Research on Sensengasse](#) is extensively defaced with antisemitic and terror-glorifying slogans and symbols. The police initiate an investigation against persons unknown.

**June 2024, 1020 Vienna:** A utility box in a park is graffitied with the words [“Kill Jews.”](#) The police are informed and the removal of the defacement initiated.



**November 12, Vienna:** A teacher reports that swastikas have been repeatedly carved into desks over an extended period at his school. According to him, colleagues and school management do not take the matter seriously. As a result, he refrains from further action but emphasises the importance of documenting such incidents.

**November 27, 1010 Vienna:** In the early hours, graffiti inciting violence against Jews is reported at the [Theodor Herzl stairway](#) near the Vienna City Temple. During the night, red-painted slogans and symbols glorifying terrorism appear on the wall, including calls for “Intifada” and the so-called “ Hamas triangles” (inverted red triangles used in Hamas propaganda to mark enemies). It is not the first time the symbolic Herzl stairway has been targeted, with similar incidents occurring in mid-[October 2024](#) and [May 2023](#).



**November 27, 1090 Vienna:** Later that same morning, graffiti is discovered on the memorial plaque for Theodor Herzl in Berggasse. Based on timing and style, the same group of perpetrators is suspected.



**December 18, 1010 Vienna:** A [flag of Israel](#), adorned with a black mourning ribbon in solidarity with the hostages taken on October 7, and displayed at the Vienna City Temple, is torn down in the early morning hours by two Swedish women (aged 18 and 28). They break the flagpole and attempt to set the flag on fire. The police apprehend the perpetrators within minutes and return the heavily damaged flag. After questioning, both are released but are reported for suspected serious property damage. The prosecution initiates proceedings.



**July 2024, 1130 Vienna:** A swastika and the phrase “Jews OUT!” are reported on a wall. The police are informed, and the appropriate authorities are contacted for removal.



**September 5, 1220 Vienna:** Two graffiti incidents are reported: next to a Palestinian flag with the slogan “Free Palestine,” a gallows is drawn with a Star of David hanging from it. Beside it is written: “The Jews are committing genocide. What are you doing about it?”



### 3. 4. Abusive Behaviour

The category “Abusive behaviour” covers antisemitic abuse, expressions, comments and messages; these may be expressed verbally (face-to-face, by phone) or in writing (letter, email, online media, other digital communication channels) and are directed at a specific person or institution.

**February 23, Online:** In the popular online game Brawl Stars, a 9-year-old child receives a friend request from an account named “LordJudenmord” (“LordJewMurder”). The parents report this incident to the Reporting Centre for documentation purposes.



**May 6, 1010 Vienna:** A man calls the Jewish Community of Vienna (IKG) to complain about the “Zionist Jews like Oskar Deutsch” (President of the IKG Vienna) who, he claims, are “killing Palestinians.” He also argues that the actions of Israel’s military are a far greater crime than those of Hamas and complains that one is immediately labelled antisemitic when criticising Jews.

**May 6, Instagram:** On Instagram, a [large news account posts](#) content commemorating the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp in 1945, featuring a quote by Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen. Numerous antisemitic comments follow – here are four examples.



**May 22, 1190 Vienna:** A visibly Jewish couple is waiting for the subway when a middle-aged woman suddenly begins shouting at them: “Genocide! Genocide! You’re committing genocide in Israel!”, “You’ve clearly learned nothing from history! Genocide in Israel!” She repeats these accusations multiple times. Another woman passing by apologises to the couple “on behalf of others.”

**June 26, 1140 Vienna:** A group of 12-year-old students, some of whom are visibly Jewish based on their clothing, are returning from a school trip with their teacher. In the subway, an older man on the phone starts yelling at the children, calling them “Jews behaving like pigs.” As the group prepares to get off, he shouts to the teacher that she should “get those animals off the subway.”

**July 27, 1120 Vienna:** At an anti-Israel demonstration by “Palestine Solidarity Austria”, a representative of the “Palestine Committee” gives [a speech](#) in which he refers to the descendants of Holocaust victims as Nazis (a classic case of perpetrator-victim reversal). He claims that Zionists are “the evil of our time.”

**September 30, School, WhatsApp:** A Jewish student at a secondary school, whose religious affiliation is known to classmates, receives a WhatsApp image. The image shows his profile picture with an enlarged nose, a burning car in the background, and the caption: “Advent, Advent, a Jew is burning.” [the phrase rhymes in German, N.B.] The school administration and police are notified, and charges are filed.

**November 8, Email:** An email sent to the IKG calls on Jews to leave Austria. The phrase “go home” likely refers to Israel; the mention of Amsterdam alludes to the [violent pogrom-like riots](#) shortly before.

Von: [redacted] <[redacted]@[redacted]>  
Gesendet: Freitag, 8. November 2024 17:41  
An: Office (IKG) <office@ikg-wien.at>  
Betreff: \*\*\*EXTERN\*\*\* WG: Aktion von heute in Wien

Juden raus aus Österreich.

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Von: [redacted] <[redacted]@[redacted]>  
Gesendet: Freitag, 8. November 2024 10:55  
An: office@ikg-wien.at <office@ikg-wien.at>  
Betreff: Aktion von heute in Wien

Juden geht nach Hause oder nach Amsterdam.  
Habt ihr euch schon mal gefragt, warum euch auf der ganzen Welt keiner mag.

Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien  
Simmeringer Hauptstrasse 246  
Zentralfriedhof 4.Tor  
1110 Wien



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Ihr Völkermord an den Palästinensern rehabilitiert die Politik Adolf Hitlers und damit gleichzeitig die Taten unserer Großväter! DANKE


### 3. 5. Mass Mailings

This refers to written antisemitic material sent to at least two addressees and usually targeting a large group of recipients. It includes publications (online and offline, e.g. newspapers, magazines, blogs), documents sent to multiple recipients (letters, emails) and the social media platforms which are rapidly replacing the latter two.

**April 3, 1150 Vienna:** A flyer found on the street is submitted to [www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at](http://www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at). In the following days, similarly worded flyers from the same area are submitted. One of them contains an explicit call to murder. A police report is filed.



**May 28, Instagram:** An Israeli military operation against Hamas and to rescue hostages in Rafah (May 2024) is labeled as a Holocaust. The image montage includes a text calling for “global resistance,” followed by the inverted red “ Hamas triangle,” which is used in terrorist propaganda to mark enemies.



**February 9, Instagram:** A post compares bunk beds in a refugee camp in Rafah/Gaza with bunk beds from the Nazi concentration camp Buchenwald in 1945. The title of the image collage references the slogan “Never Again,” which historically refers to the Shoah. Its use in this context serves to reinforce accusations of genocide and performs Shoah inversion – a common and insidious tactic of anti-Israel activism that falsely portrays Holocaust victims as perpetrators of a supposed Holocaust in Gaza.



**September 16, Instagram:** A public Instagram post equates the Star of David (symbol of Judaism) with the swastika (symbol of National Socialism).




**September, Online:** A user posts on Facebook after watching a [controversial documentary](#) about Israel and the war against Hamas in Gaza, aired on the public broadcaster’s (ORF) program “Weltjournal” on September 4. The post reads: “Although I am definitely not an antisemite, I can understand why antisemitism is on the rise right now! [...]” In the days following the broadcast, several similar incidents are reported.




## 4. Ideological Background

Antisemitic incidents - Ideological background



Antisemitic incidents 2023




“**Right-wing**” covers all the incidents which could be attributed to the political or sociopolitical right-wing, right-wing extremism or (neo-)Nazism.

“**Left-wing**” covers all the incidents which could be attributed to the political or sociopolitical left-wing or left-wing extremism in all its forms (e.g. the antisemitic BDS movement and anti-imperialism).


“**Muslim**” refers to antisemitic incidents perpetrated by people or organisations which can be attributed to Islam on account of their world view or religious beliefs, including Islamism.

24 Assaults




Just over half of the 24 physical attacks were carried out by Muslim perpetrators. In seven cases, the ideological background of the perpetrators could not be clearly determined; in three cases, the perpetrators were associated with the right-wing scene. As in the previous year, one attack was committed by a perpetrator with a left-wing background.

216 Damage and desecration




Every second act of antisemitic property damage could not be clearly attributed to a specific ideology (107 cases). Nearly one third were linked to a left-wing background (66 cases), and 31 incidents were attributed to a right-wing ideological background. Twelve acts of property damage had a Muslim context.

Abusive behaviour (626 incidents)




There were 268 cases of abusive behaviour that could not be ideologically classified. The number of cases attributed to both Muslim and left-wing backgrounds more than doubled (Muslim from 61 to 141, left-wing from 49 to 110 incidents). In contrast, the number of right-wing motivated cases dropped significantly from 204 to 107.

38 Threats




Unlike the previous year, most of the reported threats could not be clearly attributed to a specific ideology (18 cases). Seventeen cases had a Muslim background. Two incidents of threats had a right-wing background, and one had a left-wing background.

616 Mass mailings



Mass mailings with a Muslim background increased significantly in proportion compared to 2023 (270 incidents; 2023: 185). There were 198 cases attributed to the left-wing spectrum. Eighty cases came from the right, and 68 mass mailings could not be ideologically classified.

Yearly trend by ideological background 2023 (left) and 2024 (right)



The three most notable spikes occurred in January, May, and October. The peak at the beginning of the year actually represents a decrease compared to the previous month (December 2023), falling from 294 to 218 incidents. At the beginning of 2024, reported antisemitic incidents were predominantly motivated by Muslim (78) and left-wing (62) actors.

The spike in May is directly linked to two factors: first, the impending Israeli offensive in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip against Hamas and to free hostages held there. The campaign „All Eyes On Rafah” became, in this context, a driver of antisemitic agitation worldwide. The second factor contributing to the May spike was the application for an international arrest warrant against two Israeli politicians at the International Criminal Court. Ultimately, the number of Muslim-motivated incidents doubled from 33 in April to 66 in May. 124 of the 160 antisemitic incidents in May were related to Israel. May was also the month with the highest number of Shoah relativisations (59) in 2024.

The spike in October is mainly attributed to events surrounding the National Council election at the end of September (right-wing background), as well as the killing of the leader of the Hezbollah terrorist army, Hassan Nasrallah, and the escalation of the war in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (Muslim and left-wing background). October (33 incidents) and November (30) were the months in which right-wing antisemitic incidents were particularly prominent.

The discourse was shaped by debates following the National Council election itself and the election of a German-nationalist politician as President of the National Council for the first time. A significant surge in antisemitic incidents occurred, for example, after the confrontation between National Council President Walter Rosenkranz (FPÖ) and Jewish students on the eve of the anniversary of the November pogroms, in front of the Holocaust memorial at Vienna’s Judenplatz.

Incidents whose ideological background cannot be clearly determined are classified as “unattributable.”

## 5. Methodology

The cornerstone of our working methodology is the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

### 5.1. Working Definition of Antisemitism

Since the [working definition of antisemitism](#) created in 2005 by the EUMC with the help of numerous experts and affected individuals was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016, it has gained steadily increasing international support at many different levels. 26 EU member states officially use this definition – only Malta is still pending. The country has held observer status in the IHRA only since June 2024. Austria adopted the antisemitism definition in 2017 (by the Council of Ministers) and 2018 (by the municipal councils in Vienna and Graz), followed by further federal states and municipalities. The significance and important role of the working definition in combating antisemitism is also emphasised in the 2022 Vienna Declaration, signed by 15 European states. Among other things, the declaration states:

“We agree to further promote the use of the IHRA non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism, which can serve as a basis to collect comparable data on antisemitic incidents including data that is below the criminal threshold.”

The implementation report on the [National Strategy Against Antisemitism](#), presented in November 2024, also addresses the various levels (e.g., in prevention and education, as well as in the justice system and law enforcement) on which the working definition is being applied. Although not legally binding, this definition is the scientifically recognised foundation for the fight against antisemitism.

It also enables international comparability, which is essential for drawing insights and developing targeted, related measures. At the national level, it also serves research, the work against antisemitism, and law enforcement, which is often the first point of contact for those affected by antisemitism.

It should again be emphasised that not every antisemitic incident has legal implications; however, the best possible documentation is necessary to gain a comprehensive picture, in order to be able to recognise, analyse, and combat antisemitism.

All incidents reported to us are compared against this definition; not all of them meet its criteria and some are therefore not included in the statistics.

Here is the definition in full:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property and towards Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective – such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.


## 6. Manifestations of Antisemitism

As mentioned in the [semi-annual report](#), the Antisemitism Reporting Centre made changes to its “subcategories.” First, these were renamed “manifestations.” Additionally, the manifestation type “antisemitism related to COVID” was removed from the report due to the negligible number of incidents (5 cases, compared to 32 in 2023).

The following diagram shows the number of incidents associated with each type of manifestation. It is important to note that a single incident can have multiple manifestations.

Israel-related antisemitism is once again the most frequent manifestation of antisemitic incidents. The newly introduced “antisemitic othering” (487 incidents), which is explained in the next section, ranks just ahead of cases of Holocaust relativisation/denial (436 incidents), while antisemitic conspiracy myths account for slightly less than half of that (201 incidents).

Manifestations of Antisemitism



2024

## 6. 1. Antisemitic Othering


In 2024, a new manifestation type was added to the methodology: “Antisemitic Othering.” The Antisemitism Reporting Centre aligns this category with the approach used by RIAS. The definition of “Othering” is:

“Antisemitic othering refers to actions, words, or images that portray Jews as foreign, exotic, or not belonging. Examples include the use of ‘You Jew!’ as an insult, or using the term ‘Jew’ to demean others. Antisemitic othering also occurs when Austrian Jews are redefined as representatives of Israel and held accountable for Israeli government policies. Being Jewish alone is sufficient grounds for exclusion and marginalisation.”

After Israel-related antisemitism, antisemitic othering represents the second most common manifestation type (487 incidents or 32%). The month of November 2024 stands out in particular: during this time, the confrontation between National Council President Rosenkranz (FPÖ) and Jewish students (see page 21) triggered a veritable flood of incidents centered around othering.

Symbolic of this were numerous variations of messages directed at individual Jews, groups, or institutions, demanding that “the Jews” should leave Austria and return to Israel if they no longer liked it here.


2024: 487 cases of Antisemitic Othering



## 6. 2. Israel-Related Antisemitism

This manifestation was once again by far the most frequent in 2024, with 1,084 incidents (71.3%). After the extreme high in December 2023 (264 incidents), Israel-related antisemitism settled into the mid to high double-digit range – with the exceptions of January, May, and October, which generally coincide with annual peaks. An exception to this trend is November, which was particularly influenced by antisemitic othering. In one of the guest commentaries ([p. 29, available only in German language](#)), Monika Schwarz-Friesel discusses the “Israelisation of antisemitism.”


2024: 1.084 cases of Israel-Related Antisemitism



## 6. 3. Shoah Relativisation/Denial

With 436 cases (28.7%), Holocaust relativisation or denial was the third most common manifestation of antisemitism last year, just behind othering. The section “The Shoah and Its Misuse” (p. 8) explores the various forms in which this manifests, as well as the background to its development throughout the year.


2024: 436 cases of Shoah relativisation/denial




## 6. 4. Antisemitic Conspiracy Myths

Antisemitic conspiracy myths were the least common manifestation in 2024, with 201 cases (13.2%). The peak value of 52 incidents in December 2023 was not reached again during the year, aside from a few spikes in January, May, and November.

2024: 201 cases of Antisemitic conspiracy theories




Overlaps between Israel-related antisemitism and Holocaust relativization/denial




Since a single antisemitic incident can involve multiple manifestation types, there are numerous overlaps. For example, 86 percent of all cases (377 out of 436) involving Shoah relativisation or denial were also Israel-related.

Overlaps between Israel-related antisemitism and antisemitic othering



## 7. The Situation Abroad

Antisemitic incidents in European countries in 2024



2024

At the editorial deadline, data for 2024 were available from the [United Kingdom \(CST\)](#), [Italy](#), France, and parts of Switzerland. Internationally, a similar trend to that in Austria can be observed: after the massive increase at the end of 2023, the number of incidents stabilised at a high level.

## Guest commentaries

### Die Israelisierung des Antisemitismus und seine Umdeutung als „Meinungsfreiheit“

Seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 hat der Antisemitismus weltweit massiv zugenommen, auf der Straße, im Netz, in den Medien, aber auch in Teilen von Politik, Medien und Zivilbevölkerung. Seit 1945 ist judenfeindliches Gedankengut nicht mehr dermaßen offen und selbstbewusst artikuliert worden.

In der empirischen Antisemitismusforschung zeigt sich dabei schon seit Jahren, dass der israelbezogene Judenhass die vorherrschende Manifestation ist und dass dieser nach dem genozidalen Massaker der Hamas immer ungehemmter ausgelebt wird. Und dies in allen aktuellen Formen: Rechter, linker, muslimischer und mittiger Feuilleton-Antisemitismus haben trotz aller ideologisch-politischen Divergenzen gemeinsam, dass sie den jüdischen Staat – als kollektiven Juden – im Fokus ihrer Aktivitäten haben. Denn das Chamäleon Judenfeindschaft hat sich im Laufe seiner zwei Tausend Jahre andauernden Geschichte seine anti-judaistische Grundstruktur erhalten und sich den aktuellen Gegebenheiten lediglich opportunistisch angepasst. Entsprechend steht der jüdische Staat als ostentatives Symbol für jüdisches Überleben und Leben im Mittelpunkt des Hasses.

Werden Israelis als *Kindermörder* diffamiert, wird der Staat Israel als *Apartheids-, Unrechts- oder Kolonialstaat* delegitimiert, werden israelische Soldaten als *Kriegsverbrecher* beschimpft und dem jüdischen Staat *Völkermord oder Genozid* unterstellt, werden Juden kollektiv als *Israelis* bezeichnet oder verantwortlich gemacht für Geschehnisse in Nahost, handelt es sich aus der wissenschaftlichen Perspektive um Varianten des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus. Solche haltlosen Vorwürfe stellen krude De-Realisierungen dar, also Projektionen von judenfeindlichen Phantasmen und Stereotypen bar von Realität. „Neu“ sind diese Phantasmen nicht. Sie stehen in der langen Tradition judenfeindlicher Denk- und Sprachgebrauchsmuster, die jüdische Existenz als Übel

„Neu“ sind diese Phantasmen nicht. Sie stehen in der langen Tradition judenfeindlicher Denk- und Sprachgebrauchsmuster, die jüdische Existenz als Übel in der Welt zu sehen.

in der Welt zu sehen. Zeitgemäß angepasst werden uralte anti-judaistische Entwertungen auf den jüdischen Staat projiziert. Wir nennen dies in der Forschung die Israelisierung des Antisemitismus. Mit legitimer Kritik haben solche Dysphemismen der Hassrede nichts gemeinsam. Dennoch wird der israelbezogene Judenhass ebenso massiv geleugnet und umgedeutet als „Meinungs- Kunst- und Wissenschaftsfreiheit“ wie er obsessiv artikuliert wird.

Diese Abwehrkommunikation gehört mittlerweile untrennbar zum Phänomen des aktuellen Antisemitismus. Besonders deutlich ist dies im Kultur- und Campus-Antisemitismus zu sehen: Selbst explizit und unzweifelhaft antisemitische Bilder und Äußerungen werden zur „Debattenkultur“ gezählt, Boykottaufrufe und virulente Störaktionen als „politische Kritik“ legitimiert, Judenhass-Parolen grölende Demonstranten als „pro-palästinensisch“ euphemisiert. Dadurch wird Antisemitismus durch verharmlosende und beschönigende Umschreibungen nicht nur marginalisiert, sondern auch akzeptiert und erhält so wieder Normalität im gesellschaftlichen Leben.



**Prof. Dr. Monika Schwarz-Friesel,**  
Antisemitismusforscherin und Professorin  
an der Technischen Universität Berlin

Parlamentsdirektion/Zimmer

## Vom Wahn zur Vernichtung: Die Ideologie des Antisemitismus

Antisemitische Vorwürfe entspringen nicht der Realität. Nicht das Verhalten von Jüdinnen und Juden, sondern allein die Wahrnehmung, das Denken und Fühlen der Antisemit:innen produzieren sie. Antisemitisches Denken dient dabei als welterklärende Ideologie, die nur Gut oder Böse kennt. Nicht nur alles Jüdische wird abgelehnt, auch alles Abgelehnte wird als jüdisch wahrgenommen, jegliche Bedrohung mit Jüdinnen und Juden identifiziert. Im Unterschied zum Rassismus, der Menschen als unterlegen abwertet, wird im Antisemitismus das eigene Herrschaftsstreben auf Jüdinnen und Juden im Vorwurf der „jüdischen Weltverschwörung“ projiziert. Das hat auch mit dem Größenwahn der Antisemit:innen selbst zu tun: „Der Jude“ wird zum projektiven Symbol aller angestrebten, aber verwehrten Dinge – und auch aufgrund des eigenen Scheiterns des Strebens nach Übermacht, Naturbeherrschung und Weltkontrolle gehasst.



DÖW/Shaked

Von **Isolde Vogel**, Antisemitismusforscherin am Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW)

Die Gesellschaftsfähigkeit von Antisemitismus zeigt sich kaum wo deutlicher als in der Abwehr von Schuld. Die Verharmlosung von NS-Verbrechen, Forderungen nach einem „Schlusstrich“ oder die Erzählung vom „Schuldkult“ finden sich quer durch die Gesellschaft. Der Wunsch nach Entlastung zeigt sich gerade in der israelbezogenen Variante – und belegt wie nahtlos Israelhass und Antizionismus an judenfeindliche Traditionen anknüpfen. Nicht

**Ob offen gegen jüdisches Leben oder in austauschbaren Paraphrasen gegen „die Zionisten“, „die Globalisten“, „die Systemmedien“ oder Israel – gemeint sind „die Juden“.**

nur historische Schuld, sondern auch aktuelle antisemitische Tendenzen werden abgewehrt. Antisemitische Täter zu Opfern erklärt, Opfer von Antisemitismus zu Tätern. Dies dient nicht zuletzt dem eigenen Entlastungswunsch: Antisemitisch sind nur die anderen.

Modernisierte Ausdrucksformen des Judenhasses bedeuten, wie die steigenden Zahlen belegen, keine Reduktion der Verbreitung antisemitischen Denkens. Vom Antikapitalismus und reaktionärer „Globalisierungskritik“ über antiwestliche Haltung und Antiamerikanismus, bis zur antiisraelischen Agenda – viele Strömungen und Phänomene sind gerade nicht auf politische Lager, Bildungsschicht oder eine soziokulturelle Gruppe beschränkt. Der moderne Antisemitismus bietet im Gegenteil ein verbindendes ideologisches Moment und dient als weltanschaulicher Kitt. Ob offen gegen jüdisches Leben oder in austauschbaren Paraphrasen gegen „die Zionisten“, „die Globalisten“, „die Systemmedien“ oder Israel – gemeint sind „die Juden“. Gerade seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 ist eine Enthemmung zu beobachten, Israel und Gaza dienen als Projektionsflächen und ermöglichen salonfähigen schuldabwehrenden Judenhass und politische Allianzen.

Seit jeher haben Antisemit:innen das Gefühl in Notwehr zu handeln, im Widerstand gegen diese im Verborgenen agierende Macht des Bösen. Schon die Nazis setzten diesem imaginierten Bedrohungsszenario den Aufruf „Deutsche! Wehrt euch!“ entgegen. Von ihrem Plan der „Endlösung“ bis zum Wunsch nach der Auslöschung Israels durch den Märtyrertod im islamistischen Terror nach der Logik „Palestine Will Set Us Free“: Der paranoide Wahn des Antisemitismus mündet in letzter Konsequenz in einer Vernichtungsidee – oder Selbstauslöschung. Der „Kampf gegen Juden“ – oder Israel – ist nicht nur Taktik, sondern droht als Erlösungsfantasie zum „Endziel“ zu werden. Diese Gefahr muss auch in ihren Anfängen ernst genommen werden.



# ANTISEMITISMUS MELDEN UND BEKÄMPFEN



## WARUM MELDEN?

Nur wenn antisemitische Vorfälle gemeldet und systematisch erfasst werden, können wir gegen Antisemitismus vorgehen. Dafür sind wir auf Ihre Mithilfe angewiesen.

Unmittelbar nach Ihrer Meldung nimmt ein Experte oder eine Expertin der Antisemitismus-Meldestelle der IKG Wien die Bearbeitung auf. Gegebenenfalls werden Sie kontaktiert, um Verständnisfragen zu klären und weiterführende Möglichkeiten zu besprechen, etwa in Bezug auf die Polizei, auf psychosoziale, juristische oder andere Fragen.

Ein Grundprinzip unserer Arbeit ist der Vertrauensschutz:  
Sie entscheiden, wie wir mit Ihrer Meldung umgehen.

**[www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at](http://www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at)**

**+43 (1) 531 04-777**



**antisemitismus  
meldestelle**

Bei Gefahr in Verzug rufen Sie  
die Polizei unter 133  
und die IKG-Sicherheitszentrale unter +43 (1) 369 85 26.

[www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at](http://www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at)