

# ANNUAL REPORT ON ANTISEMITISM IN ITALY 2024

By the CDEC Foundation's Observatory  
on antisemitism

## HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

Gadi Luzzatto Voghera

## EDITED BY

Betti Guetta

Stefano Gatti

Murilo Cambuzzi

Larisa Anastasia Bulgar



Fondazione  
Centro di  
Documentazione  
Ebraica  
Contemporanea

# ABSTRACT

## **Antisemitism in Italy in 2024 – The Annual Report of the CDEC Foundation’s Observatory**

The Observatory on Antisemitism at the Contemporary Jewish Documentation Center – CDEC Foundation, publishes an Annual Report on antisemitic acts and hate speech in Italy. Thanks to collaborations with national and international research organizations and institutions, our analysis center has developed again for 2024 an articulate document that we offer to scholars, institutions and the world of communication.

The paper is introduced by a sociological framework of the Italian context with statistical data on the population’s perception of security and well-being; a necessary framework to contextualize antisemitism, which also considers the consequences of the conflict in the Middle East.

The data collected note a sharp increase in acts compared to 2023, a year that had already seen a worrying surge in events. Following 1,384 reports, **877 incidents of antisemitism were selected as such by the Observatory during 2024**. Out of these, **600** involve **online antisemitism** and **277** are comprised of **acts that materially occurred**.

In 2024, alongside traditional conspiracism, which remains a primary ideological source of anti-Jewish hatred, we have observed **significant growth** in both the **absolute number** and percentage of war-related incidents.

This report offers a thorough analysis of antisemitism, enhanced by a comprehensive annotated compilation of posts from social media. It also includes an overview of **best practices for countering antisemitic hatred** implemented throughout 2024. The study concludes with bibliographic recommendations for further reading.

The Observatory gathers information on incidents of antisemitism through mainstream media sources and reports them to the Antenna, an easily accessible tool available on our [web platform](#). Reports can also be submitted via WhatsApp number 349 4048201, which has been active for the past year.

# FOREWORD

**By Gadi Luzzatto Voghera**

IHRA's Working Definition (2016) has served as a foundation for developing measures to combat antisemitism, affirming that: «*Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities*».

According to the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (2020), «*Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)*».

The Nexus document (2021, updated in 2024) states that «*Antisemitism consists of anti-Jewish beliefs, attitudes, actions, or systemic conditions. It includes negative beliefs and feelings about Jews, hostile behavior directed against Jews (because they are Jews), and conditions that discriminate against Jews and significantly impede their ability to participate as equals in political, religious, cultural, economic, or social life. As an embodiment of collective Jewish organization and action, Israel is a magnet for and a target of antisemitic behavior. Thus, it is important for Jews and their allies to understand what is and what is not antisemitic in relation to Israel*».

The work of monitoring and research on the subject conducted in Italy annually by the CDEC Foundation's Observatory provides the socio-cultural and political context of reference, analyze the continuities and changes in the speech and environments in which antisemitic acts and expressions are manifested, and illustrate the countermeasures and good practices implemented by a country, Italy, which is affected by a significant increase in incidents.

The threats posed by antisemitism – in terms of religious freedom, free exchange of ideas in universities and schools, proper use of communication, and peaceful and constructive social coexistence – in the face of the spread of unacceptable forms of hate speech, constitute a direct attack on the basic rules of democracy as articulated in the Italian Constitution. We hope the document we present will be useful for institutions, policymakers, communication and media, and the world of education to assess based on updated indications the consistency and dangerousness of this phenomenon in Italy.

# THE OBSERVATORY ON ANTISEMITISM: MISSION, OBJECTIVES AND WORKING METHODOLOGY

**The Observatory on Antisemitism is a Department of the Foundation Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation–CDEC, founded in 1975. It monitors antisemitism daily in its many expressions, paying particular attention to the phenomenon’s distinctive characteristics and diverse types of matrices and forms.** The monitoring effort ensures coverage of the entire national territory. In Italy, the Observatory offers a unique service and is used for historical, sociological, and journalistic studies and surveys.

The Department collects and records antisemitic actions (physical or verbal assaults, writing and graffiti, online insults, public speeches, etc.), processes data on incidents of anti-Jewish hostility, conducts public opinion surveys, and conducts targeted studies. Significant efforts are undertaken to monitor online antisemitism considering the evolving landscape characterized as antisemitism 2.0.

The Observatory on Antisemitism categorizes as an incident of antisemitism any intentional act directed against Jewish persons, organizations, or property, in which there is evidence that the action has antisemitic motives or content, or that the victim was targeted because he or she was Jewish or believed to be Jewish. In this regard, the Observatory embraces the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance - [IHRA's operational definition of antisemitism](#).

The Observatory becomes aware of incidents of antisemitism through the mainstream media and reports to the [Antisemitism Hotline](#). The actual number of antisemitic incidents is higher than the number recorded because the reporting or visibility of incidents varies by type; it is easier to get news of the more serious ones while verbal or written offenses are rarely reported.

The Observatory’s archive has the richest collection of antisemitic books published from 1945 to the present in Italy. It also maintains numerous collections of antisemitic periodicals, and an extensive treasure of photographs, audio, and video recordings.

The Website [www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it](http://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it) is updated daily with articles, news, and research from the domestic and foreign press, Internet sites, and blogs. It features newspaper articles, studies, research, reports, debates, public statements, and scientific surveys. **During 2024, the site had 94 thousand page views and 41 thousand users.**

The Observatory on Antisemitism is also a member of the [European Network for Countering Antisemitism through Education \(ENCATE\)](#), the [Facing Facts network](#), the [European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism \(ENMA\)](#), and the National Network for [Countering Hate Speech and Hate Phenomena](#) (*Rete Nazionale per il contrasto ai discorsi e ai fenomeni d'odio*).

It actively collaborates with the **Union of Italian Jewish Communities** (*Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane* – UCEI, in Italian) and the **National Coordinator for the Fight against Antisemitism**.

The Observatory proactively engages with a diverse array of stakeholders, including institutions, educational establishments, educators, students, scholars, communicators, social facilitators, and the broader community. Its objective is to enhance awareness of anti-Jewish prejudice, foster respect for diversity, and support the initiatives undertaken by individuals and organizations in countering such prejudices.

**Osservatorio Antisemitismo**

Sei vittima o testimone di un episodio di antisemitismo?  
Segnala su:

  
**+39 349 404 8201**

  
**+39 02316338**

  
**antisemitismo@cdec.it**

[www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it](http://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it)

 **Fondazione  
Centro di  
Documentazione  
Ebraica  
Contemporanea**

 **UNIONE DELLE  
COMUNITÀ EBRAICHE  
ITALIANE**

# CONTENTS

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>ABSTRACT</b>   | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>FOREWARD</b>   | <b>2</b>  |
| <b>THE OBSERVATORY ON ANTISEMITISM: MISSION, OBJECTIVES AND<br/>WORKING METHODOLOGY</b> | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>CHAPTER 1. THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT</b>                            | <b>6</b>  |
| <b>CHAPTER 2. ACTS AND DISCOURSES AGAINST THE JEWS IN 2024</b>                          | <b>25</b> |
| <b>CHAPTER 3. THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE ANTISEMITISM</b>                                  | <b>43</b> |
| <b>CHAPTER 4. BEST PRACTICES TO COUNTER ANTISEMITISM</b>                                | <b>57</b> |

# CHAPTER 1. THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Betti Guetta

## Introduction

This report evinces the past year and the dramatic consequences of the October 7, 2023, attack in southern Israel and the Israeli government's response in Gaza. Antisemitic incidents and sentiments have increased dramatically both in the online and offline worlds. October 7 has caused a trauma that is difficult to understand outside of Israel, and that has brought back memories for many Jewish people of centuries of persecution and massacres. The conflict in Gaza has reawakened antisemitism – which has been on the rise for years, as shown by [the results of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights \(FRA\)](#) survey of Jews in the EU before October 7, 2023, which shows how difficult the situation was for Jewish communities in Europe, even before the conflict escalated. Eighty years after the horrors of the Shoah, communities, and Jews across the European Union continue to experience antisemitism and face restrictions in their Jewish lives: 96% of Jews said they had faced antisemitism in the past year and 80% said the situation had worsened in recent years. Half of the Jews who took part in the survey said they were concerned about their safety and that of their family and over 70% preferred to hide their Jewish identity.

The climate that Jews live in is worrying; the hostility, indifference, and ambivalence that many have felt around them have created feelings of anger but also isolation and loneliness (JDC).<sup>1</sup>

The Middle Eastern crises periodically bring back to the fore the public use of stereotypes and rhetorical figures linked to antisemitic language. Antisemitism affects Jews and represents a threat to social coexistence, stability, and security.

The war in Gaza has brought to light previous, underground feelings of hostility toward Israel and sometimes towards Jews. Senator Segre reflects on the lack of inhibitions: “In recent decades, antisemitism has always been latent, but only because people were ashamed to show it. Today they are no longer ashamed.”

Antisemitism manifests itself in different forms and increasingly on the Internet. This occurs despite the legal framework in force and the commitment of the EU and its Member States to combat antisemitism and promote Jewish life, as expressed in the commitments, resolutions, declarations, conclusions, strategies, and national action plans and the related EU strategy.

The report of the CDEC Foundation Observatory on Antisemitism in Italy is introduced by general considerations regarding society, the perception of security, and the well-being of

---

<sup>1</sup> See: [Despite Increased Fear, Isolation, and Pessimism amid Rising Antisemitism, European Jewish Leaders Are Resolute in Staying in Their Communities, Finds New Major Survey | JDC.](#)

the population. This is in the belief that social unease, discomfort, distrust, and fear can increase resentment, ethnocentric, xenophobic attitudes, and antisemitism.

Aspects (economic, political, socio-cultural) of Italian society are highlighted here, a country where concerns and reasons for social anxiety are very consistent as is the fear of "wars" and their possible consequences.

A country where ignorance is widespread (see Censis) and where knowledge of the issues on the agenda (Middle Eastern conflict, Palestine, etc.) is scarce. Therefore, the hostile positions towards Israel are not surprising, reducing the conflict to a fight between good and evil, between good and bad, between victims and executioners.

## **The social context of the country**

Italy is the European country with the highest old age index. At the beginning of 2023, approximately 5 million foreign citizens, both EU and non-EU, resided in Italy, representing 8.7% of the total residents. On the same date, just over 3.7 million non-EU citizens were regularly present, 60% of whom had a long-term residence permit. Foreign residents have reached 9% of the Italian population, an increase of 166 thousand individuals over 2023. This is stated in the 33rd report on immigration by *Caritas e Migrantes' "Popoli in cammino"* which states that "There are more foreigners, and they are poorer, and hatred and discrimination are increasing."

In 2019, Censis defined the country as "a community that has lost the sense of investing in the future." In 2020, the year of COVID-19, 73.4% of Italians indicated fear of the unknown and anxiety as the prevailing feeling. In 2021, they spoke of "an eternal present". In 2022, Censis described a country "that lives in a state of latency." Demos spoke of a "suspended" time, a "timeless time." Wars, inflation, and the energy emergency were added to the previous concerns. In 2023, Censis described Italy as a country suffering from sleepwalking. In that year, for Censis, "we woke up from the illusion that the destiny of the West was to become the world. Instead, we live in a world shaken by strong tensions, in which no one is happy with how the world is. A resentful and threatening world, in which the dissatisfactions of leaders and peoples are stratified and rekindled, introducing us to an era of global discontent."

In October 2023, a Demopolis survey measured the growth of Italians' concerns about the war in the Middle East. 75% feared the spread of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and 2 out of 3 feared the resumption of terrorism in Europe. Fears of the economic and international scenario were growing. At the top of families' concerns was inflation, with rising prices and the progressive reduction in purchasing power (83%). 68% feared the consequences and risks of the ongoing wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. 60% highlighted the insufficiency of resources in public health; 44% cited the erosion of family savings and the increase in mortgages.



Il vissuto dei cittadini nel sondaggio dell'Istituto Demopolis

### Le 4 principali preoccupazioni degli italiani alla ripresa autunnale



Research by [Demos and the Unipolis Foundation](#) on the fears that run through society and generate anxiety among citizens in Italy and some European countries underlines that security has become very important for “personal” feelings, attitudes, and relationships. But insecurity and the fears that generate it also define relationships with the political system.

The “global” space of fears has expanded and become more “fluid” due to great instability. It is the fear of the world. Of what looms and bursts in from “outside.” Beyond our borders, which cannot be predicted or controlled. In the past, immigrants, then COVID-19, which acts and moves without borders. Today, wars have significant consequences and contribute to a pervasive sense of insecurity. Globalization has interconnected the various realities of our world, bringing even the most distant issues closer to us. We now live in an era defined by “fluid fear,” characterized by ever-changing and evolving anxieties that lack a clear resolution. One year after another. One fear after another. <sup>2</sup>

In 2024, the 58th Censis<sup>3</sup> report highlights the strong concerns that the country is experiencing: the environmental crisis, wars on Europe's borders, inflation, migratory flows, globalization, and development models different from the Western one, the need for social protection, and especially healthcare. The issues related to insecurity and mistrust are confirmed.

49.6% of Italians think that the future will be conditioned by climate change, 46.0% by the direction that the war in the Middle East will take, 45.7% by the risk of global economic and financial crises, 45.2% by the consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine, for 35.7% by international migration, 31.0% by the trade war and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, for 26.1% by the upheavals produced by technological innovations.

<sup>2</sup> See [Il tempo della paura fluida](#) (in Italian).

<sup>3</sup> [58° Rapporto sulla situazione sociale del Paese/2024 | CENSIS](#) (in Italian).

## Citizens' priorities

At the end of December 2024, [Ipsos conducted research](#) on the citizens' priorities: economy and work are listed in first place (54%), and healthcare is in second place (35%). Other issues that worry at least a fifth of Italians are: the maintenance of purchasing power and the environmental issue. Some of the issues that have had the most space in political polemics, namely immigration and security, are not at the top of Italians' priorities. 26% indicate the functioning of institutions and the political situation as priorities. As can be deduced from the abstention rate in the last European elections of 2024 (51.7%), from the widespread indifference towards political participation: 55.7% of Italians today consider street demonstrations and protest marches useless; the growing distrust in democratic systems with 84.4% of Italians convinced that politicians only think of themselves.

A survey conducted by the Demopolis Institute<sup>4</sup> shows that Italians' priorities have changed over the past three years: for more than 8 out of 10 Italians, healthcare should be at the top of government policies. The issue of healthcare in 2024 surpasses employment policies, inflation containment, and the rising cost of living, which was the main concern of more than three-quarters of Italian families in the two years 2022-2023.

This data is confirmed by another [survey carried out by Censis](#), according to which less than a fifth of Italians believe that public welfare today guarantees all the necessary services. Social services, healthcare, and school are guaranteed in the strictly essential dimension, according to 43% of people. 38% say that today not even fundamental services are guaranteed anymore.

In recent years, awareness of the importance of the National Health Service has grown: the request for investments in healthcare has gone from 48%, detected by Demopolis in 2011, to 81%: a warning for the Government's agenda. But in the European elections, 25 million Italians stayed home. For the first time in Italy, less than one voter in two went to the polls. On 8 and 9 June 2024, 25 million Italians chose to abstain. This data characterizes the vote for the European elections in our country.

## Information and disinformation

Relationships with the political system and with what surrounds us are also defined by the information/disinformation system. In recent years, global production and consumption of data and information have grown enormously, resulting in information overload and a reduced ability to pay attention to what we see or read.

In 2023, a decline in the consumption of traditional information sources in favor of digital ones was measured due to the entry of some social networks into the category of information sources. TV news, while maintaining the leading position in the ranking of media

---

<sup>4</sup> See: [Sondaggio Demopolis: come cambiano le priorità di Governo degli italiani](#) (in Italian).

through which Italians get their information, went from 51.2% to 48.3%. Search engines are growing with 29.6% preferences and growth since 2019 (8.9%); information sites (16.2%) lost 3.1% in the last year and digital newspapers went from 14.3% to 11.8%. Among social networks, YouTube is growing as a source of information (18.5%). Instagram is considered by 15.3% of users as a source of information.

Relationships with the political system and with what surrounds us are also defined by the information/disinformation system. In recent years, global production and consumption of data and information have grown enormously, resulting in information overload and a reduced ability to pay attention to what we see or read.


In 2023, a decline in consumption of traditional information sources in favor of digital ones was measured due to the entry of some social networks into the category of information sources. TV news, while maintaining the leading position in the ranking of media through which Italians get their information, went from 51.2% to 48.3%. Search engines are growing with 29.6% preferences and growth since 2019 (8.9%); information sites (16.2%) lost 3.1% in the last year and digital newspapers went from 14.3% to 11.8%. Among social networks, YouTube is growing as a source of information (18.5%). Instagram is considered by 15.3% of users as a source of information.

Regarding young people aged 14-29, 71.4% use television, and 66.7% use radio. Information websites reach 56.4%.

Today, information is highly polarized depending on the medium chosen: on the one hand, the preference for mainstream media belongs to the profile of a user who appreciates a type of professional and authoritative information; on the other hand, we find people who prefer a style of information free from conditioning. Among those who do not trust the mainstream media, we find those who believe that they are conditioned by politics (77.7%). Additionally, 72.3% of respondents believe that economic interests distort mainstream media information. A percentage that goes well beyond half, with 68%, mentions the possible dangers for democracy. Although it is a minority, there are still almost half (48.1%) who admit to trusting only the information disseminated by subjects not belonging to the mainstream media. For these, today, thanks to social networks, anyone can produce information (47.6%). On the other side of this imaginary dividing line between new media and traditional media, almost three-quarters (74.6%) say that quality information is expensive because it requires verification of facts and sources that only professional journalists can do. Many believe that it is now difficult to distinguish true news from false information and propaganda (72.6%). That many news items can create confusion and not help one to orient oneself in daily life is an opinion shared by 67.5%, while 56.7% are convinced that the responsibility of publishers is a guarantee for citizens, the truthfulness of the content to be published ([Censis, Il vero e il falso 2024](#)).


The graph below represents the combination of the reliability enjoyed by the media and the trend in public opinion's trust in them over the last year: it is highlighted that radio, television, and the press always move together, but the gap between the Web and social networks has decreased.

Fig. 4 – Percezione dell'affidabilità dei mezzi d'informazione a andamento della fiducia dell'opinione pubblica negli ultimi 12 mesi (val. %)



Fonte: indagine Censis 2023

Fig. 2 – Italiani che ritengono di avere le competenze necessarie per distinguere le fake news (val. %)



Fonte: indagine Censis, 2023

Attention is a limited resource, with various stimulus competing for it. The most engaging contents often surprise or satisfy and evoke strong emotions like anger or fear. The rise of the Internet and social networks—now used by over half the global population, along with advancements in artificial intelligence, has changed how users and advertisers interact. These platforms let anyone share global messages at little cost, but they primarily function for profit. Algorithms prioritize content that maximizes revenue by increasing user engagement and fostering addiction. This often results in users confirming existing beliefs and being isolated in biased information bubbles. Additionally, they promote inflammatory content that stirs emotions or spreads conspiracy theories and fake news based on fear.

According to the [Global Risks Report](#) published by the World Economic Forum 2024, disinformation and misinformation generated by artificial intelligence are the second largest global risks after the climate emergency.

The production and dissemination of fake news and deepfakes is not the only problem connected with the expansion of the use of artificial intelligence: the MIT Technology Review attests that the quantity of sites and content created by artificial intelligence is growing exponentially. But AI produces new sites and content starting from already existing materials, and this favors the advent of a network increasingly full of errors, spam, and ambiguous, discriminatory content.

## Values and Identity

Great political distrust is combined with social, cultural, and identity unease. According to Censis data, there is a perceived decline caused by the presence of diversity in our societies, reducing the possibility of common sense among citizens. There are fewer universally shared values.

The erosion of the paths of economic and social ascent of the middle class creates a distance from the unifying values of the past development model (democracy, participation, Europeanism). In a society that stagnates if one is unable to rise socially thanks to commitment, merit, study, and work, the desire for recognition can translate into rivalry. Identity issues tend to replace the demands of traditional social classes and take a prominent place in socio-political dialectics. 57.4% of Italians feel threatened by those who want to root in our country's rules and habits that contrast with the consolidated Italian lifestyle, such as the separation of men and women in public spaces or the full Islamic veil; 38.3% feel threatened by those who want to facilitate the entry of migrants into the country; 29.3% see as an enemy those who have a concept of family that diverges from the traditional one; 21.8% feel hostility towards people who profess another religion; the same enmity separates 21.5% of Italians from people belonging to a different ethnic group, 14.5% from those with different skin color, 11.9% from those with different sexual orientation. This data (Censis, 2024) shows the risk of fragmentation in which differences transform into fractures and could degenerate into conflict. A solid middle class could neutralize identity divergences, but it is weakening today and puts the country exposed to the risk of identity conflicts.

A part of the population is convinced that a distinctive identity exists according to 37.6% of Italians (and the figure rises to 53.5% among people with a low level of education) the "true Italian" descends from a morphologically defined lineage, the source of national identity. Indeed, 13.7% (17.4% among the less educated) think that to be Italian it is necessary to have certain somatic traits. Less educated individuals are more likely to perceive Italians as having a fixed and unchanging identity with deep-rooted origins. Among their defining characteristics, 79.9% believe that direct descent from Italians is essential, compared to 57.4% of the general population. Additionally, 62.2% of less educated people consider being of the Catholic faith as a key factor, whereas only 36.4% of the entire population feels the same way.

**Tab. 2 - Il deragliamentò dai grandi valori unificanti (val. %)**

| <i>La sfiducia nei sistemi democratici</i>  |      |
|---|------|
| Oggi è molto difficile salire nella scala sociale   | 85,5 |
| Ormai i politici pensano più a sé stessi che ai cittadini   | 84,4 |
| Se non cambia, l'Unione europea è destinata a sfasciarsi  | 71,4 |
| Partecipare a manifestazioni di piazza e cortei di protesta non serve a niente  | 55,7 |
| <i>L'antioccidentalismo montante</i>  |      |
| I Paesi occidentali pretendono di imporre agli altri il proprio modello economico (libero mercato) e politico (democrazie liberali) | 70,8 |
| Le democrazie occidentali non funzionano più  | 68,5 |
| I Paesi occidentali (Usa in testa) sono i principali responsabili delle guerre in corso in Ucraina e in Medio Oriente               | 66,3 |
| I Paesi occidentali sono destinati a soccombere economicamente e politicamente dinanzi all'ascesa di Paesi come Cina e India        | 51,1 |
| Bisogna aumentare le spese militari fino al 2% del Pil  | 31,6 |

Fonte: indagine Censis, 2024

**The silent racism of Italians.** According to Censis, 40.8% of the population is convinced that Italians are racist, and the percentage reaches 47.2% among 18–34-year-olds. In addition, 58.5% believe that racism is increasing. For 52.2% of second-generation young people, born in Italy to at least one parent with a migrant background or raised in our country, Italians are racist: 62.4% have suffered discrimination in the past, 26% are still victims and 75% know young people of foreign origin who have been victims of discrimination. 23.4% have been refused a job because of their origin and 29.4% have not obtained a house to rent because they are considered foreigners. Among them, 64.4% are convinced that racism in Italy is increasing. Hate crimes committed in our country have more than doubled in 8 years: they were 55% in 2015, rising to 1,393 in 2022. Those of a racist or xenophobic nature, which represent the majority, have almost tripled: from 369 in 2015 to 1,105 in 2022 (+199.4%).

**Tab. 5 - Caratteristiche che definiscono l'italianità secondo gli italiani, per titolo di studio (val. %)**

|                                   | Titolo di studio        |                                   |                    | Totale |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------|
|                                   | Fino alla licenza media | Diploma o qualifica professionale | Laurea o superiore |        |
| Avere origini italiane            | 79,9                    | 58,3                              | 47,2               | 57,4   |
| Essere cattolico                  | 62,2                    | 35,3                              | 28,0               | 36,4   |
| Avere determinati tratti somatici | 17,4                    | 14,8                              | 10,6               | 13,7   |

Fonte: indagine Censis, 2024

Fig. 1.11 | **La paura dello straniero**  
 Quanto si sente d'accordo con la seguente affermazione?  
 "Gli immigrati sono un pericolo per l'ordine pubblico e la sicurezza delle persone"  
 (valori % di quanti si dicono "moltissimo" o "molto" d'accordo - Serie storica)



Fonte: Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza, sondaggio Demos & Pi per Fondazione Unipolis, novembre 2023 (N. Casi: 1.006)

## Antisemitism

Today we are faced with a growing antisemitism never measured in Italy since the end of the war. Antisemitism, a feeling, an ideology, a thought that expresses itself in multiple forms according to the situation and the socio-economic and political context, in this last year and a half has been stoked and strengthened from many sides, by the discourse or silence of various protagonists of public life.

The growth of antisemitism is related to concomitant factors:

- The development over decades of conspiracy thinking as a key to understanding the world, increased by disintermediation and information disorder. Conspiracy theories, shared by those who are hostile to institutions and the system, are widespread, especially in the areas of right-wing and left-wing extremism. Conspiracy theories often find their answers in antisemitism. The new anti-Jewish hostility influenced by ancient images and prejudices rooted in the mentality and collective imagination takes on new forms and expressions. No-global anti-globalism and conspiratorial readings tend to connect. Current fears of the "dark forces" of today's globalization evoke some of the oldest "founding myths" of antisemitism, and that of the Jewish conspiracy.
- Traditional and contemporary forms of antisemitism have intersected: right-wing antisemitism, of neo-Nazi origin, alongside globalist antisemitism, or radicalism of Islamic origin, fueled by anti-Zionism and hatred of Israel.
- The distorted representation of Israel and Zionism as expressions of imperialism has been spread for decades by "antagonist" movements. Antisemitism masks itself as pro-Palestinian solidarity and in general the representation of Israel as an outpost of the West, persecutor of the world's poor, but uses anti-Jewish arguments. The demonization of the State defined as "racist" influences antisemitism in civil society.
- The growth of the Islamist interpretation in which religious wills are welded with political ones of opposition to Israel, which assimilate Jews to supporters of Israeli politics. This component is becoming more relevant, as can be seen in the language and attitudes of

second-generation groups of Arab and North African origin in the pro-Palestinian demonstrations of recent months.

- The growth of distortion of Shoah remembrance and the appropriation of memory.

After October 7 and the war in Gaza, attitudes and opinions towards Israel have become radicalized. The war has brought about a change of perspective: the demonization and delegitimization of the existence of Israel, accused of responding asymmetrically to the atrocious massacre of civilians, has spread across the board (by age, social class, and political affiliation), and has increased antisemitism. "Anti-Zionism" has exploited the widespread misinformation about Jewish history and the deep-rooted prejudices against Jews to construct a simplistic framework through which to mask antisemitism.

Anti-Zionism as a fight against all imperialisms, which fascinates large swathes of committed young people, especially in the antagonistic left, has made the Palestinian cause a banner. The language of the demonstrators and the pro-Palestinian slogans have intertwined with the battles against social injustice, the fight against racial discrimination, the denunciation of the responsibilities of "power" in terms of global warming, etc.

The opinions that have emerged and the increase in incidents—such as chants, demonstrations, and calls for boycotts—against Israel often reflect deep-seated, endemic antisemitic sentiments that have resurfaced. This can be seen in the language and imagery used by many pro-Palestinian supporters during their marches and on social media. Examples include Christological representations, references to ritual murders, depictions of Israelis as Nazis, and slogans like "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free."

Numerous studies and extensive qualitative and quantitative surveys, including those conducted by the Observatory on Antisemitism in Italy and the FRA across Europe, reveal that significant segments of society hold strong anti-Jewish prejudices. Jews are often associated with stereotypes related to money, power, separateness, dual loyalty, and conspiracy theories. While explicit antisemitism in Italy stands at about 15%, there exists a broader spectrum of anti-Jewish sentiments and feelings of hostility that often remain hidden until circumstances allow them to surface. The recent war in Gaza has acted as a powerful trigger for these sentiments.

As the war continued, reactions to it revealed the partiality and superficiality of the information available. More than a third of Italians (36%) stated that they knew little or nothing about the events that unfolded following the Hamas attack on October 7. In contrast, 40% considered themselves informed, while only about a quarter (24%) claimed to understand the situation in depth (Ipsos).<sup>5</sup>

If knowledge about Jews is scarce, prejudices are widespread and shared: [a Survey by SWG](#) confirms the historical over-representation of the number of Jews in Italy. A figure that,

---

<sup>5</sup> See [Guerra Israele-Palestina: le opinioni degli italiani | Ipsos](#) (in Italian).



for 64% of Italians, ranges from 500 thousand to over 2 million people. This is an imagined “power” compared to the actual presence of around 30 thousand Jews in the country.

The rise of antisemitic and conspiratorial sentiments is intricately linked to social unrest and emerging forms of poverty. These feelings draw upon a long history of anti-Jewish stereotypes, which include notions of power in finance and the mass media, greed, wealth, and a desire for global domination.


Anti-Zionism encourages actions against the existence of the Jewish State, along with its characterization as racist and Nazi-like. This influence promotes antisemitism within civil society and results in acts of anti-Jewish intolerance.

The sharp increase in antisemitic incidents in the months following October 7, 2023, has changed the lives of millions of Jews in the diaspora in the last 12 months, raising questions of personal and collective security, which no one had asked since 1945. Concern for their safety and the opportunity to hide their Jewish identity has become a reality for many Jews, as also emerges from [the results of the JDC survey](#) carried out between March and April 2024, which highlights how concern for antisemitism and the threat of physical attacks has grown significantly.

Most respondents, 78%, feel less safe living in their city and are more cautious about presenting themselves as Jewish than before the Hamas attack. Thirty-eight percent say they have distanced themselves from non-Jewish friends and have sought and found community strength in Jewish families and friends, and 11 percent say they have participated more in community activities and feel closer to Jews outside their communities – in Europe, in Israel, around the world. Assessments of threats to the future of Jewish life show respondents’ concerns intensifying, with an increase in threats rated as more serious than in the past. The survey reflects a worsening security situation. A significant 38 percent of respondents reported that their institutions have experienced antisemitic incidents since October 7, and a large majority (78 percent) say it has become less safe to live and practice their Judaism. While 73 percent still consider it safe, the number of those who feel very safe has fallen to 12 percent. European Jewish community leaders are much more pessimistic about antisemitism than in the past: 83 percent expect the problem to worsen in the coming years. Respondents report greater caution in displaying their Jewish identity. A quarter say they avoid wearing a kippah, while 32 percent avoid other external signs (shirts, chains) that could make them a physical target.




Pensando alla Sua situazione personale, in che misura ritiene che la guerra in Israele e le sue conseguenze in Europa abbiano influenzato il suo rapporto con...



11


## Minacce 2024



\*Quali delle seguenti minacce esterne e interne ritiene siano più preoccupanti per il futuro della comunità ebraica nel Suo Paese? (Percentuale di intervistati che hanno dato un punteggio di 4 o 5 su una scala da 1 a 5) Italia vs Totale campione.



Ritiene che dopo gli eventi del 7 ottobre vivere come ebreo/a e praticare l'ebraismo nella città in cui risiede sia diventato...



**91%** degli intervistati italiani ritiene che il governo risponda in modo adeguato alle esigenze di sicurezza delle comunità ebraiche (70% del totale del sondaggio)

8

## Holocaust Remembrance Day

Twenty-five years of Holocaust Remembrance Day have not been enough to eradicate antisemitism from our society, as evidenced by the growth of the trivialization of the Holocaust, the distortion and appropriation of memory that is now expressed in the public narrative by large groups of young people, intellectuals, and political associations when they invert the terms of the discourse and transform victims into culprits.

“Never again. Eighty years ago, the extermination of the Jewish people by the Nazis. Today, the genocide of the Palestinian people by Israel. Holocaust Remembrance Day brings together two inhuman tragedies that offend and wound the conscience of every individual.”


These are the words that appeared in support of an event organized for January 27, 2024, in a city in Tuscany.

The percentage of Italians who recognize the usefulness of Holocaust Remembrance Day is decreasing, as emerges from the survey by Swg 2025, which since 2014 has monitored the perception and feelings of citizens towards the anniversary every January. In 2024, 23% of those interviewed believed that it is no longer useful, while 16% thought it would be a question that only concerns the Jews. On the other hand, the number of those who believe that Remembrance Day helps “not forget what happened” (from 91% in 2023 to 83% in 2024) and those who think that it helps “keeping the attention alive on these issues” (from 86% to 77%) were significantly decreasing. Remembering the genocide of the Jews and other victims of Nazism through Remembrance Day is ‘right’ for 37%, ‘educational’ for 35%, ‘necessary’ for 28%, ‘rhetorical’ for 11% and ‘useless’ for 8%.

What effect does the conflict in the Middle East have on participation and recognizability of Holocaust Remembrance Day?

The percentage of Italians who know what is celebrated on January 27 is stable over time and the trend of decreasing emotional participation on this day was decreasing, even before the conflict began. Even those who identify as closer to the Jewish people show a significant weakening in the degree of participation in the celebrations. The trend data while confirming the sensitivity that Italians have towards this anniversary, also highlight the risk of a progressive weakening of the perceived value of Holocaust Remembrance Day. It is important to note the decline in the educational value associated with this anniversary, which has dropped from 46% in 2018 to just 28% today. This decline coincides with an increase in negative evaluations, which have risen by 9% over the past four years, particularly regarding perceptions of the event as useless and rhetorical.

### Percentuale di intervistati che riconoscono correttamente la celebrazione del 27 gennaio



Valori % - Archivio SWG

Tutti i diritti riservati

The results highlight a decrease in personal and collective involvement in the celebration of Holocaust Remembrance Day.


#### Secondo lei gli italiani si sentono, verso la celebrazione del Giorno della Memoria, molto, abbastanza, poco o per nulla coinvolti? (% al netto dei «non so»)



Valori % - Archivio SWG


Tutti i diritti riservati 12

#### E lei personalmente sente di essere molto, abbastanza, poco o per nulla coinvolto, dalla celebrazione del Giorno della Memoria? (% al netto dei «non so»)



Secondo lei ricordare il genocidio degli ebrei e delle altre vittime del nazismo attraverso il Giorno della Memoria, è...

(% di risposte affermative)




Valori % - Archivio SWG

Tutti i diritti riservati

Among those who feel closer to the Jewish people after the Israel-Hamas conflict, there is a strong perception of a greater disinterest of Italians towards Holocaust Remembrance Day.


Ritengono che gli italiani si sentano molto o abbastanza coinvolti nella celebrazione del Giorno della Memoria

(% al netto dei «non so»)



Si sentono personalmente coinvolti nella celebrazione del Giorno della Memoria

(% al netto dei «non so»)




Valori % - Archivio SWG

13

## Polls on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

### Demopolis survey - October 2023

A little over ten days after the Hamas attacks in Israel, public opinion had become concerned about the evolution and unknowns of the conflict in the Middle East. 75% of Italians feared the expansion of the war front to other countries, and over 2 in 3 highlighted the very heavy cost in human lives among the civilian population in Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. 66% were concerned about the resurgence of cases of terrorism in Europe.




*Information note: the survey was conducted by the Demopolis Institute, on a national sample of 2,000 interviewees, statistically representative of the universe of the Italian adult population. Demoscopic survey of 17-18/10/2023.*

### Euromedia Research Survey, Gaza, and Italians - October 2024<sup>6</sup>


Several socio-political and economic factors alarm the Italian population about the possible repercussions of the conflict on internal security, including concern about acts of terrorism that could be activated on European territory. The main concerns of Italians lie in the possible escalation of the conflict (40.9%) and the humanitarian impact (31.5%).

<sup>6</sup> [Gaza e gli italiani: "Troppi civili uccisi"](#).



## ISPI-IPSOS Survey: War in the Middle East, one year later - September/October 2024


What do Italians think about the Middle East? More than three in four Italians (77%) say they are worried that the conflict in the Middle East could escalate both in violence and in the number of actors involved. Only a small portion (less than 3%) say they are not worried at all, confirming the fears generated by the conflict. These fears also emerge from the answers to another question. When Italians were asked in February 2024 what the two most serious threats were at a global level, 46% had already indicated "wars". By October, this threat had grown, reaching 54% of those interviewed.



## Israel and the Netanyahu government are considered the main responsible for the conflict

Despite the uncertainty (over a third of respondents said they did not know how to answer), Italians seem to believe that Israel as a whole and especially the current Netanyahu government are the ones who bear the greatest responsibility for Gaza (35% adding both options) and for Lebanon (32%). Regarding the situation in Gaza, Hamas is instead considered responsible by 15% of respondents, while Hezbollah is considered the main responsible for the extension of the war to Lebanon by 17% of respondents.

## Secondo lei, chi ha le maggiori responsabilità nell'attuale crisi in Medio Oriente?



Fonte: sondaggio ISPI realizzato da Ipsos, settembre/ottobre 2024

ISPI

### IPSOS Survey - December 2024<sup>7</sup>

About 70% of Italians are concerned about the conflict in the Gaza Strip, slightly lower compared to the start of the conflict. It is a war in which the humanitarian consequences are feared first, and foremost (32%) the possible extension of the conflict to other countries is feared (29%), while the economic consequences and the risk of possible terrorist acts of Islamist origin seem less worrying.


Israel's behavior is considered unacceptable by most Italians: 54% believe that it is a disproportionate reaction compared to the attack of October 7, 2023. A fifth instead considers the Israeli reaction understandable (data stable in recent months but decreasing compared to the start of the conflict). A greater understanding, although not a majority, of Israel's reasons, is found among center-right voters. Italy's role, according to those interviewed, should be to work on mediation between the parties to avoid an extension of the conflict (44%). About a fifth instead think that Italy should support the Palestinian cause (13%) by condemning Hamas and Hezbollah, and (7%) even without condemning the terrorist groups.

<sup>7</sup> [Sondaggio Ipsos, la guerra in Medio Oriente tra Israele, Hamas e Hezbollah | Corriere.it.](#)




## I conflitti in corso

**Lei personalmente quanto si sente preoccupata/preoccupato dal conflitto in corso nella Striscia di Gaza e in Libano, tra Israele e i miliziani di Hamas ed Hezbollah?**




**In questo momento, qual è per lei l'aspetto più preoccupante di questo conflitto?**



**Secondo lei la risposta militare di Israele nella Striscia di Gaza e nei territori confinanti...?**



**A suo parere l'Italia in questo conflitto dovrebbe...?**



**Diversi governi nel mondo, inclusi quelli di nove Stati dell'Unione Europea, hanno riconosciuto formalmente lo Stato palestinese. A suo parere anche l'Italia dovrebbe riconoscere lo Stato di Palestina in maniera ufficiale?**

**OGGI**



Corriere della Sera

## CHAPTER 2. ACTS AND DISCOURSES AGAINST THE JEWS IN 2024

Stefano Gatti, Larisa Anastasia Bulgar, Murilo Henrique Cambuzzi

CDEC Foundation's Observatory on Antisemitism categorizes as an incident of antisemitism any intentional act directed against Jewish persons, organizations, or property, where there is evidence that the action has antisemitic motivations or content, or the victim was targeted because they were, or perceived to be, Jewish. In this regard, the Observatory embraces the **International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance - IHRA's [Working Definitions of Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial and Distortion](#)**.

This chapter presents a summary of the data collected and analyzed by the CDEC Foundation's Observatory on Antisemitism in 2024, data that are not exhaustive of the phenomenon in Italian society, as acts of antisemitism—like other forms of hatred and intolerance—are often under-reported. Although the data presented here nevertheless **represent an unprecedented increase in numbers**, they definitely do not encompass the full scope of Italian reality.

### The data

During 2024, the CDEC Foundation's Observatory on Antisemitism received 1,381 reports. After careful analysis, **877** of them were categorized as incidents of antisemitism.

504 reports were not logged because they reported acts that were not considered antisemitic, were already reported, or were unclear.

The figures for 2024 (**877**) are almost double those recorded in 2023 (454), which already constituted a peak that had never been reached since - in the second half of the 1960s - the CDEC's antisemitism division began its work of indexing and studying incidents against Jews. It had never occurred to record such a large number of incidents within a twelve-month period. This growth is not an isolated phenomenon but ties in with the surge of acts against Jews [detected globally after October 7, 2023](#).

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has created in Italy a climate of social acceptance for prejudice and stereotypes against Jews that has not been experienced since the end of World War II. It is emblematic that prominent representatives of the Catholic Church have revived some of the cornerstones of anti-Jewish polemics, including the idea that Jews tend toward revenge and cruelty, a fact highlighted by the [Italian Rabbinical Assembly](#) and various secular opinion leaders in 2024.<sup>8</sup>


---

<sup>8</sup> See the articles in Italian: Lucetta Scaraffia, "L'antisemitismo e il papa ambiguo" <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/articoli/ambiguita-di-papa-bergoglio/?hilite=bergoglio>; Massimo Giuliani, "Rimosso il Gesù con la kefiah", <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/articoli/massimo-giuliani-interviene-sul-gesu-pro-pal/?hilite=giuliani>.

Post-October 7 antisemitism has also become a rallying element for [student and union protests](#), as well as an almost daily topic of political diatribes at all levels (national and local).

Most of the incidents recorded by the Observatory on Antisemitism generally fall into the typology of **Defamation** and **Insults**<sup>9</sup>, i.e., insults/narrative/prejudice/ antisemitic stereotypes applied to the online world (e.g., offensive posts on a social media site) or the offline world (e.g., antisemitic speech in a doctor's office, restaurant, or school).

The year 2024 was also marked by a considerable increase in **Threats**<sup>10</sup> to Jewish people and institutions (or those deemed to be Jewish), cases of **Discrimination**<sup>11</sup> (e.g., "Zionist" journalists who were made it virtually impossible to attend public events), and even **Assaults**<sup>12</sup> (e.g., spitting in the face of a museum employee<sup>13</sup>, or hand-wringing and insults against a young woman on a streetcar<sup>14</sup>). **Acts of Vandalism**<sup>15</sup> were characterized by particularly serious actions, such as the desecration of the only Jewish grave in a cemetery, the defacement of symbols of the Shoah in the name of anti-Zionism ("from the Shoah, you have learned nothing"<sup>16</sup>), or swastikas drawn near houses inhabited by Jewish families.



February 2024. Jewish Community member and journalist receives an anonymous death threat letter with antisemitic content.

---

<sup>9</sup> [Diffamazione e insulti - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Minacce alle persone - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)

<sup>11</sup> See <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/notizie/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/discriminazione/?anno=2024>.

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/notizie/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/aggressioni-fisiche-contro-le-persone/?anno=2024>.

<sup>13</sup> [Veneto, aggressione ad una donna ebrea - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)

<sup>14</sup> [Milano, aggressione antisemita sul tram - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)

<sup>15</sup> [Vandalismo - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Pescantina \(VE\), vandalizzato il monumento a internati e deportati - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)



June 2024. Antisemitic writings and insults, accompanied by swastikas, drawn on walls in front of a store in Rome.

After October 7, 2023, incidents against Jews increased significantly, with about half occurring in the real (offline) world: death threats written on the interior walls of establishments frequented by Jews, swastikas and threatening graffiti drawn at homes inhabited by Jewish families, periodically updated antisemitic proscription lists, public demonstrations against “Zionist agents,” threatening letters (even containing Nazi flags) sent to the Jewish communities, assaults (verbal and physical) on students in schools and universities, sharp increase in the activity of opposition groups in schools and all major universities, harassment and pressure against Jews and/or Israelis, and [vandalization of Jewish homes](#) and properties.

In 2024 out of **877** incidents, **277** took place in the offline world.<sup>17</sup>

These offline incidents are of significant concern, as they frequently infringe upon constitutional rights. Notably, a considerable number of Jews and Israelis were prevented from attending universities, have been compelled to change schools, or have been forced to hide their identities. The intimidating climate created by ‘anti-Zionists’ ([calls by extremists to “mark the homes of Zionist agents”](#)) of various stripes has also made it problematic to attend gathering places (e.g., gyms). Even Jewish Community periodicals (e.g., *Bollettino della Comunità ebraica di Milano*, *Shalom*, *Pagine ebraiche*) are **now distributed hiding the masthead** to avoid hostile reactions.

There is a common tendency to misuse language and distort the meaning of terms. Consider the fact that “Zionism” has lost its original - meaning of Jewish Revival - to take on that of “colonialism and racism” borrowed from Soviet and Islamist propaganda<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> In 2022 out of a total of 241 incidents of antisemitism 164 online and 77 offline; in 2023 out of a total of 454 incidents of antisemitism 259 online and 195 offline.

<sup>18</sup> See the article, in Italian, “Se l’odio antiebraico ferisce la democrazia,” in <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/articoli/editoriale-di-maurizio-molinari-sullantisemitismo-legato-allantisionismo/?hilito=molinari>.

The level of aggression has also grown as social acceptance for Israel-related antisemitism has expanded: if “Zionists” are equal/worse than Nazis fighting them is democratic, lawful, and even desirable, and anti-Zionists often pose as “new partisans.” After October 7, April 25 (Liberation Day) has frequently taken on the face of violent anti-Zionism as well as distorting historical truth, such that it is difficult or even impossible for members of Jewish communities to take part.<sup>19</sup>



*Lido di Venezia, May 13, 2024. “Damn Jews, we will search for you house by house all over the world to slit your throats and your children.”*

---

<sup>19</sup> See, for example: “Milano, gruppi pro pal lanciano insulti durante la manifestazione per il 25 aprile”, <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/milano-gruppi-pro-pal-lanciano-insulti-durante-la-manifestazione-per-il-25-aprile/?hilit=liberazione>; “Roma, corteo del 25 aprile, aggressioni e minacce da parte di gruppi pro pal”, <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/roma-corteo-del-25-aprile-minacce-da-parte-di-gruppi-pro-pal/?hilit=liberazione>; “Verona, insulti e minacce agli ebrei”, in <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/verona-insulti-e-minacce-agli-ebrei/?hilit=liberazione> (in Italian).


## Incidents recorded from January to December

| Month     | No. of incidents |
|-----------|------------------|
| January   | 78               |
| February  | 88               |
| March     | 94               |
| April     | 82               |
| May       | 113              |
| June      | 67               |
| July      | 64               |
| August    | 38               |
| September | 60               |
| October   | 70               |
| November  | 70               |
| December  | 53               |
| Total     | <b>877</b>       |

For the complete list of incidents of antisemitism, see


<https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/notizie/episodi-di-antisemitismo-in-italia/?anno=2024>

In the Observatory on Antisemitism database, incidents are anonymized to defend the privacy of the victims.



Antisemitic incidents by month (2022-2024).

**600** incidents concern antisemitism on the Internet, **2** incidents occurred both online and offline, while **277** consist of acts that happened physically, including **8** assaults.



Antisemitic acts online and offline (2024).

### Origin of the reports

Jews: **457**


Non-Jews: **361**

Mass Media: **59**

**NOTE:** The 600 cases of antisemitism on the Web are only those reported to the Observatory on Antisemitism by users and analyzed. The Observatory directly monitors and processes countless more posts and incidents of antisemitism on the Web throughout the year. In 2024 we directly analyzed about 4 thousand of them. Online antisemitism cannot be quantified numerically, and no research institute attempts to do so due to its lack of scientific foundation. Posts are continually reproduced and shared, while many are also removed from social platforms. However, it is crucial to analyze the content of these posts, as such examination provides valuable insights for monitoring contemporary trends and changes in language, forms, and levels of aggression.

## Types of incidents

**Number of incidents by type (2024): Defamation and insults, Graffiti and graphics, Threats, Physical assaults, Discrimination, and Vandalism.**





## Where the incidents took place

In 2024, a total of **877** incidents of antisemitism were recorded, of which the cities where **298** incidents occurred could be identified:

**Airale (TO), Ascoli Piceno, Assisi, Avellino, Azzano San Paolo (BG), Bagno a Ripoli, Bari, Bellante (TE), Bergamo, Boffalora Sopra Ticino/Magenta, Bologna (10), Bolzano (5), Brindisi, Cagliari (5), Caldonazzo (TN), Camogli, Ceccano (FR), Chiavari (GE), Cerveteri (RM), Como, Crescentino (VC), Cuveglia (VA), Enna, Ferrara, Firenze (14), Fiumicino, Genova (6), L'Aquila (2), Livorno, Mariano Comense (MI), Marostica (VI), Milan (76), Modena (3), Munich<sup>20</sup>, Montecatini (2), Monzambano (MN), Napoli (9), Ostuni, Padenghe sul Garda (BS), Padova (5), Paestum (SA), Palermo (2), Parghelia (Vibo Valentia), Parma (5), Pavia, Perugia (2), Pescantina (VE), Pigna (IM), Pinerolo, Pisa (4), Pontedera, Ponton S. Ambrogio di Valpolicella, Pordenone, Procida, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Emilia, Rivolta d'Adda (CR), Rome (56), Salerno (2), Saltrio (VA), Saluzzo, San Candido (BZ), San Casciano in val di Pesa, Sant'Omobono Terme (BG), Sarteano (SI), Sassari, San Vito di Cadore, Selva di Cadore (BL), Settecamini (RM), Seveso, Siena (3), Turin (19), Trento (2), Trieste (2), Varese, Venezia (2), Verona (4), Viareggio (LU), Vicenza, Viverone (BI), Zinola (SV).**




*Milan, subway line 4, Policlinico stop - An unknown person drew the words "Pedophile Jews." The accusation of "pedophilia" directed against Jews was recently proposed by a well-known Italian Palestinian influencer on his highly followed X/Twitter profile.*

---

<sup>20</sup> This German city has also been listed because a group of ultras fans of the Lazio soccer team in March 2024 became involved in a case of apologia for Nazi-fascism. "Lazio ultras praise the Duce in Hitler's beloved pub." in <https://www.osservatorioantisemitismo.it/articoli/cronaca-della-trasferta-a-monaco-di-baviera-degli-ultra-laziali-neofascisti/?hilit=monaco>.

## Web Platforms


**Number of episodes online by platform.**



## Victims of antisemitic incidents

**725** incidents involve Jews and/or undefined Jewish entities and are described based on archaic Judeophobic prejudices: cruel, bloodthirsty, racist, rich, cunning, cheap, prone to domination and conspiracy. Here are some of the terms commonly used to refer to the Jews: Zionists, Nazi-Zionists, Zionazis, Judeo-Nazis, Jewish Nazis, Jewish supremacist Zionists, Ashenazites, Khazars, Talmudists, Kabbalists, 'big noses,' Freemasons, Illuminati, Shlomo, 'soap', and many more.

**Zionist** (with multiple lexical variations: 'Nazi-Zionist,' 'Zionazi,' 'Zionist-supremacists,' and so on) is the term commonly used to identify the Jews – avoiding accusations of antisemitism and adding democratic and anti-racist connotations to the prejudice. To the "Zionist" it is possible to ascribe without hesitation the bleakest charges in the anti-Jewish archive (hatred of humankind, exclusivism, ritual murder and cannibalism, deicide, etc.), as even [a journalist wrote on her Facebook profile](#): "The news coming out of Gaza is a collection of horrors. Disemboweled bodies with organs removed, a practice Israel has been employing for decades on Palestinian corpses."



*In December 2024, an AI-generated cartoon was shared on Facebook that promotes the Judeophobic myth of ritual cannibalism.*



*In January 2024, a user on X published an AI-generated antisemitic image based on a fake news story accusing some US Jews of violence against non-Jewish children. The zoomorphization of Jews (often portrayed as rats or bats) is an ancient and paradigmatic element of antisemitic iconography.*

Also common is the use of the epithet **Ashkenazi** to refer to Jews, to demonize them according to the usual narrative canons (racist, exclusivist, prone to violence, victimhood, etc.), and, as per Zionist, to avoid the accusation of antisemitism: "I do not harbor hostility toward Jews but only against the false Ashkenazi Jews hated by the Jews themselves".<sup>21</sup> That establishing who and what Jews are is a *topos* of Judeophobia, think of Karl Lueger, one of the main figures of 19th-century antisemitism, burgomaster of Vienna from 1897 to 1910, who said, "I decide who is a Jew."

The conspiracy-antisemitic use of the term Ashkenazi has its roots in the ideology of the far-right "red-brown"<sup>22</sup> and conspiracist ideology, which forced into an esoteric key the contents of Arthur Koestler's book, *The Thirteenth Tribe. History of the Khazars from the Middle Ages to the Jewish Holocaust*, UTET 2004.

Zionist and Ashkenazi in their many lexical variations are used across the board (right, left, Islamists, plotters, wokeism, etc.) both by those who declare themselves (sometimes "proudly") to be antisemitic, as well as by those who prefer the anti-Zionist definition.

<sup>21</sup> Quote excerpted from books and talks by a Judeophobic polemicist and one of the theorists of "cruel Ashkenazi false Jews."

<sup>22</sup> By extreme right-wing 'red brown' we refer to that ideological area that has as its reference point the neo-Nazi Claudio Umar Amin Mutti and his publishing group *Edizioni all'Insegna del Veltro* from Parma.

**152** incidents involve Jewish individuals (or deemed as such) and/or Jewish entities (or deemed as such), which are also stereotyped and demonized according to established negative overgeneralizations. The main victims continue to be public figures who are often the focus of media attention. These people are the targets of antisemitic attacks regardless of what they do; the paradigmatic example is that of Senator for Life Liliana Segre, who is always overwhelmed by invectives of peculiar virulence even when she does not utter a word, her presence is enough.

The main targets (some targeted repeatedly) are Liliana Segre<sup>23</sup>, David Parenzo, Maurizio Molinari, Daniele Nahum, and the Union of Italian Jewish Communities.



September 2024, a post published by an X/Twitter user. The blue and red pills are a reference to the sci-fi film *Matrix* (1999), a landmark of conspiracy sub-cultures, where the blue pill represents a false reality created by cruel machines, while the red pill symbolizes reality.



Milan, September 2024, A few hundred protesters take to the streets on the day of the death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah with signs bearing the image of Liliana Segre referred to as a "Zionist agent," as well as those of Riccardo Pacifici, Minister Crosetto and other "Zionist agents."

## Gender of the victims

Female<sup>24</sup>: **66**

Male: **49**

Both: **762**

<sup>23</sup> Life Senator Liliana Segre continues to be the main victim of antisemitic attacks, the insults against her reach peaks of violence and vulgarity, the perpetrators of these posts are - often - older people.


<sup>24</sup> A misogynistic component often emerges in the attacks against Jewish women, which is expressed in boorish ways, sometimes with rape fantasies. Jewish/Zionist women would invariably be "c\*nts" and/or "wh\*res...."

## Ideological motif

The **877** incidents recorded in 2024 by the Observatory on Antisemitism, fall into the following five classifications developed based on the Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism<sup>25</sup>: Anti-Judaism (Christian and Islamic)<sup>26</sup>; Neo-Nazism/Neofascism<sup>27</sup>; Generic hatred and/or including multiple ideological undertones; Israel-related Antisemitism<sup>28</sup>; Jewish Power/ Antisemitic Conspiracism<sup>29</sup>.

Ideological motifs frequently overlap, including themes such as Israel-related anti-Judaism, antisemitism, neo-Nazism, and conspiratorial antisemitism. Classification is conducted based on the predominant theme present in each case.

***Ideological motifs (2024): Jewish Power/ Antisemitic Conspiracism (3.4%), Anti-Judaism (2.8%), Generic hatred (12.9%), Neo-Nazism/Neofascism (8.3%), and Israel-related Antisemitism (72.7%).***



## Events triggering Anti-Jewish incidents and polemics on the web from January to December

There is an increase in antisemitic incidents and speech when Jews and/or Jewish entities (or deemed as such) are the focus of media attention, regardless of what they do. After October 7, any activity involving (even indirectly) the State of Israel or 'Zionists' causes incidents.

<sup>25</sup> [EU Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism published.](#)

<sup>26</sup> Religiously biased, the central accusing myth is that of deicide.

<sup>27</sup> Racist theories that rest on biologism and hold Jews to be a separate race connoted by hereditary and traits (hatred of humankind, racism, misoxenia, etc.) are expressions of this form of antisemitism the denial/banalization of the Shoah.

<sup>28</sup> Accusatory myths and Judeophobic narratives applied to the State of Israel and "Zionists," such as a predisposition to murder and claims of racial superiority through divine election, etc.

<sup>29</sup> Conviction that Jews act behind the scenes in all affairs.

Triggering events can be divided into two categories: macro-events, such as the Hamas-Israel conflict or the Paris Olympics, and fringe events, which may occur in real life (for example, the false news about a Palestinian boy with Down syndrome and autism being killed by a dog) or online. The latter often have significant media impact due to the dynamics of the web, which includes publishing, sharing, commenting, and reposting.

Jewish holidays, presentations of 'Zionist' books or films, sports events involving Israeli teams, and the mere presence of individuals deemed 'Zionist' (ex. David Parenzo or Maurizio Molinari) have become **catalyzers** of antisemitism that follow a classic pattern, publication before/during/after the event of posts inciting violence, misleading and offensive (often crude and violent) that mix a bit of all Judeophobic themes, anti-Zionism (which in 2024 is always central), conspiracism (also always very present, often as a frame)<sup>30</sup> Shoah denialism/distortion, or a mixture of stereotypes (greed, usury, congenital evilness, etc.) against Jews.

The haters - increasingly numerous and aggressive - rage during trigger events, as a rule, they do not hide. They are provocative, want to be recognized, and often claim their prejudice as a form of defense and "resistance" from the all-powerful "Zionists."

The most impactful triggering events in 2024 were:

- **Conflict between Hamas and Israel** (January to December)
- **Public statements made by Liliana Segre** (January to December)
- **Student protests** (January to December)
- **January 27/Remembrance Day** (January)
- **Trial of the government of Israel for genocide at the Hague Tribunal** (January)
- **Easter/Pesach** (April)
- **April 25 Liberation Day** (April)
- **Student 'Acampada' at universities to globalize the Intifada** (April)
- **Eurovision** (May)
- **Pride Month** (June)
- **Paris Olympics** (July)
- **Killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh** (August)
- **European Day of Jewish Culture** (September)
- **First anniversary of the Hamas massacre** (October)
- **Amsterdam soccer match between Ajax and Maccabi Tel Aviv** (November)

---

<sup>30</sup> This motif consists of the belief that Jews/Zionists act in all events from behind the scenes, especially in tragic ones (wars, economic crises, pandemics, etc.).



Facebook, July 2024



Facebook, July 2024

## Antisemitic discourse, rhetoric, and symbols

The main ideological discourse of Judeophobia<sup>31</sup> in Italy 2024 is that which pertains to **Israel-related antisemitism**<sup>32</sup> and which has as its main narrative that of Zionism as/worse than Nazism combined with the accusation of Jews being racially superior by divine election which presupposes colonialism, imperialism, ethnocide, and **genocide**. Furthermore, there is also an increasingly widespread diffusion of anti-Jewish arguments (hatred towards humanity, exclusivism, misogyny, ritual murder and cannibalism, deicide, tendency to revenge, etc.) of archaic origin and now secularized (think of the Palestinian Christ martyred and crucified by the “Zionists”)<sup>33</sup> and transferred to an imaginary Israel/Zionism/Zionists. Anti-Jewish hostility in – and not only – extremist circles has increasingly taken the form of an aversion with religious roots, think of the attribution of vengeful and hateful impulses (“hatred of the human race”) towards Gentiles, or the tendency to kill prophets and conspiracies as inherent and hereditary characteristics of Jews/Zionists. The “vengeful” Jews are contrasted in a Manichean way with the “good” Christians (who “turn the other cheek”) and Muslims.<sup>34</sup>

This is a novelty because, until October 2023, the primary source of animosity towards Jews came from the neo-Nazi and neo-fascist right. Although anti-Jewish sentiments were present, they were not as prominent as they are today.

<sup>31</sup> Polemical arguments, cultural and subcultural frameworks, slogans, iconographic elements, and other aspects of antisemitism.


<sup>32</sup> Application of formal accusation myths and Judeophobic narratives about the State of Israel and Zionism, both depicted as Evil.

<sup>33</sup> Deicide turns into crucifixion and martyrdom of Arab-Islamic Christians.

<sup>34</sup> See the article: [“Quei cattivi maestri, seminatori di odio \(davvero inconsapevoli?\)”](#) (in Italian).

Far-right antisemitism continues to be present on the Internet, with its brutal and violent propaganda (both in terms of slogans and iconography) but, above all, in the world of football supporters ([hooligan groups](#) engage in antisemitic chants or misuse figures and symbols of the Shoah in a distorted and Judeophobic manner) and in extremist groups, as in the case of the ["supremacist and neo-Nazi" organization Werwolf](#).

The anti-Zionist Nazification of the Jews is nothing new, it is a product of Soviet propaganda in the wake of the Six-Day War of 1967 and was also active in Italy in 1982 during the war in Lebanon, but not on the present scale following October 7, 2023. Furthermore, in 1982 the Islamist element was missing, which is instead a major factor in today's propaganda. The distortion of terms and symbols linked to Nazi-fascism and the Shoah with a reversal of meanings, for example, the iconographic comparison between the Magen David (Star of David) and the Hitlerian swastika, the libel that Jews of being like/worse than the Nazis or the appropriation of Jewish figures to distort their meaning (e.g. Anne Frank with the *keffiyeh*) are now polemical tools that are used across the board (extremists, but also journalists, influencers, parliamentarians, university professors, entertainers). The comparison Jews = Nazis is often followed by the comment – also ideologically across the board – that Hitler (defined in various ways, often affectionate, such as 'Uncle Adolf', 'little mustache', 'mustachio', 'the Austrian painter', etc.) should have completed his work of exterminating the Jews.




Instagram, April 2024.

Mockery, distortion, and trivialization of the Shoah until 2023 were exclusively the prerogative of the radical right, Islamists, and fringe sections of the antagonistic left, today instead they are used transversally in all political sectors. The subcultural background that fuels aversion to Jews continues to be based on conspiracy theories shaped through Judeophobic pamphlets in the style of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and a certain Islamist millenarianism. A phantomatic 'Jewish lobby' (or Zionist) aimed at dominating and exploiting the world is imagined behind all the events. Conspiracism is often based on prejudices and an ahistorical and distorted vision of the Jewish people and their events, as emerges in February 2024, when a group of high school students from Milan released a document on "Zionism and



## ANNUAL REPORT ON ANTISEMITISM

Judaism” in which they described “Semitism” as a form of “aversion towards Judaism”<sup>35</sup> and Zionism as a “colonial and genocidal policy”. In another instance, a university Professor of Philosophy accused Jewish people of racism, exclusivity, and a tendency to violence against non-Jews.



Milan, February 2024, pamphlet published by high school students.


Israel-related antisemitism post-October 7, 2023, draws heavily on Islamist ideology<sup>36</sup>, the paradigm being the slogans “*From the river to the sea*” and “*Khaybar Khaybar ya yahud*”<sup>37</sup>. Antisemitism related to Islamism or jihadism often exalts the terrorist movements of Islamic Jihad (Hamas, Hezbollah), and is expressed (online and offline) in forms of smug aggression sometimes with mocking tones, as seen in the attacks launched by Mohammad Hannoun in March 2024 against Senator Segre and the ‘lobby’<sup>38</sup> and the exaltation of Islamist terrorism.

<sup>35</sup> “Zionism is the policy of genocide against the Palestinian people.” See the news in Italian: [Liceo di Milano, scritte e volantino antisemiti - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#).


<sup>36</sup> See the study carried out by the Setteottobre Association [“The Normalization of October 7/ Palestinian ‘resistance’ on social networks”](#) (in Italian).

<sup>37</sup> These slogans call for the “elimination of the Zionist entity” and the death of the Jews.

<sup>38</sup> President of the Palestinian Association in Italy: [“Senator Segre doubts that it can be called genocide, because there is an exclusive reserved for their lobby.”](#)



Facebook, October 2024



March 2024. An antisemitic influencer with a large following publishes an aggressive post against Jews on her Instagram account. In the comments of the same post, there are threatening phrases towards the Jewish people, for example.



May 2024. Post published by a former MP of a populist party and current political commentator and activist.



March 2024. Some accounts on the audio social network Clubhouse Italia show antisemitic images comparing Israelis to Nazis.

Il quarto reich, i nazisti del terzo millennio, gli israeliani ...



Facebook, January 2025.

This year has seen a progressive increase in the social acceptance of antisemitism, a process that began in the wake of the Islamist attacks of October 7th and came to completion in the following months. A significant contribution was made by influential figures in the Catholic Church and the cultural sector, and by the spread of the so-called “woke” ideology – especially present among young people and in the entertainment world – which sees Jews/Zionists as a paradigm of imperialism, colonialism, and ‘privilege.’ Borrowed from “wokeism” is the accusation that the “Zionists” are engaging in “pinkwashing” to serve anti-Arab and anti-Islamic purposes (“the shameful Israeli pinkwashing that uses the subjectivity and rights of queer people as a tool in the hands of colonialism and Zionist violence”<sup>39</sup>) and that, because of “Zionists”, “there is no climate justice in Palestine.”

2024 confirms what emerged in 2023, that is, **a strong rooting of the antisemitic imagination in Italian society**, ready to reactivate in its most extreme forms when the State of Israel is involved. This antisemitism is fueled by the poor reaction of explicit condemnation or indifference on the part of important public figures (mayors, rectors, other prelates, etc.). Antisemitism constitutes a significant societal challenge that transcends the Jewish community, impacting society. However, the responsibility for addressing and denouncing this issue is frequently placed disproportionately upon Jews.

---

<sup>39</sup> “We take to the streets against the Zionist colonial occupation that has lasted for over 75 years.” See the news, in Italian: [Milano, organizzazione queer sostiene una manifestazione antisionista e pro pal - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#)

## CHAPTER 3. THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE ANTISEMITISM

Larisa Anastasia Bulgar

Even before October 7, social media and digital platforms had become the primary channels for the dissemination of antisemitism. Unlike in previous years<sup>40</sup>, **the most prevalent polemical theme on social media was antisemitism linked to the State of Israel**, manifesting in various forms—ranging from Salafist extremism to neo-Nazi hatred and radical left-wing rhetoric.

Among the key changes observed was the increased use of antisemitic **hashtags** and **slogans** (such as the slogan *#FromtheRivertotheSea*, which often serves as a call for the eradication of the State of Israel<sup>41</sup>); the rise in harassment targeting Jewish users and communities, including trolling and **death threats**; the **glorification of Hamas and Hezbollah terrorism**; the shadowbanning of pro-Israel accounts; and the proliferation of **conspiracy theories** that blame Jews for global conflicts<sup>42</sup>.

Compared to 2023, the Osservatorio recorded a 2.8 percentage point increase in online threats (calls for genocide against the Jewish people, death wishes, and disease-related curses) targeting Jewish entities and individuals or those perceived as such (**62** incidents, up from 19). Of the **522** recorded incidents of online defamation and insults, **49** explicitly referenced Adolf Hitler, with statements such as “*he should have finished the job*,” “*mustachio was farsighted*,” or “*Adolf should have wiped you all out*.” Given the sheer volume of comments, many of these incidents, recorded as single cases, encompassed numerous antisemitic interactions among internet users.

The **Italian Union of Jewish Youth** (in Italian, *Unione Giovani Ebrei d'Italia* - UGEI) reported that it had to stop its TikTok [campaign, “Ask a Jew,”](#) aimed at promoting knowledge of Judaism, due to offensive and sarcastic user comments. Many reiterated sentiments like “the little mustache should have finished his job.”

Another prevalent Judeophobic narrative **equates the State of Israel with** or portrays it as worse than, **Nazi Germany**. **60** recorded incidents featured comments such as “the new Nazis of the third millennium,” “Nazisionists,” or “you’re worse than the Nazis,” where “Zionist” was used interchangeably with “Jew,” often accompanied by insults like “murderers,” “bloodthirsty,” and “pedophiles.”

A further antisemitic trope, both linguistic and iconographic, involves **comparing Gaza to the Auschwitz extermination camp**, or even asserting that the situation of Gazans is worse

---

<sup>40</sup> In past years, the prevailing motif pertained to the radical right wing. See [Annual-report-on-antisemitism-in-Italy-2023.pdf](#).

<sup>41</sup> Originally this slogan in Arabic is “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be Arab.”

<sup>42</sup> See [Fighting Online Antisemitism \(FOA\), “Addressing Anti-Zionism on Social Media: Evidence-Based Recommendations for TikTok, Meta, X and YouTube”](#).

than that of Holocaust camp detainees (**32** offline incidents and **44** online in 2024). In some cases, this extends to Holocaust denial, with statements such as “*The real Shoah is this—Gaza.*”



Facebook, October 9th, 2024.



Facebook, September 30th, 2024.

A study by **Decoding Antisemitism** analyzing a sample of a thousand comments from Italian accounts [found that in 19.6% of cases](#), commentators placed sole responsibility for the conflict on Israel. Accusations included statements like “Israelis are paying for years of oppression against Palestinians” and “Regrettable for the dead, but Israel is entirely to blame for this bloodshed.”

## How Social Media Amplify Hate Speech and Antisemitic Prejudices

Polarization and dehumanization are deeply interconnected phenomena that reinforce each other. However, while they pose significant challenges, they are neither the sole nor necessarily the primary issues that digital platforms present to our society. Social media algorithms operate based on sophisticated content **personalization** mechanisms that adapt to user interactions, interests, and browsing history.<sup>43</sup> Ideally, this process should facilitate access to relevant information. We rely on these systems daily for decisions ranging from choosing a movie to watch or a restaurant to visit making profoundly life-shaping choices, such as selecting a romantic partner through dating platforms. However, their operation raises significant concerns about social and cognitive implications: To what extent are these choices totally free or merely *necessary*?

<sup>43</sup> Pedro Domingos, *L'Algoritmo Definitivo. La macchina che impara da sola e il futuro del nostro mondo*, Bollati Boringhieri 2015 (in Italian).


One of the most significant effects is the **progressive ideological entrenchment** of younger generations. Due to their self-referential nature, they are exposed exclusively to perspectives that align with their **pre-existing beliefs**. This phenomenon, known as the "echo chamber" effect, creates an insular informational environment. The resulting scarcity of engagement with divergent viewpoints risks solidifying monolithic worldviews, with potentially severe repercussions for public discourse and social cohesion. Other critical issues associated with this phenomenon include:

- **Limitation of Informational Freedom:** Users, often unaware of algorithmic filtering mechanisms, do not actively control the content they consume. This passivity can contribute to the crystallization of ideological positions, making them impervious to new evidence and conflicting sources of information. This is particularly problematic when analyzing complex and contentious topics, such as the Israeli-Arab conflict (e.g., casualty figures or the nature of military operations), where information polarization can hinder balanced understanding.
- **Promotion of Sensationalist Content:** Algorithms tend to prioritize materials that provoke strong emotional reactions, often at the expense of information quality and accuracy. The logic of engagement favors polarizing content, sensationalist headlines, and short, gratifying messages, thus contributing to the radicalization of public discourse and the spread of distorted and partial narratives.
- **Normalization of Hate Speech:** Echo chambers and content selectivity can facilitate the proliferation of discriminatory materials, including antisemitism, racism, and other forms of intolerance.
- **Ineffectiveness of Fact-Checking:** Numerous studies demonstrate that mere exposure to accurate information is insufficient to alter erroneous beliefs, particularly when these are deeply ingrained. This phenomenon, known as the "backfire effect," suggests that when confronted with evidence contradicting their views, individuals not only reject new data but also further entrench their convictions. In other words, misinformation cannot be combated solely through the presentation of objective facts; more complex strategies are needed that consider the **emotional and identity-based dimensions of learning** and opinion formation.

The **behavior** of users disseminating antisemitic content online reflects typical patterns of digital hatred: refusal to engage in dialogue, absolutization of their own beliefs, rhetorical extremism, dehumanization, and delegitimization of interlocutors. These communicative strategies frequently manifest through '*whataboutism*' (deflecting attention onto supposedly more critical issues to downplay or deny a problem) and the use of vulgar and offensive language. Such tendencies are not limited to antisemitism but also emerge prominently in debates on topics – such as social inclusion, immigration, body positivity, feminism, gender issues, and many others.

## Trends observed online in 2024

October 7 marked a welding together of **Arab-Islamic groups active in Italy** and the far-left area, especially in collaboration with Palestinian organizations of similar ideology, such as the Arab-Palestinian Democratic Union (UDAP) and activists linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FPLP<sup>44</sup>). The so-called “antagonist” groups, including not only the CARC but also groups such as Rete Comunista, OSA, Cambiare Rotta, CoBas, Potere al Popolo, USB, and others, participated in massive demonstrations organized by Palestinian associations such as the ‘Association of Palestinians in Italy’ (API), Young Palestinians, Palestinian Students and the Union of Palestinian Communities and Organizations–Europe.



*Instagram, image created on Earth Day, March 30, 2024. The FLPL logo is clearly visible at the top left.*

The Observatory has [found online some short manuals](#) of disinformation, dehumanization, and delegitimization that in a few pages (from 5 to 10 each) address, point by point, the themes of the ancient Arab- Israeli conflict, presenting a selective and distorted narrative that profoundly alters reality. These documents - available in many languages<sup>45</sup> - present decontextualized or manipulated information, capable of arousing distrust and hostility towards the ‘Zionists.’ Here are some examples: “The Nakba Never Ended: The Gaza

---


<sup>44</sup> The **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, founded in 1967 by the Arab Christian George Habash. Over the years, the group has played a leading role in some of the most ferocious attacks in the West and in Israel. The term “popular” refers to the movement’s adherence to Marxist ideals. At the international level, it obtained the support of Gaddafi in 1969 and by 1970 it already had 3,000 fighters. In the first, and only, Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the Front obtained 3 seats in Parliament. On 7 October 2023, it participated with the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, together with Hamas and the other Brigades, in the massacres in Israel.

<sup>45</sup> English, Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Arabic, and Italian. The page also sponsors its Telegram and WhatsApp channels.

Genocide Is the Final Phase," "What if Jesus Was Born Today in the Occupied West Bank?," "Apartheid: The West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian Citizens of Israel," "How Israel Supports Oppression Around the World: The Oppression of Palestinians Is Linked to the Oppression of Other Peoples," "The Oslo Accords: The Palestinian Versailles," "Hamas' First Report Since October 7th Recap," "Why Zionism Needed the Nakba," "**Greenwashing** in Israel," "**Pinkwashing** in 2024," "A Guide to BDS," "5 Things to Remember as Christmas Comes to a Closer Look," "Israel's Violence Against Palestinian Women," "Read This Next Time You Hear About Violence in Israel/Palestine," "The Armed Resistance," "UNRWA: Western Countries Are Cutting Support for Palestinian Refugees"; and many more. For those who read them, especially if they lack adequate critical tools, the effect is to reinforce pre-existing prejudices or create new ones. In addition to the presence of sources, which confers an apparent scientific value, and their usability and instant accessibility, a further element of success lies in the simplicity with which these concepts can be learned and replicated.

The pages that operate in this intense propaganda activity tend to form an **interconnected ecosystem**, in which each actor legitimizes the other. Their structure is branched out starting from a national page that is replicated and renamed according to all the local realities in which it is present or relies on an association or political group. The members of these movements plan their activities, create, and share materials, promote the collection of money to self-finance, and print the necessary materials (stickers, flags, banners) on other platforms such as **Mattermost** and **Telegram**. The pages and the individuals who manage them, who call themselves "activists," tag each other and reshare their content, using **common languages and symbols to amplify their message** and **reach a wider base of users**.

Throughout 2024, their events also involved other youth organisations working on issues such as the environment including Extinction Rebellion and Fridays4Future, and the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, who have embraced the same rhetoric.



*Above, Fridays4Future activist Greta Thunberg at the march in Milan, Oct. 11, 2024, photo by Rainews.it*



In June 2024, on Pride Month, a campaign was launched on social media (Instagram and X) called **#NoPrideinGenocide**, which aimed to also boycott Jewish communities and Jewish LGBTQ+ organizations, which - to quote its promoters - "are not welcome"<sup>46</sup>.



*Left, an example of a post circulated for the social campaign "No Pride in Genocide," on Instagram. Right, a creator-promoted image on Instagram, accompanied by the caption "glory to the martyrs," June 2, 2024.*

A worrying phenomenon recorded is the public call for the **criminalization of Zionism**: many Italian influencers have publicly called for Zionists to be arrested; some posters calling for "stop Zionist agents" and "[hunt down Zionists](#)" have appeared during pro-Palestine demonstrations in the squares and newspapers; some of these figures have been invited to speak to students on the Palestinian question, as self-styled experts, despite their [questionable claims](#) on social media; university collectives have invited exponents of Arab-Islamic terrorism to speak, including [Maryam Abu Daqqa](#) and [Leila Khaled](#). In some cases, book presentations [celebrating October 7](#) were promoted right inside the universities.

The situation made the atmosphere intolerable for Jewish and Israeli students. According to a **UGEI Report** - that included the participation of 230 young Jews from all over Italy - 83% of the sample perceived an increase in antisemitism, and one in two individuals had been a victim of or had witnessed episodes of antisemitism; 60% of them had changed their habits and 76% believed that the current level of antisemitism derives precisely from the demonization of the image of Israel in the media.<sup>47</sup> For the above reasons, the UGEI has joined the "[National Manifesto for the Right to Study](#)", promoted by three student associations present in 17 Italian universities.

In 2024, we documented incidents of **doxing**, a widespread practice in the United States, which consists of seeking, collecting, and disseminating personal information about individuals or groups - in this case, 'Jews', 'Zionists', or those deemed to be such - without their consent. This is what happened in the case of some Israeli students in a university group on

<sup>46</sup> See [MILANO - Keshet non sarà al Pride: «Isolati ed esclusi, chiediamo un dialogo» - Moked](#).

<sup>47</sup> See UGEI, "Report antisemitismo. Novembre 2023 - maggio 2024" (in Italian).

WhatsApp, who saw their phone numbers stolen. The same activity of members of the CDEC Foundation was the target of [videos on social media](#) and proscription lists.<sup>48</sup>

Another trend observed is that of **identity marketing**, which uses images or symbols to attract attention and generate profit from the popularity of the theme, both online (advertising, sponsorships) and offline, leveraging strong emotions such as solidarity, public indignation, or belonging to the cause. An example is the case of [a shop in Brescia](#) that sells gadgets and t-shirts with individuals armed with scimitars, accompanied by the slogan “Free Palestine.” The same has happened with some Italian artists, well known among young people, who have embraced this rhetoric of “liberation” in songs and music videos, [singing “fu\\*k the Jews and pedophiles”](#), and “the swastika is now a star”, “you are not human beings.”<sup>49</sup> A typically Italian subculture has emerged in which, to the singing of “Bella Ciao,” slogans such as “Intifada” and “Israel is a terrorist” are raised in the streets. Terms such as “resistance” and “liberation,” deeply rooted in Italian history, are reinterpreted to confer an aura of legitimacy to the actions of Hamas in recent years. [Music playlists](#) that combine Arabic songs with songs by singer-songwriters of the Italian “left” have been discovered.



Parma, event poster, “No Zionists,” May 4, 2024.

**Artificial intelligence (AI)** is emerging as a tool to create and spread antisemitic content, amplifying the reach and sophistication of hate propaganda. Algorithms are being used to generate text, images, and videos that distort history to spread conspiracy theories and reinforce discriminatory stereotypes. Additionally, chatbots and language models can be manipulated to produce hostile narratives, making it more difficult to identify and moderate such content on digital platforms.

---

<sup>48</sup> On three occasions, the proscription list posted online by NPCI has been updated, and the names include well-known public figures, journalists, writers, as well as private citizens and volunteers from Jewish organizations.

<sup>49</sup> [Instagram, canzone rap antisemita - Osservatorio Antisemitismo.](#)



Facebook, March 21, 2024. Neo-fascist user shares a caricature depicting stereotypically painted rabbis with a photograph of some bullets inscribed with Mussolini's face and a call to shoot Jews.



Facebook, July 4, 2024. Post accompanied by the words, "the cancer of the planet has a black beard and hat." The user also has as a profile picture the image "Fuck Israel."



Facebook, June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2024.



X, November 9th, 2024.



Facebook, Dec. 25, 2024, AI-generated images repurposing Palestinian Christology myths.



On the left, a Facebook page dedicated to psychology shared this image depicting Senator Segre with deformed and monstrous features, attributing to her the phrase, "genocide is mine and that's all."

On the right, an example of an image made with AI, attached to a user's post insulting Liliana Segre.

## Weaponizing the 'Palestinian Question': New Forms of Antisemitism

To understand the reasons for the success of this propaganda, we have developed some hypotheses. First, this success can be traced back to the intrinsic specificities of the "Palestinian question." What gives the Arab-Israeli conflict a peculiar character is its nature of "**intractable conflict**," a dimension that is not found in other conflict scenarios.<sup>50</sup>

Nadim N. Rouhana and David Bar-Tal,<sup>51</sup> analyzing the psychological dynamics of ethnic conflicts, argue that some of them present specific traits that increase their resistance to change, making them intractable. The communities involved in such contexts develop social beliefs that, on the one hand, allow them to manage the tensions generated by conflict, but on the other, contribute to perpetuating it in a vicious circle. According to the two authors, this complexity is rooted in five factors: 1) the perception of exclusive legitimacy, 2) the historical experience of victimization, 3) the intertwining and dispersion of national populations, 4) the double asymmetry, and 5) the politicization of religion. These factors have contributed to nourishing two opposing narratives, the Israeli and the Palestinian one, making reconciliation impossible.

There is a second issue, linked to the first: the worsening of Israel's image online. Since October 7, the focus of discussions on TikTok and X (Twitter) has shifted to the war in Gaza and

<sup>50</sup> On the definition of "untractable conflict", see: "*intractable conflict*" si rimanda a N. Rouhana, D. Bar-Tal, "Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case", *American Psychologist*, n. 53, 1998, pp. 761-770; N. Oren, D. Bar-Tal, O. David, *Conflict, Identity, and Ethos: The Israeli-Palestinian Case*, in *The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict*, Praeger, Westport 2004, pp. 133-154.

<sup>51</sup> N. Rouhana, D. Bar-Tal, "Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case," cit., p. 764.

accusations against Israel, with a **strong connection** between antisemitism and **anti-Israel sentiments**<sup>52</sup>.

Finally, several scholars have observed the tendency on the part of Hamas and other Palestinian movements, in recent years, to the **instrumental use of the rhetoric of human rights**.<sup>53</sup>

## Antisemitism from the Web to the public squares

The distinction between the online and offline worlds has nearly vanished. An unprecedented mobilization, driven by the “Globalize the Intifada” movement, has engaged [university students](#), particularly members of activist collectives, who view anti-Zionism as a form of anti-fascism and anti-racism.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has manifested itself in the streets, hitting both cities where the Jewish presence is concentrated (Rome, Milan, Turin, and Bologna) and those where there are no Jewish communities (such as Brescia, [Cagliari](#), and Palermo). Opposition movements have [vandalized shops](#) and defaced city walls; murals and plaques commemorating the victims of deportation.<sup>54</sup> They tore down [posters dedicated](#) to hostages kidnapped by Hamas; they covered street signs and poles in cities with stickers, following the trends of the platforms (e.g., “All Eyes on Rafah”); they placed [stumbling blocks with the names of Palestinian victims](#) and plaques dedicated to Hamas militants, and **generating a deep sense of insecurity**, not only for Jewish communities, a symptom of a social malaise that transcends the issue of antisemitism.



*University of Bologna, inauguration of the academic year, March 2024.*

---

<sup>52</sup> Research Lab Social Media & Hate Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism Indiana University, “The Image of Israel on X and TikTok After 10/7”, December 2024.

<sup>53</sup> L. Allen, *The rise and fall of human rights. Cynicism and politics in occupied Palestine*, Stanford University Press 2013.

<sup>54</sup> See: [Milano: Vandalizzato murale al Memoriale della Shoah, cancellate le stelle di David - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#); [Milano, tolto il murale ‘Antisemitism, History Repeating’ - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#); [Sondrio, vandalizzato l’orto giardino della memoria - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#); and [Firenze, vandalizzate pietre di inciampo - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#).

**CARC** and **NPCI** are some of the actors who in 2024 marked their support for Hamas and its rhetoric. "On October 25, 2024, following the elimination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, [...] the CARC website published the «testament of Sinwar», defined as «martyr of the resistance struggle of the Palestinian people against the Zionist occupation», going as far as to label him as «partisan».<sup>55</sup> On the same days, Italian squares filled up with signs with photos of Sinwar and Hezbollah flags.<sup>56</sup>

## The platforms' response: TikTok, Meta and X

Content reported by the Observatory that [violates the Digital Services Act \(DSA\)](#) - which we will henceforth call "illegal" - includes materials that incite hatred, violence, or discrimination based on criteria considered "**protected categories**" - such as race, religion, and ethnic origin. Such content includes, for example, antisemitic messages, posts denying or distorting historical events such as the Holocaust, terrorist propaganda, or speeches promoting hate crimes. Four years after the adoption of the first European Strategy to combat antisemitism (2021-2023), the ambitious legislative package of the DSA **imposes** on digital platforms the obligation to detect, remove, and prevent the dissemination of such content, establishing a regulatory framework to ensure a safer online space.

However, two years after it entered into force, the implementation of the DSA has shown its limits. [According to CCOA](#) (Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism), in 2024 experts monitoring antisemitic incidents and members of Jewish communities raised concerns about the decline in online **content removal**. There is limited awareness and understanding of DSA within civil society, accompanied by poor capacity to implement it and a lack of confidence in its effectiveness in countering antisemitism.<sup>57</sup> In more complex cases, where **moderation** of content requires a thorough understanding of the war or the historical and social context, to understand the references that users make, platform moderators fail to correctly identify antisemitic messages. This failure can be attributed to a lack of specific training, the difficulty in recognizing **more subtle forms of antisemitism**, and the complexity of distinguishing between legitimate criticism and content that violates the rules. Such gaps undermine the effectiveness of moderation and allow hateful messages to continue to circulate online, as, in the case of users who wished "Happy October 7th," one year after the Hamas massacres.

---

<sup>55</sup> G. Giacalone, "I legami tra l'estrema sinistra italiana e i militanti palestinesi", cit., p. 12 (in Italian).

<sup>56</sup> Here are some example: [Firenze, corteo in memoria di Sinwar con cori antisemiti e bandiera di Hezbollah - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#); [Milano, manifestanti piangono la morte di Sinwar - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#); [Roma, violenza al corteo pro-Pal e bandiere di Hamas e Hezbollah - Osservatorio Antisemitismo](#).

<sup>57</sup> The study involved forty-two interviews with experts on antisemitism and digital policy in five European countries-Sweden, France, Poland, Germany, and Italy. Please refer to: [Mainstreaming Digital Human Rights: A pan-European Policy Roadmap to Combat Online Antisemitism - ISD](#).



*Instagram, May 11, 2024.*

Messages that employ irony and sarcasm or utilize language not explicitly negative or vulgar present considerable challenges in terms of identification. The algorithms intended to automatically filter out inappropriate comments are often ineffective at recognizing those that are constructed using **coded language and symbols**. The current European regulation has not extended the application of the DSA to content in non-European languages spoken in the Community, such as Arabic and Russian. Furthermore, a recent study by the Alliance for Europe<sup>58</sup> has illustrated the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions on platforms that do not remove such content within 24 hours.

Meanwhile, smaller, high-risk services where **extremist ecosystems thrive** – such as **Telegram** and **4chan** – as well as end-to-end encrypted messaging platforms – such as **WhatsApp** – escape effective DSA oversight. Of particular concern is the cross-platform ecosystem, which facilitates the spread of antisemitic ideologies by encouraging the passage of content from extremist networks present on ‘**fringe platforms**’ to the mainstream public discourse.<sup>59</sup>

**TikTok**, the Chinese company founded in 2016 and spread across 160 countries worldwide, has recently implemented new measures to combat Holocaust denial and distortion on its platform, strengthening its commitment to fighting antisemitism and disinformation. In collaboration with UNESCO and the World Jewish Congress (WJC), the social network has introduced mechanisms to direct users who search for Holocaust-related terms to reliable and verified sources of information. This initiative responds to alarming data provided by UNESCO, according to which 17% of Holocaust-related content on the platform distorts or denies historical events, contributing to the spread of dangerous revisionist theories. The platform has stated that it has used “all its strengths” to **remove hateful content** and **strengthen moderation**, to stem the phenomenon and promote a safer and more aware digital environment. These measures are part of a broader effort by large digital platforms to address the challenges related to online radicalization and the manipulation of historical

---

<sup>58</sup> See “Sanctioned but Thriving. How Online Platforms Failed to Address the Widespread Presence of Entities Under Eu Sanction,” 2024.

<sup>59</sup> See [Mainstreaming Digital Human Rights: A pan-European Policy Roadmap to Combat Online Antisemitism - ISD](#) cit., p. 12.

memory, underlining the crucial role of collaboration between international institutions, civil society organizations, and actors in the technological sector.<sup>60</sup>

The [Antisemitism Research Center \(ARC\) and Combat Antisemitism Movement \(CAM\) report](#) revealed how the legitimization of “martyr” and “shahid” content has helped inspire terrorist attacks – as young people see these terrorists portrayed as national heroes and are motivated to emulate them for similar recognition – underscoring the urgent need to enforce **Meta’s** policies more rigorously to prevent the spread of content that condones violence. Content analysis on Meta revealed that 32% of posts using the term “*martyrs*” to positively describe individuals involved in terrorist acts contained **glorifying language**. This type of narrative violates Facebook and Instagram policies, which prohibit support for terrorism. Furthermore, the portrayal of terrorists as heroes and role models has in some cases been linked to inspiring **new terrorist attacks**. The use of the term “martyr” is significantly prevalent on Meta platforms, with **over 20,000 profiles** generating more than 28,000 posts and comments, reaching a total of approximately 37.8 million interactions. It is estimated that up to **372.5 million users** have been **exposed to content glorifying terrorism**, with a potential view count exceeding 1.1 billion people.<sup>61</sup> In March 2024, **Meta’s Oversight Committee ruled on the use of the term “martyr” or “shaheed” on its platforms**. In its findings, members reiterate that Meta’s decisions are guided by “respect for human rights,” including “freedom of expression,” and that these are global and not limited to the context between Israel and Hamas. Therefore, the Committee believes that Meta’s approach to moderating the word “shahid” is overly broad and **disproportionately restricts freedom of expression** and civic discourse. Meta’s policies **prohibit the glorification**, advocacy, and depiction of individuals, groups, and events designated as dangerous, as well as **incitement to violence**. If applied precisely, these rules should reduce the risks associated with using the platforms for terrorist purposes. Precisely for this reason, the Council recommended that Meta lift the blanket ban on the term *shahid* and adopt a more contextual approach in assessing content that includes it.<sup>62</sup>

In September, the same Committee published [a new decision on the moderation of the slogan “From the River to the Sea”](#), finding that, despite the different nuances it assumed in the cases submitted to the Council, it did not violate the regulation on incitement to hatred and violence since it did not make explicit reference to **Hamas, an organization designated as dangerous by Meta**.

Nonetheless, an important step forward was the [new policy approved by Meta](#) in July 2024 on the use of the term “Zionists” as a synonym for Jews in hate speech content. The central issue that emerged was the equation of “Zionists” with criminals, as in the statement “*Zionists are war criminals*.” For this reason, specific cases were submitted to the independent Oversight Board for further assessment. Meta’s policy prohibits attacks based on protected characteristics such as nationality, race, or religion, but recognises that the term “Zionism”

---

<sup>60</sup> [Introducing new resources in recognition of Holocaust Remembrance Day | TikTok Newsroom](#).

<sup>61</sup> See [New Report Raises Alarm on How ‘Martyr’ Term Fuels Terror-Linked Meta Content | Combat Antisemitism Movement](#).

<sup>62</sup> [Referring to Designated Dangerous Individuals as “Shaheed” | Oversight Board](#).



can have multiple meanings. While it refers to a political movement (which is not a protected characteristic), in some contexts it is used to refer to Jews or Israelis, making it relevant under anti-hate speech legislation. Meta has stated that it will now remove content attacking “Zionists” when the term does not explicitly refer to the political movement, but uses **antisemitic stereotypes**, or threatens other types of harm through **intimidation or violence directed** against Jews or Israelis **under the pretext of attacking Zionists**, including:

- Claims about control of the world or the media.
- Dehumanizing comparisons, such as comparisons to pigs, filth, or vermin.
- Calls for physical violence.
- Denials of existence.
- Mockery for having a disease.

A sore point concerns the regressions made on platform X (Twitter). In 2024, the trial brought by **HateAid** and **the European Union of Jewish Students (EUJS)** against the platform took place, accusing it of not adequately moderating content, thus promoting an unprecedented propagation of antisemitic ideology. The oral hearing of the **#TwitterTrial** took place only on 4 June before the Regional Court of Berlin. During the hearing, X challenged the jurisdiction of the German judicial system, arguing that the proceedings were conducted strategically and that the plaintiffs were not ordinary users of the platform. The court accepted this line of argument, dismissing the appeal. The ruling makes the use of *litigation strategy* in Germany almost impracticable. Furthermore, the legal maneuvers adopted by X hinder a substantive examination of the case, allowing the platform to **evade its responsibilities regarding illegal content**. [HateAid has filed an appeal](#). Josephine Ballon, CEO of HateAid, said: *“This ruling is the final blow for many strategic litigation actions in Germany. These proceedings aim to clarify fundamental legal questions that concern us all. This is why a public debate is essential, for example on the liability of social media platforms. This is precisely what X is trying to evade with its **legal maneuvers**. If necessary, we will go through all levels of jurisdiction to finally obtain clarity on this issue.”*<sup>63</sup>

Elon Musk, the owner of X, has taken a stand on the issue, declaring in October 2024 that hate speech [will no longer be moderated](#). In January 2025, fifteen organizations signed a joint statement announcing that they would cease operating on X by the first quarter of the year, citing the rise in antisemitism and social polarization on the platform. [According to the statement](#), **X has become a tool for amplifying hate speech**, and under Musk’s leadership, it has reduced content moderation, given space to white supremacists, and rehabilitated conspiracy theorists. The organizations attribute Musk’s active role in spreading hostile and xenophobic content.

**On 17 January 2024, the European Commission announced an intensification of its investigation into** whether [Platform X violated EU rules](#) on content moderation. To this end, it issued formal requests for information and a preservation order for relevant documents. Further developments are expected.

---

<sup>63</sup> See [X finds loophole: Strategic lawsuit only possible in Ireland – HateAid](#).

## CHAPTER 4. BEST PRACTICES TO COUNTER ANTISEMITISM

Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, Murilo Henrique Cambuzzi, Stefano Gatti

In 2024, the Italian government and the European Union adopted several actions to counter antisemitism and the trivialization/distortion of the Holocaust. The main initiatives include:

**Awareness and Education.** Various training courses have been initiated in Italy at diverse school levels, particularly focusing on combating antisemitism. Notably, some events involving the CDEC Foundation should be highlighted.

- Seminar: [Narrating the Shoah and Hostile Language: Combating Prejudices in the Classroom](#) (Milan, January 16, 2024).
- Seminar: [Online Training Course: "I AM NOT ANTISEMITIC, BUT..."](#) (November 7 – 14 – 21 – 28, 2024).
- Conference: [The Rise and Transformation of Antisemitism After October 7](#) (Milan, May 21, 2024).
- Conference: [DISTORTING HISTORY. Holocaust Denial and Distortion in Italy and in International Comparison](#) (Milan, November 13, 2024).
- Symposium: [ENCATE Network Meeting](#) (Milan, November 11-13, 2024).
- Course: [A Precarious Identity](#) (February 5 – May 29, 2024).
- Project: [Resistenza e Resa](#) (November 2023 – May 2024).
- Conference: [Contemporary Issues and the Memory of the Shoah](#) (Milan, November 6, 2024).
- [Educational Workshop Offer 2024-2025](#).
- Sixth CDEC/TOLI residential seminar (Merano, August 2024) organized within the European project ["Combating Holocaust Denial and Distortion through Active Citizenship, Remembrance and Education #CARE"](#).

**Legislation.** In 2024, Pasquale Angelosanto, the National Coordinator for the fight against antisemitism, established a permanent Committee to develop a new National Strategy. By early 2025, the final draft of this strategy was submitted to the Presidency of the Council.

**Public initiatives.** In response to ongoing instances of distortion and improper application of the concept of antisemitism, the CDEC Foundation issued a [clarifying statement](#) on July 4, 2024.

**The European Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life.** The implementation of the [European Strategy for Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life](#) is still ongoing, yet several objectives have already been achieved. Many EU Member States have strengthened the protection of Jewish schools, synagogues, and cultural centers by implementing stricter security measures and increasing surveillance. Additionally, progress has been made in removing antisemitic content from social media, with the EU

enhancing cooperation with digital platforms and developing accountability policies for them. However, some objectives remain unfulfilled. Certain Member States still need to reinforce their national legislation and improve coordination to tackle antisemitism more effectively. Furthermore, not all Jewish communities in Europe benefit from an adequate level of protection, particularly in countries with a smaller Jewish presence or facing economic challenges. Despite advancements, monitoring online hate speech remains a challenge, especially regarding the speed and effectiveness of removing harmful content in real time. The full implementation of the strategy therefore requires continuous commitment from Member States, ensuring that ongoing efforts are reinforced, and remaining gaps are addressed with urgency.<sup>64</sup>

**Monitoring and Reporting.** The [Digital Services Act \(DSA\)](#) has positively impacted the tone of discourse on social media. The DSA officially came into full effect on February 17, 2024. In Italy, the EU-funded F.A.D.E. project has successfully concluded. This initiative aimed to improve public authorities' ability to identify, prosecute, and effectively sanction instances of antisemitic hate and discrimination promptly.

**Intercommunity Dialogue.** Efforts to promote dialogue between Jewish communities and other religious groups have been systematically encouraged. One significant initiative in this regard is the “EMUNA Interfaith Dialogue Project,” which is designed to enhance mutual understanding among diverse faiths. This initiative has led to the establishment of [Emuna Italia, an educational program dedicated to interfaith and intercultural engagement](#).

**ECRI Report (Council of Europe) on Italy – July 2024.** Observation No. 43 states the following: «ECRI is pleased to learn that the institutional framework aimed at countering antisemitism has been significantly developed over the last few years. In 2020, the post of National Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism was created under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. In 2021, a National Strategy for Combating Antisemitism was drawn up. The Strategy contains a set of recommendations ranging from legislative changes to organising training activities. However, it does not provide a timeline for the realisation of those measures. ECRI also learned about a few initiatives involving substantial cooperation between the authorities and the Jewish community, which resulted for instance in educational projects and training for public officials, including law enforcement officials».<sup>65</sup>

**Civil society.** The significant increase in antisemitic acts and rhetoric following October 7, 2023, led to the establishment of *Setteottobre*. The association was founded in November 2023 on the initiative of a group of managers, diplomats, journalists, and other professionals, most of whom are not Jewish. Under the presidency of Stefano Parisi, *Setteottobre* organizes demonstrations—such as the one on March 7, 2024, when dozens of women expressed solidarity with the Israeli victims raped by Islamist terrorists—and public events, which have garnered the support of dozens of Jewish and non-Jewish organizations and featured

---

<sup>64</sup> [First progress report of the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life - European Commission](#).

<sup>65</sup> [ECRI Report on Italy, adopted on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 2024](#).

prominent Italian and international speakers. *Setteottobre* has also conducted a structured study titled [\*The Normalization of October 7: Palestinian 'Resistance' on Social Networks\*](#) (in Italian).

Also related to the context after October 7, the initiative Fighting the Narrative of Hate in Universities, launched by '[Studenti per Israele](#)', is noteworthy. This initiative aims to combat the increasing antisemitic sentiment observed in Italian universities.

In addition to the initiatives undertaken at the national level in Italy by organizations such as **Fondazione CDEC**, **UCEI**, **UNAR**, and various other entities dedicated to data collection, education, and the fight against antisemitism and other forms of hatred, several networks operate at the European level. These include **Facing Facts**, **ENMA** (European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism), and **ENCATE** (European Network for Combating Antisemitism Through Education). These networks provide substantial support in the fight against antisemitism by offering significant benefits, which encompass:

- **Training and Awareness:** all networks offer training programs for teachers and educators to enhance awareness of antisemitism and its manifestations.
- **Educational Resources:** provide teaching materials and resources to facilitate education on Jewish history and culture, helping to combat stereotypes and prejudices.
- **Support Network:** foster collaboration among organizations dedicated to countering antisemitism, enabling the exchange of best practices and effective strategies.
- **Monitoring and Research:** promote data collection and research on antisemitic phenomena, offering a clear overview of the current situation and enabling targeted interventions.
- **Promotion of Tolerance:** encourage intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding, contributing to the development of more inclusive and respectful communities.
- **Advocacy and Policy Influence:** engage with institutions to shape public policies addressing antisemitism and promoting human rights.

ISBN 9788894097474

Osservatorio  
antisemitismo



Fondazione  
Centro di  
Documentazione  
Ebraica  
Contemporanea