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The evidence from World Values Survey  
data**

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**The return of religious Antisemitism? The evidence from *World Values Survey* data**

Arno Tausch

## Abstract

**1) Background:** This paper addresses the return of religious Antisemitism by a multivariate analysis of global opinion data from 28 countries.

**2) Methods:** For the lack of any available alternative we used the *World Values Survey (WVS)* Antisemitism study item: rejection of Jewish neighbors. It is closely correlated with the recent ADL-100 Index of Antisemitism for more than 100 countries. To test the combined effects of religion and background variables like gender, age, education, income and life satisfaction on Antisemitism, we applied the full range of multivariate analysis including promax factor analysis and multiple OLS regression.

**3) Results:** Although religion as such still seems to be connected with the phenomenon of Antisemitism, intervening variables such as restrictive attitudes on gender and the religion-state relationship play an important role. Western Evangelical and Oriental Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are performing badly on this account, and there is also a clear global North-South divide for these phenomena.

**4) Conclusions:** Challenging patriarchic gender ideologies and fundamentalist conceptions of the relationship between religion and state, which are important drivers of Antisemitism, will be an important task in the future. Multiculturalism must be aware of prejudice, patriarchy and religious fundamentalism in the global South.

Keywords: Relation of Economics to Social Values; Index Numbers and Aggregation; Labor; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants • Non-labor Discrimination; Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination; Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - General, International, or Comparative; Religion

JEL Classification Codes: A13; C43; F66; J15; J16; N30; Z12

## Introduction

This paper attempts to address the issue of the return of religious Antisemitism by a rigorous, quantitative analysis of the global opinion data of the *World Values Survey (WVS)*.<sup>1</sup> It is based on interviews with almost 400.000 representative interview partners from all of the world's major cultural zones.

Ever since the pathbreaking study by Adorno et al. (1950), it was alleged that religion plays a major role in the rise of Antisemitism in conjunction with other factors. Attempting to establish the drivers of global Antisemitism today and whether or not religion plays a role in it, it is all too logical to test this hypothesis with comparable opinion survey data from as many countries as possible.

Considering the vast literature on religion and Antisemitism (Langmuir, 1990; furthermore, Ericksen and Heschel, 1999; Gidley and Renton, 2017; Laqueur, 2006; Michael, 2006; Rittner et al., 2000; Spicer, 2007), such an empirical research strategy seems to be most promising. Our study highlights the importance of including variables about gender roles in society and variables about the concrete understanding of the relationship between religion and state in future Antisemitism studies.

Comparative data about global Antisemitism are scarce, with the notable exception of the ADL (2014) study of Antisemitism in over 100 countries. But the freely available ADL (2014) data do not contain systematic religion background variables of the thousands of interviewed global respondents, so a multivariate analysis about the relation between religion and Antisemitism must rely on other sources. In this context, the *World Values Survey (WVS)*, enters the stage. Ever since the influential Weil study (1985) on Antisemitism in the United States, West Germany, Austria, and France, the use of such comparative opinion survey data in

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>. All downloads on September 11, 2018.

the study of Antisemitism is regarded as a legitimate tool of analysis of the subject.

The *World Values Survey (WVS)* was started in 1981, it consists of nationally representative surveys using a common questionnaire conducted in approximately 100 countries, which make up some 90 percent of the world's population. The *WVS* has become the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever conducted. It contains representative freely available anonymous individual data of the global citizenry on income, social position, education, religion, attitudes about life and politics, gender roles, trust in institutions, ethics, and prejudices *et cetera*. These data render themselves for further analyses, for example, on how trust in the national government across countries is correlated with income and education, or how the different denominations in, say, Germany or India, view the priorities of a democracy and how these views correlate with xenophobia, homophobia and racism in the country. The *World Values Survey* thus offers really endless opportunities for the social sciences and scientific phantasy and ingenuity has no limits.

For 28 countries (Albania; Argentina; Bangladesh; Bosnia; Belarus; Canada; Chile; Czech Republic; India; Iran; Iraq; Japan; South Korea; Kyrgyzstan; Mexico; Moldova; Nigeria; Russia; Slovakia; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Spain; Uganda; Macedonia; Egypt; United States; Uruguay; and Venezuela) the *World Values Survey* contains an item on whether or not respondents reject to have a Jewish neighbor.

Compared with the theoretical sophistication of previous Antisemitism studies today (Curtis et al., 1986; Plous, 2003; Wistrich, 2010; see also Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010), this second-best research strategy might look like rather primitive, but considering the high nation-state level correlation between the ADL data (2014) and the *WVS* data, established in this essay, this "*forensic sociology approach*" seems to be justified, considering the quantity and quality of the other *WVS* data and its huge opportunities to properly measure religious phenomena at given regular intervals since the 1980s. Thus, our research strategy is perhaps weak on the variable to be explained but it has a powerful and

very exhaustive array of comparative explanatory variables at its disposal.

Thus, this article takes up the challenge to study in full the relationship between religion and Antisemitism at the level of global society, based on the mentioned second-best solution of operationalizing Antisemitism by the single variable of someone rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor.

In our essay, we first describe the theoretical background of this study, and then designate the methods and data.

Our results are presented at different levels. First, we analyze the extent of Antisemitism in world society according to countries and global denominations and the extent to which respondents attach importance to religion in their lives. Such a research strategy far better captures the depths of religious feelings than religious service attendance rates or the strength of belief in a personalized Deity, often used in other studies (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), since asking global respondents about the importance they attach to religion is independent from the belief in a personalized Deity inherent in the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Röhrich, 2004, 2010).

We then present the results of our multivariate factor analysis, looking at the effects of the importance of religion in life, the importance given to religious faith in education, life satisfaction, satisfaction with the financial situation of the household, gender, age, and received years of education and how these effects combine to explain Antisemitism. We specifically also include variables about gender roles in society and variables about a restrictive understanding of the relationship between religion and state, making the difference between an enlightened and a restrictive, patriarchic reading of the religious Holy Scriptures and the different religious traditions.

We also undertook a multiple standard OLS regression analysis of the weight of these variables in explaining Antisemitism. In both research strategies, it emerges that traditionalist opinions on gender roles, reserving higher education for male persons, and on the religious

fundamentalist demand that only religious believers should be elected to public office, are statistically highly significant in determining Antisemitism. These opinions are the real litmus test of an enlightened versus a restrictive religiosity.

We further analyze this theme by looking at the partial correlations of an entire similar array of other *World Values Survey* variables with Antisemitism, keeping satisfaction with life and the financial situation of the household, gender and age constant. This analysis again highlights the importance of the above-mentioned pattern of interpretation.

A final analysis then shows the extent of Antisemitism in different countries of the world, ranked by denominational groups, and based on the *World Values Survey* data. While in our 28 countries with complete data Protestants in Uruguay, Canada, and Argentina and Roman Catholic regular Sunday Mass Church attenders in Argentina, Canada and the United States are the major denominational communities with the lowest global rates of Antisemitism, Muslims in India, Iran and Iraq are the most antisemitic religious groupings of the world.

We present some policy relevant prospects and conclusions in the final chapter of our work.

### *Background*

We are well aware of the many past valuable attempts in the growing international scientific tradition of ecumenical and religious studies to arrive at theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons of global religions and civilizations (just to mention a few: Juergensmeyer, 2000, 2011, 2013, Küng, 1997, 2002, Lenoir and Tardan-Masquelier, 1997; Lenoir, 2008, Röhrich, 2004, 2010; Sacks, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2014).

Global opinion surveys can contribute to a still better understanding of the realities of global religions “*on the ground*”. To study the Scriptures

by comparative means and to rely on an anthropological, philosophical and theological interpretation does not tell us, for example, how different publics around the globe, brought up in different religious traditions, are inclined to follow or disregard the need to hold a valid ticket when using public transport, independent from income, education and gender. The systematic social scientific study of global values and opinions, used in this essay, answering precisely such questions, has of course a long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and Inglehart, 2011; furthermore, on global value change, Aleman and Woods, 2015; Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Ciftci, 2010; Davidov *et al.*; 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede *et al.*; 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). This research tradition contributed to an unprecedented rise in the empirical global sociology of religions.

What do we know from this type of sociology on the phenomenon of Antisemitism? Adorno et al. (1950) in their pathbreaking study on the authoritarian personality already attempted to establish the hypothesis that subjects with some religious affiliation are more prejudiced than those without affiliation, but no significant differences between Protestants and Catholics exist. Adorno et al. (1950) also maintained that there is a low but significant negative relation of intelligence and education to ethnocentrism. Other factors mentioned in that famous study are parental relations, childhood experiences, the conception of the self, and the dynamics and the organization of personality. Political and economic ideas, religious ideology and syndromes all determine the development of the authoritarian personality. A veritable endless number of studies meanwhile has researched the connections between Antisemitism and authoritarianism, and between Antisemitism and sexism (see Auestad, 2015; Young-Bruehl, 1996). This article is well within the tradition to study Antisemitism with the help of rigorous quantitative methods and applies a comparative perspective in focus (see the influential study by Glock and Stark, 1996 on Antisemitism in Canada; furthermore, Aichinger and Fine, 2017; Brym et al., 1993; Cohen, 2018; Farnen et al., 2005; Klein and Streib, 2018; Klein et al., 2018).

We start from the assumption that a *macho*-type of outlook on society, typically to be found among adherents of the opinion that University education is more important for a boy than for a girl, will have a profound effect on the general pattern of prejudice, held by an individual, including Antisemitism (Adams et al., 1997). In the theoretical social science literature, there is a large consensus that sexism and Antisemitism are deeply interconnected, and that sexist social structures enhance antisemitic tendencies (Adams et al., 2002; Eisenstein, 2014; Guillaumin, 2002; Lutz et al., 1995; Smith, 1988; Williams, 1989). A very large number of empirical studies, but also government reports, have already highlighted this close inter-relationship (Brah, 1991; Brandt, 2011; Inglehart, 2006; Leong and Ward, 2006; Reisigl and Wodak, 2005; Small, 2013; United States Congress, 2015). While in some advanced industrial countries, like the U.K., there is now a gender gap in tertiary education to the detriment of males,<sup>2</sup> in a large number of countries not only enrollment rates in tertiary education are often heavily male-biased; but also professed opinions on the issue consent with this large-scale discrimination (Chzhen and Bruckauf, 2017). To state that “*A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl*” must be regarded as the “*locus classicus*” of the discourse of gender discrimination (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005; Wuthnow, 2008). In fact, this variable is one of the best documented in the entire WVS project and is highly correlated with a host of other indicators (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

We also start from the assumption that the effects of denomination and commitment to religion on Antisemitism *per se* are not as important as the effects of a religious fundamentalist world outlook that says that “*politicians who don't believe in G'd are unfit for public office*”. The importance of “*religious fundamentalism*”, measured here by the mentioned WVS item has been also stated frequently in the relevant literature, among others, in Hosseini and Saha, 2018; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Kaufmann, 2009, 2010; Kaufmann and Goujon, 2010; Kaufmann and Haklai, 2008; Patterson, 2010; Skirbekk; and Tessler, 2002. Such an opinion is not restricted to so-called developing countries. Even

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<sup>2</sup> Guardian, May 12, 2016, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/12/university-gender-gap-scandal-thinktank-men>.

in the United States, an influential Evangelical Republican, 2016 Presidential Contender Senator Ted Cruz (Texas) made headlines when he exactly declared in 2016 that *an Atheist isn't fit to be President of the country*.<sup>3</sup>

What is the relationship between Antisemitism, xenophobia and “*existential security*”? In view of the contemporary implosion of societal trust by majority populations in Western democracies in their respective political systems, we are also inclined to mention here as well Inglehart’s recent theory of “*cultural evolution*” (Inglehart, 2018) in the explanation of xenophobia, racism and Antisemitism. Inglehart argues that people's values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which survival is secure; it was precarious for most of history, which encouraged a heavy emphasis on group solidarity, a rejection of outsiders, and obedience to strong leaders. High levels of existential security encourage openness to change, diversity, and new ideas. The unprecedented prosperity and security of the postwar era brought cultural change, the environmentalist movement, and the spread of democracy. But, Inglehart says, in recent decades, diminishing job security and rising inequality have led to authoritarian reactions. In the perspective of Inglehart’s theory, growing unease with “*multiculturalism*” and “*migration*” coincides with a rising inequality in many countries of the Western world.<sup>4</sup>

The analysis of Antisemitism can look back on more than a century of fruitful studies with a vast and still growing literature (Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun, 2012; Kertzer, 2007; Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; von Bieberstein, 1977; Wistrich, 2010; see also Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010). The ADL, 2014 study was a hallmark in previous research, because it opened the way for cross-national, empirical comparisons of the rates of Antisemitism. The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score (ADL, 2014) is 26 percent, that is to say at least 26% of the citizens of our

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<sup>3</sup> Huffington Post, Dec. 21, 2016, available at [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ted-cruz-atheists\\_us\\_5640b613e4b0411d30719f52](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ted-cruz-atheists_us_5640b613e4b0411d30719f52). On Antisemitism and Evangelical Christianity, see Kressel, 2007; Rausch, 1993.

<sup>4</sup> For most recent time series data about inequality, see University of Texas Inequality Project, available at <https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html>.

globe – more than 1 billion people - are anti-Semitic. This reflects the percentage of global respondents who say that at least six of the eleven negative stereotypes tested in the ADL (2014) study are “*probably true.*” In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages)

Middle East & North Africa (MENA): 74%

Eastern Europe: 34%

Western Europe: 24%

Sub-Saharan Africa: 23%


Asia: 22%


Americas: 19%

Oceania: 14%

In Map 1 we summarize the results from the ADL (2014) study in a geographical fashion in order to estimate the strength of societal Antisemitism.

**Map 1: The ADL 100 scores of global societal Antisemitism**





Highest: Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia

Lowest: Laos, Philippines, Sweden, Netherlands, Vietnam

### *Materials and methods*

Global value studies are made possible by the availability of systematic and comparative opinion surveys over time under the auspices of leading representatives of the social science research community, featuring the global/and or the European populations with a fairly constant questionnaire for several decades now. In the case of the *World Values Survey*, the original data were made freely available to the global scientific publics and render themselves for systematic, multivariate analysis of opinion structures on the basis of the original anonymous interview data.<sup>5</sup> Our data thus are from this set of reliable and regularly repeated global opinion surveys (see Davidov *et al.*; 2008; Inglehart, 2006; Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

In the social sciences, there is a rich and evolving debate on the conclusions to be drawn from these comparable and freely available “*omnibus surveys*”. For a number of years now, also some leading economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion data, especially from the *World Values Survey* (Alesina, Algan *et al.*, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, *et al.*, 2015). The interest of the economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth certainly was a factor contributing to the rise of the methodological approach, which we share with many other social scientists in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006, Barro, 2003). Prejudice is the anti-thesis to societal trust. Antisemitism is thus an anti-thesis to societal trust. The majority of the major economic studies, using *World Values Survey* data concluded that trust is an important factor for long-run economic growth (Alesina, Algan *et al.*, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, *et al.*, 2015; Zak and Knack, 2001). Trust is also an important factor in the political stability of a nation. Some of the countries with very high rates of Antisemitism, like Iraq, are also countries with extreme problems of political stability and very low interpersonal trust (Tausch, 2016b; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

In the present article, we feature on religiosity and Antisemitism in the framework of what is called in Political Science the “*civic culture*” of the respective societies where the people holding religious beliefs live (Almond and Verba, 2015) and the role played by religiosity in this “*civic culture*” (Inglehart, 1998; Silver and Dowley, 2000). Studies on Muslim religious beliefs were a growing focus of research in international social science since the 1990s, especially since the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York City. Compared to the now existing veritable flood of high quality survey-based studies on Muslim communities around the globe, the available comparable opinion-survey based evidence on other global denominations is still rather scarce (Tausch and Moaddel, 2009).

Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal opinion survey data from the *World Values Survey* have discovered *inter alia* that there are pretty constant and long-term patterns of change in the direction of secularization (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Inglehart and his associates firmly believe

that especially the ability of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to tell people how to live their lives is declining steadily (see also Morel, 2003).<sup>6</sup>


We are well aware that our research design is only a second-best solution, but in view of the free availability of data we had no better choice.

In order to be able to rely in any reasonable measure on our results, at least we had to look into the empirical relationship between the ADL 100 variable and *World Values Survey* Antisemitism rates on a country to country level, in order to calibrate our estimates. For 23 countries we can calibrate the results accordingly and calculate a Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficient between the available two comparative data series on global Antisemitism, i.e. the *WVS* data on the rejection of Jewish neighbors, and the ADL (2014) data. The countries with complete data for both variables are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Uganda, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, representing a fair mix of global religions and cultures. Indeed, the two measurement scales have 56.16% of the variance in common, i.e. our preferred second-best solution using *WVS* data in our study captures more than half of the variance of the far superior measurement scale, the ADL (2014) data series.

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<sup>6</sup> [http://ur.umich.edu/0405/Apr11\\_05/11.shtml](http://ur.umich.edu/0405/Apr11_05/11.shtml)

**Graph 1: the correlation between the WVS data on rejecting Jewish neighbors and the ADL (2014) rates of Antisemitism**



Note: WVS scale ranging from 0.0 (=0%) to 1.0 (=100%)

Our statistical analysis of open survey data is based on one of the most commonly used statistical software of the world, the IBM SPSS XXIV, utilized at universities and research centers around the globe.<sup>7</sup> The program contains the entire array of modern multivariate statistics (Blalock, 1972; Tabachnik and Fidell, 2001), and any researcher should be able to arrive at the same results as we do here when she or he uses the same open data and the SPSS. The chosen SPSS data-file from the WVS data base was called “WVS\_Longitudinal\_1981\_2014\_spss\_v2015\_04\_18.sav.” All details, including the mathematical algorithms used are available from IBM, 2011a, 2011b.

Our main statistical calculations relied on cross tables, comparisons of means, bi-variate and partial correlation analyses, factor analysis (oblique factor rotations based on promax factor analysis) and standard multiple regressions (OLS). Can the variables under consideration here

<sup>7</sup> IBM SPSS SPSS Statistics, <http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/spss-statistics>.

be represented in mathematically reduced dimensions, and what percentages of the total reality are thus reproduced, and how are these dimensions related to each other? And what is the relationship of the underlying variables with these dimensions? Is there indeed such a “factor” or “dimension” as religiosity, and how does it affect Antisemitism? Is there, apart from it, also something like “feminism”, and also something like “class” or “status”, which influences Antisemitism, independent from the other “factors”? Promax factor analysis is a well-established multivariate and mathematical variety among the general techniques of factor analysis, which extracts the underlying dimensions from the matrix of correlations between the variables and precisely answers the questions just raised above.<sup>8</sup> It was amply described in recent literature (Finch, 2006; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014, see, furthermore Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970). Promax factor analysis is considered to be the most appropriate technique of factor analysis in public opinion survey studies today (Finch, 2006; Ciftci, 2010, 2012, 2013; Ciftci and Bernick, 2013). Factor analysis – in our case promax factor analysis – also allows the researcher to use the mathematical model for the development of a new measurement scale for the new dimensions, derived in the research process (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). In modern social indicators research, such new scales are called “*parametric indices*”.

Current methodology of the social sciences makes it clear that besides factor analysis, there also other powerful tools of multivariate analysis available to test complex relationships between an independent variable (in our case Antisemitism) and independent variables (Blalock, 1972; Tabachnik and Fidell, 2001). In our case, we used standard OLS multiple regression analysis and partial correlation analysis.

Keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical opinion survey research (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), for all analyzed groups

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<sup>8</sup> The mathematical algorithm is described in [https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB\\_22.0.0/com.ibm.spss.statistics.algorithms/alg\\_factor\\_promax.htm](https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLVMB_22.0.0/com.ibm.spss.statistics.algorithms/alg_factor_promax.htm). Interested readers are also referred to materials used at the University of Texas in Dallas, available at <https://www.utdallas.edu/~herve/Abdi-rotations-pretty.pdf>.

and sub-groups, a minimum sample size of at least 30 respondents per country had to be available to be able to attempt reasonable predictions (Clauß and Ebner, 1970).

For the necessary calculation of error margins, readers are referred to the easily readable introduction to opinion survey error margins, prepared by Cornell University Roper Center's <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/support/polling-fundamentals-total-survey-error/>. Readers more interested in the details are also being referred to <http://www.langerresearch.com/moe/>. On the basis of the methodological literature on opinion surveys, this website makes available a direct opinion survey error margin calculator. It is important to recall that for example at a 5% rate of rejection of Jewish neighbors, error margins for a sample of 1.000 representative interview partners are  $\pm 1.4\%$ ; and at a 10% rejection rate, the error margin is  $\pm 1.9\%$ ; and at a rejection rate of 15%, the error margin is  $\pm 2.2\%$ ; see <http://www.langerresearch.com/moe/>. That error margins differ according to reported rates of responses is an important fact of opinion survey research theory, often forgotten to be mentioned in the debate. Appendix Table 2 contains benchmark data on error margins, relevant for our study.

Since any researcher around the globe should be able to reproduce our findings, our presentation of the results will be rather brief, and we concentrate here on the most salient results (see below).

### *Results from the global comparisons*

In the 28 countries under comparison here, the following ranking of Antisemitic attitudes is to be observed (Table 1). In Iraq, Iran, Egypt and India, more than half of the entire resident population rejected to have a Jewish neighbor, while in Canada, Argentina, Belarus, Uruguay and the United States, this percentage was below 10%. It would be premature to interpret our results only along global denominational or world political conflict lines. Some Muslim majority societies, for example, Bangladesh

and Albania, did even better than world political and military allies of the West, like South Korea, Slovakia, Japan and Spain.


**Table 1: percent of people saying that they reject to have a Jewish neighbor**

	<b>% rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor</b>	<b>N</b>
Iraq	90%	4924
Iran	75%	2657
Egypt	62%	3000
India	53%	2500
South Korea	41%	1200
Nigeria	35%	1001
Slovakia	34%	466
Japan	28%	1011
Bosnia	28%	1200
Venezuela	26%	1200
Mexico	26%	3895
Moldova	25%	1008
South Africa	24%	3000
Spain	22%	2719
Uganda	22%	1002
Bangladesh	20%	1500
Kyrgyzstan	20%	1043
Macedonia	20%	1055
Zimbabwe	19%	1002
Czech Republic	18%	924
Albania	17%	1000
Chile	13%	3700
Russia	11%	4001
United States	9%	1200
Uruguay	8%	2000
Belarus	7%	2092
Argentina	6%	3361

Canada	4%	1931
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In Appendix Table 1 and in Graph 2, we test the relationship between Antisemitism (and other phobias) and the traditional self-positioning scale on the left to right political spectrum, reported in the *World Values Survey*. There is an Antisemitism of the political right and an Antisemitism of the political left. Most other global phobias correspond to this pattern:

**Graph 2: The different phobias in the world system according to the left-right political spectrum: rejecting to have different types of neighbors according to respondents' self-positioning on the left-right political scale. Data from the *World Values Survey***



In view of the empirical weakness of the traditional explaining of Antisemitism by the political left-right scale (Adorno et al., 1950), it is no wonder that nowadays religion variables are increasingly used to explain the phenomenon of Antisemitism. In terms of the percentages of Antisemitism per global denomination, the following rank scale of Antisemitism by denomination emerges. There is a clear North-West/South-East divide of global Antisemitism. *World Values Survey* respondents with a Muslim or Oriental Christian background or a Buddhist or Hindu background are much more Antisemitic than the adherents of mainstream Western Christianity, Orthodoxy or people without any denomination (see also Connelly, 2012):

**Table 2: Antisemitism by global denomination<sup>9</sup> according to the *World Values Survey***

<b>Denomination</b>	<b>% respondents reject to have a Jewish neighbor</b>	<b>N</b>
Shia	83,0%	3743
Sunni	74,6%	716
Muslim	56,4%	9549
Christian (oriental)	54,1%	207
Hindu	51,0%	2408
Buddhist	33,0%	591
Total WVS global respondents	31,0%	54944
Independent African Churches (e.g. ZCC, Shembe, <i>et cetera</i> )	22,9%	652
Evangelical	21,5%	1047
Protestant	19,9%	3629
Other	18,5%	1135
Roman Catholic	17,7%	15504
Orthodox	16,4%	4941
No religious denomination	15,3%	10399

As we already highlighted, *World Values Survey* studies on the effects of religious beliefs on human values often quantified the strength of these beliefs by variables such as “*G’d important in your life*” or by religious service attendance rates (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

Here, we rather opted to work with the variable: *Important in life: Religion: very important, rather important, not very important, not at all important*, since we were faced with a large number of respondents, whose religious belief systems does not single out a personalized G’d (as

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<sup>9</sup> unweighted by the different population size in different countries

in the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam). We document the mean rejection rate of Jewish neighbors (0, lowest, 1, highest) according to the SPSS routine “*comparison of means*”.

On a global scale, there is a slight U-shaped relationship between the strength of religious beliefs across countries and denominations and Antisemitism, with both strong believers and people giving no importance to religion displaying a higher rate of Antisemitism.

**Table 3: average Antisemitism (rejecting Jewish neighbors, scale ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to religion according to the *World Values Survey***

<b>Important in life: Religion</b>	<b>Antisemitism (rejecting a Jewish neighbor - 0 to 1)</b>	<b>N =</b>	<b>Standard deviation</b>
Very important	0,430	27566	0,495
Rather important	0,220	12801	0,416
Not very important	0,160	8942	0,371
Not at all important	0,170	5456	0,373

Table 4 disaggregates our findings for the different major global denominations. While in Protestantism and Christian Orthodoxy, whose cultures are characterized by high secularization, the already mentioned U-shaped effect of strong believers and people strongly distant from religion being more antisemitic reemerges. Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination who give (great) importance in their lives to religion are more antisemitic than the more secular Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination.

**Table 4: average Antisemitism (rejecting Jewish neighbors, scale ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to religion in major global denominations, according to the *World Values Survey***

	<b>Religion very important</b>	<b>Religion rather important</b>	<b>Religion not very important</b>	<b>Religion not at all important</b>
Hindus	0,590	0,450	0,390	0,370
Muslims	0,690	0,440	0,280	0,260
Buddhists	0,360	0,380	0,310	0,280
Global population	0,430	0,220	0,160	0,170
Protestants	0,200	0,210	0,150	0,240
Catholics	0,190	0,180	0,160	0,160
Orthodox	0,210	0,150	0,130	0,160
Without denomination	0,180	0,160	0,130	0,150

In Table 5, we analyze the relationship of other phobias (not wanting a neighbor who is a person of a different race, or a Muslim, or an immigrant, or a homosexual person) with the strength of religious feelings on a global scale. Three of the four analyzed phobias correspond to the patterns analyzed above. This implies that Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination who give great importance or importance to religion in their lives are more xenophobic and homophobic than the secular Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Catholics and also people without denomination. The most religious segment of the global population embraces the highest phobias regarding race, immigrants and homosexuals. But the rejection of Muslim neighbors is highest among the most secular segment of global society. This finding suggests a future conflict axis already taking shape in many countries, including France (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

**Table 5: average other phobias (rejecting various types of neighbors, scale ranges from 0 to 1) according to the importance, attributed to religion by the global population, according to the *World Values Survey***

Religion	People of a different race	Muslims	Immigrants/foreign workers	Homosexuals
Very important	0,210	0,200	0,260	0,590
Rather important	0,160	0,190	0,210	0,490
Not very important	0,130	0,190	0,180	0,420
Not at all important	0,130	0,210	0,180	0,390

**Results from the Promax factor analysis of World Values Survey data**

In the following, we attempt to explain our indicator “Rejecting to have Jewish neighbors” by nine variables in a promax factor analytical model. In the wording of our variables, we took great care to consider the exact meaning of the highest numerical values:

- Not important in life: Religion
- Important child qualities: religious faith
- Satisfaction with your life
- Satisfaction with financial situation of household
- Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
- Reject opinion: Politicians who don’t believe in God are unfit for public office
- Gender (female)

- Age
- Highest educational level attained

In Table 6, we first of all list the variables and the percentages of total variance explained (“extraction”):

**Table 6: the variables of the Promax factor analytical model**

	<b>Extraction (from 0 to 1)</b>
Not important in life: Religion	0,644
Important child qualities: religious faith	0,606
Rejecting to have Jewish neighbors	0,388
Satisfaction with your life	0,775
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	0,789
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	0,575
Reject opinion: Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0,556
Gender (female)	0,660
Age	0,608
Highest educational level attained	0,601

Table 7 shows the statistical properties of the model. There are four factors, whose so-called *Eigenvalues* are above 1.0, and which explain some 62% of the total variance. The *Eigenvalue* > 1.0 criterion is one of the most important benchmarks in the interpretation of factor analytical results (Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970).

**Table 7: Total variance explained by the factor analytical model**

	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	% of variance explained	cumulated total variance explained
secularism	2,359	23,592	23,592
life satisfaction	1,506	15,063	38,655
highly educated younger generations	1,176	11,764	50,419
feminism	1,161	11,607	<b>62,026</b>

The factor loadings as evidenced in the so-called structure matrix after the “rotation” of the factors are documented in Table 8. The statistical relationships between the extracted factors and the underlying variables (Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970) suggest to talk about four dimensions, to be called here:

- secularism
- life satisfaction
- highly educated younger generations
- feminism

The methodological literature suggests to use all factor loadings equal or above 0.33 or above 0.50 for the naming of the different factor analytical dimensions. It is always subjective in character and open for a debate. It is imperative to mention the factor loadings in full in a research publication of this kind (Gorsuch, 1983; Harman, 1976; Rummel, 1970).

Table 8 shows the factor loadings in the so-called structure matrix, while Table 9 documents the statistical relationships between the factors after the promax rotation. Graph 3 summarizes the results of our investigation for the study of Antisemitism: secularism, life satisfaction, and feminism all wield a negative, Antisemitism reducing effect. But the deficiencies of

higher education in many so-called “Third World countries” and educational gaps between the generations enhance Antisemitism.


**Table 8: the factor loadings of the factor analytical model**

	<b>secularism</b>	<b>life satisfaction</b>	<b>highly educated younger generations</b>	<b>feminism</b>
Not important in life: Religion	<b>0,789</b>	0,076	0,107	-0,051
Important child qualities: religious faith	<b>-0,772</b>	-0,080	-0,054	0,014
<b>Rejecting to have Jewish neighbors</b>	<b>-0,546</b>	<b>-0,137</b>	<b>0,124</b>	<b>-0,304</b>
Satisfaction with your life	0,181	<b>0,878</b>	0,016	0,096
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	0,060	<b>0,882</b>	0,085	0,002
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	0,307	0,036	0,198	<b>0,694</b>
Reject opinion: Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	<b>0,743</b>	0,131	0,043	0,145
Gender (female)	-0,119	0,039	-0,114	<b>0,781</b>
Age	0,149	0,088	<b>-0,745</b>	-0,011
Highest educational level attained	0,218	0,187	<b>0,747</b>	0,013

**Table 9: correlations between the factors**

Component ... correlation with	secularism	life satisfaction	highly educated younger generations	feminism
secularism	1,000	0,152	0,076	0,104
life satisfaction	<b>0,152</b>	1,000	0,046	0,064
highly educated younger generations	0,076	0,046	1,000	-0,010
feminism	<b>0,104</b>	0,064	-0,010	1,000

**Graph 3: Factor loadings of Antisemitism**



Thus, our analysis shows that secularism and feminism are the most robust blocks against the resurgence of Antisemitism, world-wide. The factor “life satisfaction” (life satisfaction and satisfaction with the financial position of the household) wields only a small influence on the extent of Antisemitism, showing that Antisemitism is both a phenomenon of the rich and the poor.

Table 10 and our choropleth maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) document the country results (factor scores) of our investigation.

Our combined new measurement scales for

- secularism
- life satisfaction
- highly educated younger generations
- feminism

show a clear North/South and West/East divide of the phenomena involved. The highest concentration of the drivers of Antisemitism is to be found in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and West Asia. Table 10 and our choropleth maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) hold important messages for the debate of “*multiculturalism*”, already foreseen by Wistrich, 2007: the areas of origin of mass migration to Western countries since the 1990s are all characterized by conditions, leading to higher rates of Antisemitism. Table 10 and the choropleth maps (Map 2, Map 3, Map 4, Map 5) closely correspond to the findings reported in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, above:



**Table 10: Country factor scores of the analysis**

Country/region		secularism	life satisfaction	highly educated younger generations	feminism
Albania	Mean	0,565	-0,281	-0,146	0,175
	N	855	855	855	855
	Standard deviation	0,860	0,879	1,006	0,941
Argentina	Mean	0,473	0,287	-0,450	0,272
	N	1129	1129	1129	1129
	Standard deviation	0,821	0,852	1,025	0,907
Bangladesh	Mean	-0,396	0,075	-0,021	-0,411
	N	1206	1206	1206	1206
	Standard deviation	0,586	0,859	0,898	0,911
Bosnia	Mean	0,694	-0,151	-0,083	0,120
	N	1082	1082	1082	1082
	Standard deviation	0,789	0,933	0,945	0,929
Canada	Mean	0,891	0,746	-0,123	0,340
	N	1847	1847	1847	1847
	Standard deviation	0,830	0,787	1,065	0,846
Chile	Mean	0,500	0,332	-0,312	0,113

	N	1086	1086	1086	1086
	Standard deviation	0,814	0,853	1,074	1,013
Iran	Mean	-0,633	0,205	0,359	-0,405
	N	2412	2412	2412	2412
	Standard deviation	0,733	0,874	0,936	0,962
Iraq	Mean	-1,087	-0,379	0,055	-0,455
	N	3765	3765	3765	3765
	Standard deviation	0,479	0,899	0,879	1,027
South Korea	Mean	0,839	0,179	0,547	-0,070
	N	1005	1005	1005	1005
	Standard deviation	0,808	0,848	0,808	0,994
Kyrgyzstan	Mean	0,618	0,191	0,351	0,044
	N	1009	1009	1009	1009
	Standard deviation	0,761	0,979	0,918	0,967
Moldova	Mean	0,349	-0,511	-0,073	-0,002
	N	800	800	800	800
	Standard deviation	0,772	0,879	1,126	0,904
South Africa	Mean	-0,032	-0,181	0,163	0,231
	N	2674	2674	2674	2674
	Standard deviation	0,706	1,052	0,881	0,971
Zimbabwe	Mean	-0,212	-0,956	-0,306	0,340
	N	889	889	889	889
	Standard deviation	0,605	1,002	0,898	0,924



Spain	Mean	0,950	0,394	-0,332	0,117
	N	1022	1022	1022	1022
	Standard deviation	0,736	0,679	1,265	0,903
Uganda	Mean	-0,207	-0,228	0,206	0,265
	N	927	927	927	927
	Standard deviation	0,638	0,976	0,740	1,039
Macedonia	Mean	0,560	-0,341	-0,194	0,245
	N	935	935	935	935
	Standard deviation	0,841	1,027	1,023	0,932
Egypt	Mean	-0,853	-0,212	0,033	-0,104
	N	2305	2305	2305	2305
	Standard deviation	0,455	1,121	0,984	1,029
United States	Mean	0,330	0,654	0,105	0,333
	N	1163	1163	1163	1163
	Standard deviation	0,829	0,799	0,940	0,871
Uruguay	Mean	1,042	0,454	-0,702	0,233
	N	907	907	907	907
	Standard deviation	0,732	0,741	1,071	0,822
Total	Mean	0	0	0	0
	N	27019	27019	27019	27019
	Standard deviation	1	1	1	1

# Map 2: secularism





Highest: Uruguay; Spain; Canada; Korea, South; Bosnia;  
Lowest: Iraq; Egypt; Iran; Bangladesh; Zimbabwe

**Map 3: life satisfaction**



Highest: Canada; United States; Uruguay; Spain; Chile;  
Lowest: Zimbabwe; Moldova; Iraq; Macedonia; Albania


Map 4: higher education younger generations



Highest: Korea, South; Iran; Kyrgyzstan; Uganda; South Africa;  
Lowest: Uruguay; Argentina; Spain; Chile; Zimbabwe

Map 5: feminism





Highest: Canada; Zimbabwe; United States; Argentina; Uganda;  
Lowest: Iraq; Bangladesh; Iran; Egypt; Korea, South


In Table 11, we calculated an overall indicator of the social conditions preventing Antisemitism. This calculation is based on the well-established research technique of the multiplication of the country factor scores with the *Eigenvalues* of each factor (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). In our case, we used the factors secularism, life satisfaction, and feminism. The results of this procedure are reported in Table 11:

**Table 11: social conditions working against Antisemitism**

Country/region	secularism	life satisfaction	feminism	Index of social conditions preventing Antisemitism
Canada	2,102	1,124	0,395	3,622
Uruguay	2,459	0,684	0,271	3,414
Spain	2,241	0,594	0,136	2,970
Korea, South	1,979	0,270	-0,082	2,168
United States	0,777	0,985	0,387	2,149
Argentina	1,115	0,432	0,315	1,862
Chile	1,180	0,500	0,132	1,812
Kyrgyzstan	1,458	0,287	0,051	1,796
Bosnia	1,638	-0,228	0,139	1,549
Albania	1,332	-0,424	0,203	1,112
Macedonia	1,322	-0,514	0,285	1,092
Moldova	0,824	-0,769	-0,003	0,052
South Africa	-0,075	-0,273	0,269	-0,079
Uganda	-0,488	-0,343	0,308	-0,523
Bangladesh	-0,933	0,113	-0,477	-1,297
Zimbabwe	-0,500	-1,439	0,395	-1,545
Iran	-1,493	0,308	-0,470	-1,655
Egypt	-2,013	-0,320	-0,121	-2,454
Iraq	-2,563	-0,571	-0,528	-3,662

In Graph 4, we compare the results of the above reported Table 11 with the results of Table 1. The Index of social conditions preventing Antisemitism has an expected and clear negative and linear correlation with the percentage of people rejecting to have Jewish neighbors, and the explained variance is above 55%:

**Graph 4: How the social conditions, defined by secularism, life satisfaction and feminism prevent Antisemitism**



x-axis: Index of social conditions preventing Antisemitism.

This result can be regarded as one of the main findings of our multivariate analysis. Secularism, life satisfaction and feminism explain 55% of Antisemitism.

**Results from the multiple regression analysis of World Values Survey data**


Graph 5 and Table 12 contain the regression analytical results of our investigation showing the importance of the variables about a fundamentalist interpretation of the relationship between religion and state and the sexist inclination to reserve higher education only for male persons.

The dependent variable in the multiple standard OLS regression is Antisemitism (rejection of a Jewish neighbor; 0 = no rejection; 1 = rejection). The independent variables in our research endeavor were:

- Not important in life: Religion
- Important child qualities: religious faith
- Satisfaction with your life
- Satisfaction with financial situation of household
- Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
- Gender (female)
- Age
- Highest educational level attained
- Reject opinion: Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office

The model could be calculated for more than 27.000 WVS respondents, all indicators (except the higher education variable) wield a very significant effect on Antisemitism, the entire equation achieves an F-Ratio of more than 500 and is thus highly significant, and the explained R<sup>2</sup> is 14.8%. Graph 5 and Table 12 shows the high weight – *ceteris paribus* – of fundamentalism and sexism in explaining Antisemitism.

Graph 5: the drivers of Antisemitism (t-test)



**Table 12: explaining global Antisemitism (rejection of Jewish neighbors) according to the data of the *World Values Survey* by multiple regression (standard OLS regression)**

	<b>Regression coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard error</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>Error p.</b>
Constant	0,878	0,018	xxx	49,024	0,000
Not important in life: Religion	-0,037	0,004	-0,070	-10,014	0,000
Important child qualities: religious faith	0,123	0,007	0,126	18,434	0,000
Satisfaction with your life	-0,020	0,001	-0,112	-16,244	0,000
Satisfaction with financial situation of household	0,009	0,001	0,049	7,172	0,000
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	-0,056	0,003	-0,111	-18,920	0,000
Gender (female)	-0,019	0,006	-0,020	-3,414	0,001
Age	-0,002	0,000	-0,064	-11,112	0,000
<i>Highest educational level attained</i>	0,001	0,001	0,003	0,478	0,633
Reject opinion: Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	-0,064	0,002	-0,184	-28,090	0,000

N = 27019; adj. R<sup>2</sup> = 14.8%; F = 521,170; error p = .000

### *Discussion on other drivers of Antisemitism*

Table 13 answers the question whether or not the partial correlation relationships of Antisemitism with other variables confirm the multivariate analyses presented above. Each time, satisfaction with life & satisfaction with the financial situation of the household & gender & age was kept constant. Apart from the fact that the different phobias registered in the *World Values Survey* closely are connected with each other, including Antisemitism, it emerges that authoritarian expectations about the nature of democracy have the highest and most consistent partial correlation relationships with Antisemitism. To say that it is essential in a democracy that religious authorities interpret the laws, and that in a democracy, criminals should be severely punished correlates significantly with Antisemitism. Table 13 thus shows the most important partial correlation relationships between *WVS* variables, important for the study of prejudice, and Antisemitism.

Our Table also answers many detailed aspects of the intricate relationship between religion and Antisemitism. For example, the relationship between the belief in G'd variable and Antisemitism is close to zero, while the partial correlation between the belief in re-incarnation and Antisemitism is clearly significant. Interestingly enough, a preference for state ownership of the means of production is significantly and positively related to Antisemitism.

Our readers can interpret the other results of Table 13 for their own scholarly agenda, in view of the great number of reported research results which should serve as a first selection for future fruitful empirical investigations on the subject.

**Table 13: partial correlations with Antisemitism. Constant: Satisfaction with your life & Satisfaction with financial situation of household & Sex & Age**

	<b>partial correlation with Antisemitism</b>	<b>error probability</b>	<b>degrees of freedom</b>
<i>Believe in: devil</i>	-0,002	0,770	20165
Believe in: God	0,077	0,000	44716
Believe in: heaven	0,109	0,000	42449
Believe in: hell	0,135	0,000	41910
Believe in: life after death	0,096	0,000	41529
Believe in: people have a soul	0,068	0,000	43241
Believe in: re-incarnation	0,192	0,000	10209
Believe in: sin	0,020	0,005	20774
Competition good or harmful	-0,026	0,000	45631
Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	0,069	0,000	5895
Democracy: Criminals are severely punished	0,252	0,000	6013
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	0,156	0,000	5984
Democracy: People can change the laws in referendums.	-0,040	0,002	5938
<i>Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.</i>	-0,006	0,662	6027
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment.	0,099	0,000	5989
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.	0,261	0,000	5904
Democracy: The army takes over when government is incompetent.	0,283	0,000	5852

Democracy: The economy is prospering.	0,177	0,000	6024
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.	-0,182	0,000	6034
Hard work does not bring success	-0,113	0,000	26804
Important child qualities: determination perseverance	-0,074	0,000	53261
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	0,010	0,025	55065
Important child qualities: good manners	0,128	0,000	30780
Important child qualities: hard work	0,012	0,006	53261
Important child qualities: imagination	-0,037	0,000	53261
Important child qualities: independence	-0,020	0,000	55065
Important child qualities: obedience	0,118	0,000	55065
Important child qualities: religious faith	0,242	0,000	55065
<i>Important child qualities: thrift saving money and things</i>	-0,005	0,205	55065
<i>Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people</i>	0,008	0,067	55065
Important child qualities: unselfishness	-0,035	0,000	53261
no confidence: Armed Forces	-0,093	0,000	54128
no confidence: Churches	-0,105	0,000	54528
no confidence: Education System	-0,132	0,000	13243
no confidence: Justice System/Courts	-0,098	0,000	27377
no confidence: Labour Unions	-0,063	0,000	46972
<i>no confidence: Major Companies</i>	0,008	0,069	47362
no confidence: NATO	0,026	0,000	24811

no confidence: Parliament	-0,085	0,000	48756
no confidence: Social Security System	-0,083	0,000	12998
no confidence: Television	-0,091	0,000	47832
no confidence: The Civil Services	-0,070	0,000	48390
no confidence: The Environmental Protection Movement	0,022	0,000	33672
<i>no confidence: The European Union</i>	<i>0,016</i>	<i>0,058</i>	<i>13431</i>
no confidence: The Government	-0,045	0,000	49909
no confidence: The Police	-0,097	0,000	50048
no confidence: The Political Parties	-0,050	0,000	45929
no confidence: The Press	-0,062	0,000	49453
no confidence: The United Nations	0,206	0,000	36833
no confidence: The Women's Movement	-0,012	0,034	33272
Private vs state ownership of business	0,122	0,000	52366
reject neighbors: Drug addicts	0,141	0,000	50662
reject neighbors: Emotionally unstable people	0,203	0,000	47005
reject neighbors: Heavy drinkers	0,181	0,000	50662
reject neighbors: Homosexuals	0,275	0,000	50660
reject neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0,457	0,000	50660
reject neighbors: Muslims	0,464	0,000	31731
reject neighbors: People of a different race	0,390	0,000	50661
reject neighbors: People who have AIDS	0,330	0,000	50661
reject neighbors: People with a criminal record	0,225	0,000	51900

## *Religion and Antisemitism – the cross-national evidence from the ADL data*

To wind up our research results, we also report a multiple regression about the explanation of the ADL-100 nation level Antisemitism rates by cross-national economic and social background variables.

So, in Table 14, we ask ourselves whether standard variables of international development accounting, gathered by the World Bank (2017) and the UNPD (2017), as well as Alesina's societal trust variable (Alesina & Guiliano, 2013, 205; Alesina & Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 2015) and Barro's religious adherence data (2003) sufficiently well explain the global ADL, 2014 Antisemitism rates. We expect that first there is an increase of Antisemitism with rising per capita incomes, levelling off at higher income levels. Mean years of education will be an important impediment against Antisemitism, and a climate of societal trust will diminish Antisemitism. Unfortunately, it is evident that with all these other factors being constant, adherence to Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam all are still to be considered as significant drivers of the rate of societal Antisemitism, all reflecting the centuries of Antisemitism in the concrete, but different history of the religious institutions in these cultures.

**Table 14: The drivers of global Antisemitism (ADL, 2014)**

	<b>Regression coefficient B</b>	<b>Standard error</b>	<b>Standardized regression coefficient Beta</b>	<b>T =</b>	<b>Error p</b>
Constant	9,131	9,674		0,944	<b>0,348</b>
Mean Years of Schooling 2013 (UNDP HDR 2014)	-1,958	1,033	<b>-0,219</b>	-1,896	<b>0,062</b>
income 2013 (EU =100) (World Bank, 2017)	18,054	6,099	<b>1,023</b>	2,960	<b>0,004</b>
income 2013 (EU =100) ^2 (World Bank, 2017)	-1,985	0,915	<b>-0,708</b>	-2,170	<b>0,033</b>
% Roman Catholics per 2000 (Barro, 2003)	10,772	5,314	<b>0,173</b>	2,027	<b>0,046</b>
% Orthodox per 2000 (Barro, 2003)	35,687	8,588	<b>0,318</b>	4,155	<b>0,000</b>
% Muslims per 2000 (Barro, 2003)	54,565	5,635	<b>0,825</b>	9,684	<b>0,000</b>
Gallup poll about trust in other people (UNDP, 2014)	-0,322	0,137	<b>-0,176</b>	-2,344	<b>0,022</b>

Adj. R<sup>2</sup> = 69%; n = 87 countries; F = 28. 363; error p = . 000

Data from the ADL (2014); World Bank, UNDP, Robert Barro (Harvard)

The factor trust, highlighted by Alesina, is an important stabilizing factor for an open society. In our analysis, this also holds true for the determination of the absence of large-scale Antisemitism by the factor trust. The percentage of Roman Catholicism per total population, and the percentages of Christian Orthodox believers and the percentages of Muslims are all significant drivers of Antisemitism. There is a so-called Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1976) of Antisemitism, suggesting that antisemitism coincides with the modernization crisis experienced by semi-industrial societies at middle stages of development.

### *Conclusions and prospects*

Even in the ideologically charged atmosphere of debates on “*multiculturalism*” in most Western countries, with right-wing and xenophobic political parties and social movements challenging the multicultural intellectual consensus of the 1990s and the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, we should dare to ask the question already raised by Wistrich, 2007 about the future of multiculturalism in the light of the evidence, emerging from Map 1 and other Tables, Maps and Graphs of this article. These materials dramatically highlight the prevalence of Antisemitism in many parts of the Muslim world (Kressel, 2012), and not only there. Look at the Antisemitism data for the Catholic faithful in Slovakia; Bosnia; Spain; and Albania in Table 15 below, you realize how European Catholic Church leaders and European Catholic communities at large failed to implement the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. In the entire future global parallelogram of ideological and political forces of our globe, Roman Catholicism indeed will also still play an important role, the trends towards Secularism notwithstanding. Is the world of Roman Catholicism nowadays really so immune from Antisemitism, as the Second Vatican Council hopefully suggested? The Vatican Council’s “*Nostra aetate*”<sup>10</sup> declaration famously stressed what it calls

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<sup>10</sup> [http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist\\_councils/ii\\_vatican\\_council/documents/vat-ii\\_decl\\_19651028\\_nostra-aetate\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html).

*the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham's stock: Since the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred synod wants to foster and recommend that mutual understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, of biblical and theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues. Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone.*

Our data lamentably clearly show, that Vatican II did not as yet become a reality in many Catholic countries more than five decades after the Second Vatican Council. What has become true for the Catholicism of Canada and the United States five decades after Vatican II, did not necessarily happen to the ten most antisemitic Catholic communities of devout Catholics, attending each Sunday the Catholic Church service in, say, South Korea; South Africa; Slovakia; Nigeria; Bosnia; Venezuela; Spain; Albania; Uganda; and Mexico (see Table 15, below). And what was the evidence from other global denominations? Is, say, Hindu or Buddhist religiosity connected with a higher or lower rate of Antisemitism, irrespective of other possibly intervening variables?

This paper attempted a multivariate analysis of global Antisemitism, based on measuring Antisemitism by the rejection of Jewish neighbors from the *World Values Survey* data. In the 28 countries under comparison here, we found that the highest rates of Antisemitism prevail in Iraq, Iran, Egypt and India, where more than half of the entire resident population rejected to have a Jewish neighbor, while in Canada, Argentina, Belarus, Uruguay and the United States, this percentage was below 10%. While it would be premature to interpret our results only along global denominational or world political conflict lines, there is indeed a clear South-North and West-East divide of Antisemitism. We clearly show that there is a U-shaped relationship between political orientation and Antisemitism, with Antisemitism lowest among self-declared adherents of the global moderate left and highest among adherents of both the extreme left and the extreme right. We provide

data about the religious background of Antisemitism and found that – like with other phobias and prejudices - Antisemitism was highest among *World Values Survey* respondents with a Muslim or Oriental Christian background or a Buddhist or Hindu background. There is a slight U-shaped relationship between the strength of religious beliefs across countries viz. denominations and Antisemitism, with both strong believers and people giving no importance to religion displaying a higher rate of Antisemitism than those people who attach not very a big importance to religion in their personal lives.

Our multivariate analyses based on promax factor analysis and multiple regression analysis found in addition that secularism, life satisfaction, and feminism all wield a negative, Antisemitism reducing effect on the extent of Antisemitism. But the deficiencies of higher education in many so-called “Third World countries” and educational gaps between the generations enhance Antisemitism.<sup>11</sup> Secularism, combined with a healthy separation of religion and state; and feminism are the most robust blocks against the resurgence of Antisemitism, world-wide. The factor “life satisfaction”, combining life satisfaction proper with satisfaction about the financial position of the household, wields only a

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<sup>11</sup> We draw our readers’ attention to the fact that the positive effects of mean years of overall education on the reduction of societal Antisemitism are considerable, see Table 14, based on country-wide ADL data and data from international standard sources. Although this theme is beyond the scope of this essay, it suffices to say here that the analysis of the curricula and the library holdings on issues of Judaism, the *Shoah et cetera* in many centers of higher learning in the Muslim world are still deficient, to say the least. In its 2014 study, the ADL ran extra questions regarding awareness about the *Shoah*. Only 33 percent of the global population today are aware of the Shoah and believe it has been accurately described by history. In Oceania, it is 82 percent, in Western Europe, it is 77 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 57 percent, in the Americas, this percentage is 55 percent, in Asia it is 23 percent, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 12 percent, in Oceania it is 82 percent. Notably, in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), it is only 8 percent. Global, regional, and national Union catalogues of the academic libraries around the world inform us about the quality or dearth of academic library holdings on issues of Judaism, the *Shoah et cetera* corresponds roughly to the geographical structure, mentioned in the ADL (2014) study. The more that future global opinion leaders are educated in a spirit of tolerance, Enlightenment and Jewish culture and history, the more the world will be able to eradicate Antisemitism.

smaller influence on the extent of Antisemitism, showing that Antisemitism is both a phenomenon of the rich and the poor.

Our combined new measurement scales for

- secularism
- life satisfaction
- highly educated younger generations
- feminism

showed again the North/South and West/East divide of Antisemitism, with the highest concentration of the drivers of Antisemitism to be found in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and West Asia. The regression analytical results of our investigation based on *World Values Survey* data yet again show the connection between a fundamentalist interpretation of the relationship between religion and state, and the sexist inclination to reserve higher education only for male persons on the one hand and Antisemitism on the other hand. This finding echoes the evidence, based on factor analysis.

Also, partial correlation relationships of Antisemitism confirm the multivariate analyses already presented. Authoritarian expectations about the nature of democracy have the highest and most consistent partial correlation relationships with Antisemitism. To say that it is essential that in a democracy, religious authorities interpret the laws, and that in a democracy, criminals should be severely punished, correlates significantly with Antisemitism, independent from other important factors such as age, education, and position in society. *Sharia* courts, amputating thieves and having adulterers whipped, and supreme religious councils, passing or rejecting laws promulgated by the elected parliament would be instances what could be understood by a democracy severely punishing criminals and by religious authorities interpreting the laws.

We also reported a multiple regression about the explanation of the ADL-100 nation level Antisemitism rates by cross-national economic and social background variables. Unfortunately, it is evident that the

adherence to Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam all are still to be considered as significant drivers of the rate of societal Antisemitism.

To debunk the codes of religious Antisemitism in Christianity, it took the intellectual capital, braveness and iron will of people like Jules Isaac and James Parkes (Isaac, 1960; Parkes, 1974). Our investigation shows that religion, sexism and fundamentalism still can be strong driving forces of Antisemitism in the world today. With mass migration from regions, which precisely are high-risk zones for the rise of Antisemitism, we cannot escape, with Wistrich (2007), also debate about multiculturalism at the end of this essay. Multiculturalism, in the words of Bernstein (1994):

*“condemns Western culture as racist, sexist, and imperialist, ... while elevating the virtues of non-Western, non-patriarchal, and minority cultures as underrepresented and underappreciated.”*

and

*“If you want real multiculturalism, get on an airplane and go someplace else — out there in that great region of the world called Abroad, where practices like female circumcision abound, along with amputation of the hands of thieves, head-to-foot veils for women, and death sentences for those who write supposedly “blasphemous” books. That place called Abroad, by the way, is not the place where tolerance for homosexuality was invented, or equal rights for women, or where the phrase about all men being born equal and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights was struck.”*

In our concluding Table 15 we summarize our rather bleak final results of our *World Values Survey* based investigation. In that Table, we highlight the available evidence and data for the active segment of global Catholicism, i.e. those Catholics who attend, as prescribed by their faith (John Paul II, 1994), each Sunday the Roman Catholic Church service, compared with data for numerically major other religious denominations. This statistical exercise might be painful for Roman Catholic audiences, but the stark statistical facts for parts of global Catholicism today just are that:

**Table 15: The performance of different denominations in overcoming Antisemitism – a global comparison, based on *World Values Survey* data**

Rank in overcoming Antisemitism	Sample	Country/region	Antisemitism (average rejection of Jewish neighbors, scale 0-1)	N	percentile performance
1	Protestants	Uruguay	0,000	30	1,14
2	Protestants	Canada	0,020	336	2,27
3	Protestants	Argentina	0,020	44	3,41
4	countrywide	Canada	0,040	1931	4,55
5	countrywide	Argentina	0,060	3361	5,68
6	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Argentina	0,060	607	6,82
7	<i>Dominicantes</i>	United States	0,060	145	7,95
8	Orthodox	Belarus	0,060	1145	9,09
9	countrywide	Belarus	0,070	2092	10,23
10	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Canada	0,070	219	11,36
11	Protestants	United States	0,070	313	12,50
12	countrywide	Uruguay	0,080	2000	13,64
13	<i>Dominicantes</i>	India	0,080	38	14,77

14	Muslims	Russia	0,080	104	15,91
15	countrywide	United States	0,090	1200	17,05
16	Orthodox	Kyrgyzstan	0,100	78	18,18
17	countrywide	Russia	0,110	4001	19,32
18	Orthodox	Russia	0,110	1525	20,45
19	Protestants	Albania	0,110	180	21,59
20	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Belarus	0,120	49	22,73
21	countrywide	Chile	0,130	3700	23,86
22	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Chile	0,130	666	25,00
23	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Uruguay	0,130	128	26,14
24	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Czech Republic	0,140	51	27,27
25	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Zimbabwe	0,160	131	28,41
26	countrywide	Albania	0,170	1000	29,55
27	Muslims	South Africa	0,170	84	30,68
28	countrywide	Czech Republic	0,180	924	31,82
29	Protestants	Uganda	0,180	443	32,95
30	countrywide	Zimbabwe	0,190	1002	34,09
31	Muslims	Bangladesh	0,190	1378	35,23
32	Orthodox	Macedonia	0,190	627	36,36
33	Orthodox	Chile	0,190	139	37,50
34	Orthodox	Mexico	0,190	37	38,64
35	Protestants	Venezuela	0,190	75	39,77
36	countrywide	Bangladesh	0,200	1500	40,91

37	countrywide	Macedonia	0,200	1055	42,05
38	countrywide	Kyrgyzstan	0,200	1043	43,18
39	Muslims	Macedonia	0,200	266	44,32
40	Protestants	Czech Republic	0,200	51	45,45
41	Protestants	Zimbabwe	0,210	273	46,59
42	countrywide	Spain	0,220	2719	47,73
43	countrywide	Uganda	0,220	1002	48,86
44	Hindus	South Africa	0,220	54	50,00
45	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Mexico	0,230	1369	51,14
46	Muslims	Kyrgyzstan	0,230	775	52,27
47	countrywide	South Africa	0,240	3000	53,41
48	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Uganda	0,240	283	54,55
49	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Albania	0,240	119	55,68
50	Protestants	South Africa	0,240	1048	56,82
51	Buddhists	Japan	0,250	272	57,95
52	countrywide	Moldova	0,250	1008	59,09
53	Orthodox	Moldova	0,250	878	60,23
54	Protestants	Chile	0,250	62	61,36
55	countrywide	Mexico	0,260	3895	62,50
56	countrywide	Venezuela	0,260	1200	63,64
57	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Spain	0,270	671	64,77
58	Protestants	Nigeria	0,270	211	65,91
59	countrywide	Bosnia	0,280	1200	67,05

60	countrywide	Japan	0,280	1011	68,18
61	Muslims	Bosnia	0,280	485	69,32
62	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Venezuela	0,300	321	70,45
63	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Bosnia	0,300	84	71,59
64	Protestants	Mexico	0,310	158	72,73
65	Protestants	Slovakia	0,330	40	73,86
66	countrywide	Slovakia	0,340	466	75,00
67	countrywide	Nigeria	0,350	1001	76,14
68	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Nigeria	0,350	193	77,27
69	Muslims	Uganda	0,350	169	78,41
70	Protestants	South Korea	0,350	284	79,55
71	Hindus	Bangladesh	0,360	107	80,68
72	Orthodox	Bosnia	0,360	248	81,82
73	<i>Dominicantes</i>	Slovakia	0,370	147	82,95
74	<i>Dominicantes</i>	South Africa	0,380	210	84,09
75	<i>Dominicantes</i>	South Korea	0,400	89	85,23
76	countrywide	South Korea	0,410	1200	86,36
77	Muslims	Nigeria	0,410	248	87,50
78	Orthodox	Nigeria	0,430	176	88,64
79	Buddhists	South Korea	0,440	250	89,77
80	countrywide	India	0,530	2500	90,91
81	Hindus	India	0,530	2206	92,05
82	countrywide	Egypt	0,620	3000	93,18

83	Muslims	Egypt	0,620	2830	94,32
84	Muslims	India	0,640	138	95,45
85	countrywide	Iran	0,750	2657	96,59
86	Muslims	Iran	0,750	2614	97,73
87	countrywide	Iraq	0,900	4924	98,86
88	Muslims	Iraq	0,900	4874	100,00

But our Table above does not only hold implications for immigration policy and social integration policy decision makers in the context of multiculturalism. To underestimate the gaps in tolerance, characterizing the world today, also has implications for religious leaders and also the global research community. As Wistrich showed in his prophetic analysis, written in 2007, we must become finally able to address the tolerance deficits in many countries on earth, which became the countries of origin of the recent huge movements of migration to the rich, Western, democracies. To negate this real threat for the future of a climate of tolerance and liberal democracy in the West is simply out of touch with reality and is contradicted by solid global evidence about global values, to which this essay attempted to make a modest contribution. Rather than expecting rising global existential security, which will be diminishing prejudice (Inglehart, 2018) in the migration sending and recipient countries, we now can expect rising prejudice in the framework of shrinking existential security and rising inequality on a global scale. This is the stark world of 2018, and it is time that social policy and also the social sciences take account of this reality.

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**Appendix Table 1 Left-right spectrum and the mean rejection rates of different types of neighbors in the world system according to the *World Values Survey***

Self-positioning on the political scale		People of a different race	Immigrants/foreign workers	Homosexuals	Jews	People of a different religion	Muslims	Gypsies
Left	Mean	0,19	0,22	0,54	0,24	0,21	0,20	0,33
	N	13157	13037	13034	2432	8052	3481	511
	Standard deviation	0,396	0,416	0,498	0,425	0,404	0,399	0,472
2	Mean	0,16	0,19	0,49	0,21	0,17	0,19	0,41
	N	7900	7880	7723	1470	4967	2188	447
	Standard deviation	0,364	0,395	0,5	0,406	0,375	0,392	0,492
3	Mean	0,13	0,16	0,42	0,18	0,14	0,16	0,40
	N	15857	15878	15299	2658	9802	4388	970
	Standard deviation	0,337	0,37	0,494	0,387	0,349	0,37	0,49
4	Mean	0,13	0,17	0,43	0,20	0,15	0,18	0,43

	N	17417	17406	16620	2881	10766	4598	970
	Standard deviation	0,336	0,378	0,495	0,399	0,357	0,381	0,496
5	Mean	0,15	0,19	0,48	0,18	0,17	0,19	0,39
	N	65981	64777	63508	11374	40303	15794	2602
	Standard deviation	0,358	0,394	0,499	0,388	0,378	0,396	0,488
6	Mean	0,16	0,20	0,47	0,19	0,18	0,19	0,43
	N	30976	30453	29588	4550	19347	7095	1105
	Standard deviation	0,367	0,404	0,499	0,393	0,387	0,394	0,495
7	Mean	0,17	0,21	0,47	0,21	0,19	0,21	0,48
	N	21875	21697	20846	2997	14173	4919	772
	Standard deviation	0,379	0,406	0,499	0,407	0,394	0,407	0,500
8	Mean	0,19	0,23	0,51	0,23	0,21	0,23	0,52
	N	21457	21056	20447	2893	13867	4643	729
	Standard deviation	0,390	0,419	0,500	0,420	0,404	0,423	0,500
9	Mean	0,21	0,24	0,54	0,22	0,23	0,24	0,51
	N	10600	10204	10149	1361	6907	2216	294
	Standard deviation	0,409	0,429	0,499	0,411	0,421	0,427	0,501

Right	Mean	0,24	0,27	0,55	0,25	0,27	0,23	0,46
	N	22077	21068	21280	2997	13198	5053	387
	Standard deviation	0,430	0,441	0,497	0,431	0,444	0,420	0,499
Total	Mean	0,17	0,21	0,49	0,20	0,19	0,20	0,42
	N	227296	223457	218492	35611	141381	54374	8785

**Appendix Table 2: Margins of Error at 95% Confidence Level**

<b>Sample size</b>	<b>error margins (+-) for the resulting percentages</b>				
<b>N</b>	<b>10% or 90%</b>	<b>20% or 80%</b>	<b>30% or 70%</b>	<b>40% or 60%</b>	<b>50%</b>
20	13,1%	17,5%	20,1%	21,5%	21,9%
30	10,7%	14,3%	16,4%	17,5%	17,9%
40	9,3%	12,4%	14,2%	15,2%	15,5%
50	8,3%	11,1%	12,7%	13,6%	13,9%
75	6,8%	9,1%	10,4%	11,1%	11,3%
100	5,9%	7,8%	9,0%	9,6%	9,8%
250	3,7%	5,0%	5,7%	6,1%	6,2%
500	2,6%	3,5%	4,0%	4,3%	4,4%
1.000	1,9%	2,5%	2,8%	3,0%	3,1%
2.000	1,3%	1,8%	2,0%	2,1%	2,2%